EVALUATION REPORT

November 2015

Evaluation of UNICEF's Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA)

Outcome Evaluation

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EVALUATION OF UNICEF'S PEACEBUILDING, EDUCATION AND ADVOCACY PROGRAMME (PBEA)

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PREFACE

In too many parts of the world, conflict has been putting children and young people at risk and, all too often, taking their lives. Around the globe, conflict has swept people from their homes, spread hunger and disease and destroyed the facilities and infrastructure needed to support lives and livelihoods. Conflict has in many places wiped away the gains made through decades of development effort and blocked the path towards future progress and prosperity. Under these circumstances, it is vital to learn what steps can be taken to promote peace, resilience and human security.

The present report documents an important and innovative effort to harness education in support of peacebuilding. Over the past four years, UNICEF has been implementing the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA), supported by funding from the Government of the Netherlands. PBEA was a four-year programme (2012-2015) aimed at strengthening resilience, social cohesion and human security in 14 countries recovering from conflict or at risk of falling into conflict. The chosen approach was to strengthen education policies and practices with a view to building peace. Indeed, PBEA provided an opportunity to test whether a social service such as education can be successfully harnessed to promote peace.

Given such a novel strategy and challenging agenda, it was recognised that evaluation could help to document the various interventions and results achieved under the programme and learn valuable lessons for the future. PBEA has benefitted from a number of evaluation activities. An evaluability assessment was conducted in 2013; a developmental evaluation was initiated to accompany PBEA implementation in Ethiopia and Myanmar; and finally a summative evaluation was undertaken to assess outcomes. The outcome evaluation is the subject of this report. The objectives of the evaluation were to examine PBEA's approach and to assess the programme's contribution to the intended outcomes of social cohesion and resilience, as well as sector outcomes concerning access to education and quality of education. A robust methodology was articulated, with data collection being executed in two phases.

In the first phase, a 'rapid outcome harvesting' exercise was executed in all 14 countries implementing PBEA (Burundi, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, State of Palestine, Uganda, and Yemen). The 'outcome harvesting' approach was expanded to take the form of 'result harvesting' to capture all levels of results - outputs, intermediate outcomes and fully achieved outcomes. The second phase focused on results validation involving a range of stakeholders, and included a number of country visits.

The evaluation concluded that PBEA achieved substantial results. It successfully demonstrated that the approach of using a social service such as education to deliver peacebuilding results could be effective. A responsive, context-sensitive approach to programming, informed by systematic conflict analysis, was found to be the right strategy.

The evaluation presents UNICEF with a number of significant lessons and challenges. For instance, it challenges UNICEF to articulate a clearer vision for its work in peacebuilding and to integrate this vision into strategies at corporate and country levels. This would require institutionalising conflict perspectives within programme development by using the results of conflict analysis in the adaptation and design of programmes and policies. UNICEF faces further challenges in sourcing the right capacities for peacebuilding work and managing risks associated with peacebuilding programmes. Finally, UNICEF needs to promote and monitor strict adherence to "do no harm" principles in conflict-affected locations.

UNICEF has the opportunity to capitalise on the experience gained through the PBEA programme. A coherent knowledge management strategy could consolidate lessons and experience from two areas: first, the mainstreaming of peacebuilding into education programmes; and, second, using education to deliver peacebuilding results in fragile contexts. Based on these lesson, resources could be developed to inform education sector planning processes at country level.

UNICEF also has a responsibility to consolidate its achievements under PBEA. This is especially important in countries implementing PBEA which face active conflict or humanitarian crises. The evaluation recommends mobilization of resources to sustain critical peacebuilding activities and afford UNICEF country offices the support necessary to incorporate PBEA approaches into their next regular programming cycle.

The evaluation was ably conducted by Avenir Analytics. On behalf of the Evaluation Office, I would like to thank Brian Majewski for his leadership of the evaluation, and the Avenir evaluation team consisting of Anna Seeger, Covadonga Canteli, Katherine George, Kerstin Tebbe, Nick Petten, and Zehra Rizvi. We are also grateful to colleagues from the Peacebuilding Support Office, Search for Common Ground and the many development partners and education sector specialists who were generous with their time.

I would also like to express our gratitude to everyone who participated in the evaluation. The PBEA management team in New York provided support, encouragement and inputs while ensuring that the evaluation team had access to all facets of the programme. I therefore warmly thank the team, consisting of Friedrich Affolter, Bosun Jang, Anna Azaryeva, Andrew Dunbrack, and Brenda Haiplik. The evaluation also received inputs from the PBEA Technical Working Group based in New York: John Lewis, Sharif Baaser, Mendy Marsh, Saji Thomas, Juliet Young, Kerida McDonald, and Emilie Rees Smith. PBEA teams and UNICEF leadership in all 14 implementing country offices invested a substantial amount of time in the outcome harvesting exercise, in validating their inputs alongside government and implementing partners, and in providing support during field visits. We greatly appreciate their inputs and cooperation.

This evaluation was very demanding both conceptually and in practice and I would accordingly like to thank my colleagues in the Evaluation Office for their work: Kathleen Letshabo developed and managed the evaluation throughout, bringing her own expertise in education to bear; Tina Tordjman-Nebe also provided technical support in the early stages of the evaluation and reviewed the draft reports, while Celeste Lebowitz and Dalma Rivero provided strong administrative support throughout.

Finally, in reading this report, we must keep in mind the children and young people who are affected by violence and conflict. Their futures, and ours, depend on finding a way forward towards peace and a world free of conflict.

Colin M. Kirk
Director
Evaluation Office
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABE	Alternative Basic Education
ABEC	Alternative Basic Education Center
ACCRA	Association de Coopération Rurale en Afrique et en Amérique Latine
ACTS	Action for Community Transformation and Sponsorship
ADAP	Adolescent Development and Participation
ADC	Africa Development Corps
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AES	Alternative Education Systems
AET	Africa Educational Trust
AKU-IED	Aga Khan University - Institute of Education and Development
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ALP	Alternative Learning Programme
AQAP	Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Penninsula
AR	Annual Report
ARRA	Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs
AVSI	Association of Volunteers in International Service
BBSA	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association
BEGE	Basic Education and Gender Equality programme, UNICEF
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BRMS	Basic Requirements and Minimum Standards
C4D	Communications for Development
CA	Conflict Analysis
CAR	Central African Republic
C/DRR	Conflict and Disaster Risk Reduction
CDRM	Conflict and Disaster Risk Management
CEC	Community Education Committee
CESR	Comprehensive Education Sector Reform process
CFS	Child Friendly Spaces or Child Friendly Schools
CNHPR	Committee for National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation, South Sudan
CO(s)	Country Office(s)
CORD	Christian Outreach Relief and Development
CP	Child Protection
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPC	Community Peace Committees
CPD	Country Programme Document
CPMP	Country Programme Management Plan
CPVE	Community Volunteer Peer Educators
CRSS	Center for Research & Security Studies
CSE	Conflict sensitive education
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSZ	Central South Zone, Somalia
CTC	Child to Child Club
DE	Developmental evaluation
DED	Deputy Executive Director
DEO	District Education Office
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DIP	Development Initiative Programme
DOC	Department of Communications
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DRRFSS	Disaster Risk Reduction and Food Security Sector
DRS	Developing Regional States, Ethiopia
E4PB	Education for Peacebuilding
EAPRO	East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECRC	Early Childhood Resource Center
ED	Executive Director
EDSP	Education Strategic Development Plan

EEPCT	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition
EFY	Ethiopian Fiscal Year
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ELDS	Early Learning Development Standards
EMIS	Education Management and Information System
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
EO	Evaluation Office
EPSINC	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, and the Beginning of a New Citizenship
ERP	Economic Recovery Plan
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
ESDP	Education Sector Development Plan
ESP	Education Sector Plan
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Plan
EVD	Ebola virus disease
FACE	Funding Authorisation and Certificate of Expenditures
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBO	Faith-based Organisation
FED	Food and Enterprise Development programme, USAID
FENU	Forum of Education NGOs in Uganda
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GBV	Gender-based Violence
GBS	Go-to-School, Back-to-School, Stay-in-School Campaign
GCPEA	Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack
GEM	Girls' Education Movement
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GoL	Government of Liberia
GoM	Government of Myanmar
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
GRACE	Gender, Rights and Civic Engagement, UNICEF
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan, Ethiopia
GRF	Global Results Framework
HATIS	Humanitarian Action and Transition
HHI	Harvard Humanitarian Initiative
HQ	Headquarters
IP	Implementing Partner
I4S	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy, Democratic Republic of Congo
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICTJ	International Center for Transitional Justice
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGA	Income generating activities
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JNV	Junior National Volunteer
JPI	Just Peace Initiative
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude and Practice
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
KPJA	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Academy
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LS+PE	Life Skills and Peacebuilding Education
LSaZP	Learning Spaces and Zones of Peace
MCs	Musalahati Committees
MDD	Music, dance and drama
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIA-PBO	Ministry of Internal Affairs—Peacebuilding Office, Liberia
MIED	Mountain Institute for Educational Development
MMS	Mashal Model School

MoCYS	Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, South Sudan
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MoEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MoESTS	Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Sports, Uganda
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development Uganda
MONUSCO	United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOVs	Means of Verification
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports, Liberia
MRE	Mine Risk Education
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechansim
NDDR	National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
NDP	National Development Plan
NEL	National Education Law
NESP	National Education Sector Plan
NEZ	North East Zone, Somaliland
NFE	Nonformal Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSA	Non-State Actors
NV	National Volunteer
NWZ	North West Zone, Puntland
NYSP	National Youth Service Programme, Liberia
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development / Development Assistance Committee
OM	Operational Matrix
OPM-PCPPB	Office of the Prime Minister Platform for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, Uganda
PARMO	Public Sector Alliances and Resource Mobilization Office, UNICEF
PASP	Policy, Advocacy and Social Protection section
PBEA	Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCA	Programme Cooperation Agreement
PCP	Peace Consolidation Plan
PEAD	Peace Education and Development Foundation
PEAR+	Programme of Expanded Access to Returnees, Democratic Republic of Congo
PD	Programme Division
PFF	Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum
PILER	Pakistan Institute for Labour Research
PITE	Provincial Institute of Teacher Education
PMT	Programme Management Team
PoC	Protection of Civilians
PPIU	Policy Planning and Implementation Unit
PPP	Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PRDP	Peace Recovery and Development Plan
PRS	Peacebuilding and Recovery Support unit, UNICEF
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTE	Primary Teacher's Education curriculum
QBEP	Quality Basic Education Programme
RALS	Rapid Assessment of Learning Spaces
RCT	Randomised control trial
REB	Regional Education Bureau
RESEN	Rapport d'état du système éducatif national
RO	Regional Office(s)
ROSA	Regional Office for South Asia
RSU	Reform Support Unit
RTP	Right to Play
SAHE	Society for Advancement of Education
SCR	Social Cohesion and Resilience Programme, Pakistan

SCYMI	Sudan Christian Youth Ministry—International
SECADEV	Secours Catholique au Développement
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SFH	Sport for Hope
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SIGE	Système d'information sur la gestion de l'éducation
SitAn	Situational Analysis
SLO	Standard Learning Objectives
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SPAG	Strategic Planning Advisory Group
SPO	Strengthening Participatory Organisation
SRGBV	School Related Gender Based Violence
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
SRSP	Sarhad Rural Support Programme
SSPRC	South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission
STAREC	Stabilisation and Reconstruction of Former Armed Conflict Areas
STF	Straight Talk Foundation
SUDHAAR	Sudhaar Society
SUPRAID	Sudan Protection Aid
SZoP	Schools as Zones of Peace
T4D	Technology for Development
TCC	Teacher Code of Conduct
TLS	Temporary Learning Spaces
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN ISF	United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework, Somalia
UNMISS	United Nations South Sudan Mission
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VACiS	Violence Against Children in Schools
VAC RTRR	Violence Against Children Reporting, Tracking, Response and Referral Guidelines
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WCARO	West and Central Africa Regional Office
WCC	War Child Canada
WEO	World Economic Outlook
WFP	World Food Programme
YDD	Youth Development Department
YEP	Youth Education Programme
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

More than 1.5 billion people live in fragile contexts, some of which are experiencing on-going conflict,[1] with children being disproportionately affected. In 2011, 20 million out-of-school adolescents were living in countries affected by conflict, 11 million of which are female[2]. And while the number of out-of school children is estimated to have dropped by 42 percent between 2000 and 2012[3], the problem of out-of-school children is becoming increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries[4]. As such, there is a pressing need in the development and humanitarian community to find effective solutions that address the root causes of conflict.

UNICEF's Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy (PBEA) is a programme that was developed to test and/or implement innovative education solutions to achieve peacebuilding results. Funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN) for a total of USD 150 million over a period of four and a half years (2012-2016), the vision of the PBEA was to "strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts" while its *strategic result* was to "strengthen policies and practices in education for peacebuilding". PBEA implementation targeted five outcomes areas:

1. The inclusion of education into peacebuilding policies, and vice versa;
2. Increasing institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive and peace education;
3. Increasing capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty bearers to cope, reduce, and prevent conflict and promote peace;
4. Increasing access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace; and,
5. Generating evidence and knowledge on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding, and evidence upon which programming practice can be based.

The extent to which social services (i.e. education) can be used for peacebuilding is an under-defined area of work that has not previously been tested at scale in UNICEF. Hence PBEA represented an unprecedented effort for UNICEF to go beyond conventional development and humanitarian approaches to try out solutions that interrupt cycles of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict. PBEA opened up the space for learning about peacebuilding processes, and required UNICEF staff to overcome conceptual and practical challenges.

THE EVALUATION AIMS AND APPROACH

PBEA has benefitted from two other evaluative activities – an evaluability assessment in 2013, and a developmental evaluation underway in two PBEA sites (Myanmar and Ethiopia). This report presents the results of an outcome evaluation, the guiding question of which was:

"To what extent has UNICEF achieved PBEA programme outcomes and made identifiable contributions to peacebuilding, social cohesion and/or resilience at the individual, community, institutional and/or systems levels?"

* French and Spanish Executive Summaries available at: http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_PBEA-2015.html

1 World Bank Institute, *Fragile and conflict-affected situations*, https://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/fragile_situations_insert_fy12.pdf , accessed 19 July 2015

2 UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report: Policy Paper 10*, July 2013.

3 *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children.* UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF (2015). Montreal: UIS. http://dx.doi.org/10.15220/978-92-9189-161-0-en

4 UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2015*, 2011, pg. 8.

The evaluation began with a document review of all 14 PBEA implementing country offices[5] and PBEA activities conducted by the Education Section and collaborating units at Headquarters and Regional Offices (RO).

Working with UNICEF country staff and implementing partners through a "outcome harvesting" exercise, the evaluation identified changes that have occurred as a result of PBEA inputs, and articulated them as 'results statements'. An iterative process was used to engage programme management and implementing partners to refine and validate the result statements.

The third stage of data collection comprised field visits to three PBEA implementing country offices (Burundi[6], Pakistan and South Sudan), key informant interviews were conducted with UNICEF staff and partners in country offices, regional offices and the global level. In all 285 informants contributed documents and information to the evaluation.

The evaluation was conducted 15 months prior to the end of the PBEA programme when many activities were gaining momentum. An end of programme evaluation with better timing likely would have captured additional results, and possibly better effects.

ACHIEVEMENT OF PBEA RESULTS

The vision of PBEA represents ambitious goals of building peace and social cohesion. These are inter-generational aspirations. In just over three years PBEA has achieved results by developing context specific programmes, building on core UNICEF tools and relationships, that take account of conflict drivers[7] and developing programmatic solutions to contribute to the mitigation of those conflict drivers.

The evaluation found that PBEA has made commendable contributions to providing access to conflict sensitive education, as well as enhancing individual and institutional capacities to navigate and resolve conflicts peacefully, incorporating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into policies and developing evidence and learning about the role of social services in peacebuilding. Based on preliminary successes, the evidence demonstrates that UNICEF should scale up these types of interventions to build on the gains achieved.

Selected country level results

Achievements at the country level were captured in 'results statements' and classified by degree of change (outputs, intermediate outcomes, and outcomes).[8] Country programmes achieved the greatest scale, substantiveness and verifiability of results when they focused early in their programming on addressing conflict drivers within an overarching theory of change, followed by holistic programme design, attracting peacebuilding expertise into their teams, sensitising key stakeholders and building capacity of partners, before turning their attention to intervention types, and activities.

The majority of interventions focused on conflict drivers related to a culture of violence, exclusion and inequality. This reflects areas where UNICEF has a comparative advantage in using its relationships and experience to provide entry points for peacebuilding work.

Policy results

After a significant amount of groundwork to build buy-in from national governments around concepts of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, policy related results were

5 Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.

6 Due to security restrictions the Burundi visit was adapted to consist of three days of workshops with CO staff and partners held in Nairobi, Kenya.

7 The term "conflict drivers" refers to the root and intermediate causes of conflict and conflict triggers depending on country context.

8 Some result statements pertain to more than one global outcome area.

achieved in 11 countries, mostly at the output level. Substantive policy related results revolve around the incorporation of conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches into national and sub-national education sector plans and policies. This has led to strengthening education systems via, for example, the Education Management and Information System (EMIS) and curriculum reform.

Few examples of integrating education into peacebuilding policies and plans were found though policy results were identified that pertained to child protection (violence against children) and gender equity. Achievement of tangible policy results depended on context specific factors, including the timing of national policy, strategy and curriculum reform processes and the capacity of government to implement new policies.

Institutional capacity results

To some extent all PBEA country programmes invested in building capacity to enable implementation, even where the outome harvesting exercise did not produce a specific result statement. The use of a participatory conflict analysis, is an example of using a "new" PBEA-specific activity to build institutional capacities as was reported in Chad, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda.

Outcome level results represented instances where the increase in institutional capacities led to actions such as new programming approaches or the rollout of systems to address violence in schools. Recruiting peacebuilding experts and training others in such skills early on was found to be important for ensuring better results.

Individual capacity results

Important outcomes were achieved using sports, play, and arts (theatre, children's radio, song, writing, dance, art). Youth camps built capacities to prevent, mitigate and manage conflicts, and to improve social cohesion. Young people entered into inter-community dialogue to resolve conflict that was often rooted in ethnic and cultural divisions and over access to resources. At the very least, these activities reduced the risk of conflict between participating communities.

Individual capacity interventions were often smaller in scale and more difficult to verify in terms of change in attitudes, knowledge, perceptions. However they were often considered significant by PBEA teams because of their ability to address a culture of violence and achieve impact with young people.

Access to conflict sensitive education

PBEA work on access to conflict sensitive education benefited strongly from the high prioritisation of equity within UNICEF education programmes. The majority of interventions aimed to improve the way that education was delivered and increase access to conflict sensitive education. Examples include: training teachers in conflict resolution skills to reduce and manage conflict in schools; livelihood and life skills to out-of-school youth and adolescents; and teaching peacebuilding approaches in school curriculums.

While school construction was a common intervention, it was often combined with other activities including supply distribution, training teachers to increase availability of quality teachers and materials development. This led to access to education by marginalised or excluded groups, such as IDPs, returnees and refugees.

Learning, evidence and advocacy

In the area of learning, evidence and knowledge generation conflict analyses were conducted in 14 countries, and over 30 country-level case studies were developed to capture learning and results. While fewer result statements were generated related to this outcome area, country offices have participated in regional and global research initiatives and some have initiated context specific studies. Programme staff also report significant gains from 'learning by doing' as well as gains from sharing lessons within and across country offices.

Selected results at the regional level

WCARO and ESARO played a key role in providing guidance and support of work related to institutional capacity building and learning, evidence and advocacy. Institutional capacity building support was delivered in training workshops, tele-conferences, and one-on-one technical 'backstopping' in reviewing conflict analyses, CA-based programme development, recruitment and partner contracting of programme staff, tailored guidance and tools and consolidated lessons and good practices.

Regional advisers also supported COs to conduct research that informed UNICEF policy and programming at country and regional levels, and government policy in PBEA countries. For instance, ESARO supported a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey in four countries (Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia and Uganda), which provide the first cross-programme baseline for outcome level changes. WCARO supported COs and regional learning with technical assistance missions to develop CO case studies and conducted regional case studies to compare lessons across countries.

Selected results at the global level

In addition to supporting country implementation of the PBEA, the most identifiable PBEA results at global level relate to learning, evidence and advocacy. The Programme Management Team (PMT) was heavily engaged in technical quality support for planning and reporting, while Technical Working Group (TWG) units focused on sector specific projects to expand learning on approaches to peacebuilding. The PMT also led a process to develop and implement a global PBEA research strategy, as well as manage research projects. The first few outputs of the research strategy were being completed and disseminated. Lessons from this research will be used to improve ongoing and future peacebuilding programmes.

Beyond the research strategy, research and evidence building work was commissioned to study methods of measuring peacebuilding, advocacy and strategic level results as well as transitional justice (linkages between human rights violations and the education sector).

FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE RESULTS

Over the course of its implementation, PBEA had to adjust its strategies to incorporate new information and/or emerging success factors. With 11 months left in the PBEA programme, it is expected that more results will be achieved and the foundation for learning and applying lessons in future programming will be in place.

UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding

UNICEF demonstrated a number of institutional strengths that have supported PBEA implementation. These are:

- Comparative advantages in education and working with children and youth,
- Experience in humanitarian and development work,
- Experience combining upstream policy and downstream implementation in a holistic approach, and
- The UNICEF mandate and relationships (especially with governments).

UNICEF's strategic focus on equity was also an institutional advantage for the PBEA programme as inequitable access to education was often found to be a driver of conflict.

A correlation analysis[9] conducted on the result statements against PBEA and CO characteristics implies that the following aspects positively impact outcome achievement:

- Having an overarching theory of change;

[9] X^2 tests, error assumed 10% or below.

- Having experienced peacebuilding experts as part of the PBEA team;
- Mainstreaming peacebuilding across other UNICEF sectors; and,
- Strong support of country office leadership.

The majority of PBEA COs developed theories of change for individual outcome areas in their result frameworks, while use of conflict analyses for programming varied considerably ranging from little apparent effect (same activities before and after) to those who clearly served as the foundation for programme design and adjustments. Country offices use their conflict analyses for one of two purposes; to infuse conflict sensitive approaches into existing programmes, or directly address conflict drivers with the goal of achieving peacebuilding results.

The PBEA programme has proven adaptable to changes in context and mitigated risks in many environments, increasing programme relevance and effectiveness and confirming UNICEF's positioning for peacebuilding work. In a few cases shocks were too overwhelming for PBEA to adapt and programme implementation was halted for a period of time. In general, highly contextual programming based on conflict analyses represented a new way of working, and examples of positive adaptation were found to address limitations and risks posed by traditional IPs, and siloed sectoral approaches.

UNICEF-Wide Collaboration

Over the implementation period, PBEA increasingly engaged other sectors and units at all levels, though some country programmes have invested more in inter-sectoral approaches than others. For example, Burundi's success in mainstreaming across sectors has great potential for sustainability of peacebuilding within UNICEF structures. In many other countries (e.g. Somalia and South Sudan) conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were integrated fully across the entire education portfolio, and not only in the education in emergencies sub-sector as is often the practice. Deploying conflict-sensitive approaches and seeking peacebuilding results for the entire education response should be investigated further as a possible new solution for programming in fragile and conflict affected states.

The evaluation found different models of collaboration and coordination in PBEA countries with different reported levels of efficiency. Direct engagement of the Representative or Deputy Representative enabled greater efficiency for cross-sectoral programming, with leadership having a broader perspective and the influence to ensure cooperation between the sectors, and to engage in peacebuilding advocacy at a higher level.

External Partnerships

External partnerships were essential for UNICEF's PBEA implementation, including identification of new partners that had peacebuilding expertise and/or legitimacy in communities. Once capacity gaps were addressed, these partnerships enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of PBEA implementation.

The major gap in PBEA partnership strategies is at the level of strategy and coordination of partnerships globally. Some key donor agencies, other UN agencies and INGOs involved in education and peacebuilding played a minimal role in the PBEA, while implementing partners often worked in isolation. In these instances, PBEA missed the opportunity to maximise the strategic advantage of partnerships.

Management and governance

PBEA management, knowledge management and implementation support improved over time, following the hiring of PMT staff nine months into the programme, and establishment of regional office support later in the programme. Internal key informants at all levels noted the PMT worked hard at establishing capacities and making the necessary adjustments based on learning and feedback from COs

and other units. PBEA country management capacities did improve albeit to a varying degree, depending on the CO operational structures and level of management support for peacebuilding. Human resource capacities for PBEA have grown considerably after early delays.

The resource allocation process between the donor, UNICEF HQ and each CO was found to be mostly efficient, reasonable and transparent. Nevertheless, alternative funding models such as a rigorous competitive proposal based selection process with opportunity for self-nomination and context specific accountability plans may be more suited to peacebuifling work going forward.

CONCLUSIONS

PBEA was designed to work at the nexus of education and conflict, to improve conflict sensitive programming and contribute to peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience, using education as an entry point. Meaningful results were achieved in integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into education sector reform and other policies[10]; building institutional capacities of UNICEF, governments and implementing partners for conflict sensitive programming and peacebuilding; building individual and community capacities to mitigate causes of conflict; and increasing access to conflict sensitive education. More results are expected in generating learning and evidence of what works in social services for peacebuilding. The evaluation made eight overarching conclusions.

Conclusion 1: PBEA has, by and large, achieved substantial results in each of the five PBEA outcome areas and is following appropriate and the most promising practices for peacebuilding programming, However, a number of important lessons were learned about programming choices that are required for UNICEF to increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable peacebuilding results.

Conclusion 2: PBEA has demonstrated that the choice of using a social service such as education for delivering peacebuilding results is the right one, even though some of the necessary building blocks are yet to be put in place. Given that PBEA has piloted new approaches to working in and on conflict for UNICEF, the results achieved are satisfactory given time and resource limitations.

Conclusion 3: UNICEF is well positioned to engage in peacebuilding work based on its mandate and institutional strengths. However, the organisation needs to navigate sensitivities, identify entry points, focus resources on high risk environments to achieve scale and emphasise the primacy of context specific programming.

Conclusion 4: PBEA's emphasis on conflict analysis based programming was the right approach and leads to responsive context specific programmes that can contribute to peacebuilding.

Conclusion 5: Programme implementation partnerships, including new partners, have enabled UNICEF to increase its reach and access and deliver peacebuilding results. High-level advocacy partnerships and management of implementing partners for better knowledge exchange across organisations are required.

Conclusion 6: PBEA demonstrated that conflict-sensitive and/or peacebuilding programming that attempts to address drivers of conflict requires strong leadership support to enable cross-sectoral collaboration and ultimately mainstreaming of peacebuilding solutions.

Conclusion 7: PBEA programme management has developed well to support accountability and learning and to mobilise support of multiple sectors. Adjustments to allow more flexibility for COs to focus on local needs and increased capacity for RO backstopping improved performance. Dedicated programme

[10] This includes minimising negative impacts of conflict, maximising positive elements of policies and systems to promote social cohesion and integrating peacebuilding-specific outcomes into plans.

staff with peacebuilding expertise significantly improve CO programme management.

Conclusion 8: The PBEA resource allocation process was, by and large reasonable, transparent, and communicated clearly. However, utilisation and management of funding was not as efficient as it should have been, mostly due to the fact that donor accountability and accountability for funding decisions was at the global level, while accountability for results was decentralised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

According to the UNICEF Strategic Plan (2014-2017), UNICEF's mandate extends across the development-humanitarian continuum. For the foreseeable future the organisation will continue to work in fragile and conflict affected contexts where a majority of children live in poverty, are underserved by their states, and are therefore susceptible to various vulnerabilities. To achieve long lasting improvements in the lives of children, there is a renewed sense of urgency for UNICEF and all its partners to embark on development and humanitarian programming that seeks to disrupt cycles of violence by addressing the root source of conflict.

PBEA has also exposed the need for UNICEF to be more decisive about the organisation's role in peacebuilding work, and the need to improve coherence in its approach. Hence recommendations address the imperative for UNICEF leadership to stake a position on the level of engagement that the organisation can accommodate. Other recommendations speak to minimum requirements for operating in conflict environments, potential partnerships and measures to responsibly transition from the current PBEA programme to the future.

Recommendation 1: UNICEF should articulate a clearer vision for its role and contribution to peacebuilding in conflict affected and fragile contexts, and integrate this vision into corporate strategies, global programme policy, country programme strategies, and in key messages from UNICEF leadership.

Recommendation 2: As a minimum programme of action, UNICEF should institutionalise conflict analysis approaches as a part of the programme development cycle, and ascertain the use of conflict analysis findings in adaptation and design of programmes and policies, including mandating strict adherence to "do no harm" principles.

Recommendation 3: UNICEF should consolidate lessons learned from the two areas of mainstreaming peacebuilding into the education programmes and using education to deliver peacebuilding results in fragile contexts, and use them to develop resources for education sector planning.

Recommendation 4: UNICEF should develop a partnership strategy that will set parameters for its engagement with peacebuilding work, determine how to better leverage the capacities, experiences and skills of its partners (traditional and potential), and unleash the organisation's influence to heighten the likelihood to achieve peacebuilding results for children and youth.

Recommendation 5: For the next generation of peacebuilding programmes, UNICEF should continue to mobilise funding, earmarked, pooled, or other resources, to a level that will facilitate global visibility and learning, while ensuring proper financial and results accountabilities at the decentralised (country office) level.

Recommendation 6: UNICEF should secure funding (new or unspent PBEA funding) to enable continuation of critical activities in PBEA implementing countries that are presently facing conflict and/or humanitarian crises, and to afford the rest of the country offices the opportunity to incorporate key PBEA lessons into their next UNICEF regular programming cycle.

Recommendation 7: The PBEA team at HQ should identify a mechanism to update country level result statements developed in this evaluation to ensure a full and final compilation of results for future learning, as well as make proper institutional arrangements for completion of PBEA research initiatives and management of knowledge products.

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SECTION I

BACKGROUND

This section summarises the evaluation purpose, scope, methodology and process, and discusses the global context for UNICEF's Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy programme and other peacebuilding work.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the background and programme rationale, UNICEF's mandate for peacebuilding, the evaluation purpose, objective, outputs, and the evaluation scope and methodology.

1.1 PROGRAMME RATIONALE

More than 1.5 billion people live in countries that are experiencing conflict and/or fragility and conflict,[11] with children being disproportionately affected. In 2011, 20 million out-of-school adolescents were living in countries affected by conflict, of which 11 million are female[12]. And while the number of out-of school children is estimated to have dropped by 42 percent between 2000 and 2012[13], the problem of out-of-school children is becoming increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected countries, where the proportion increased from 30% in 1999 to 36% in 2012[14].

Recent studies also show that targeted attacks on education and incidents of military use of schools and universities are occurring in far more countries and far more extensively than previously documented.[15] Hence, the relevance of the PBEA programme is linked to a pressing need in the development and humanitarian community to find effective solutions that address the root causes of conflict.

PBEA was designed to work at the nexus of education and conflict, to improve conflict sensitive programming and contribute to peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience, using education as an entry point. Its results included integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into education sector reform and other policies; building institutional capacities of UNICEF, governments and implementing partners for conflict sensitive programming and peacebuilding.

PBEA set out to increase social cohesion and improve the capacities of people to mitigate and manage conflict in communities and schools thereby setting the stage for reducing instances of violence; increasing access to education from early childhood to secondary education and delivering conflict-sensitive and peace education; and producing research and engaging in advocacy to change attitudes of key decision makers on the role of children and youth, education and social services in peacebuilding at the country and global level.

1.2 UNICEF'S MANDATE

UNICEF's role in peacebuilding is guided by its mandate and that of the broader United Nations (UN) system, its strategic plan, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and UN Security Council resolutions delegating it responsibilities.

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11 World Bank Institute, *Fragile and conflict-affected situations*, https://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-acquia/wbi/fragile_situations_insert_fy12.pdf , accessed 19 July 2015

12 UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report: Policy Paper 10*, July 2013.

13 *Fixing the Broken Promise of Education for All: Findings from the Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children.* UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and UNICEF (2015). Montreal: UIS. http://dx.doi.org/10.15220/978-92-9189-161-0-en

14 UNESCO, *Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2015*, 2011, pg. 8.

15 GCPEA, *Education Under Attack*, 2014

The Charter of the United Nations establishes its aim to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and to maintain international peace and security".[16] A peacebuilding architecture exists within the UN system that includes the Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) (further explained in Section 2.3). At the country level, UNICEF works with these and other UN agencies as part of the UN Country Team (UNCT) to determine and prioritise interventions that can contribute to peacebuilding goals.

According to its mission statement, UNICEF's mandate is to "advocate for the protection of children's rights, to help meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential." It is "committed to ensuring special protection for the most disadvantaged children – victims of war, disasters, extreme poverty, all forms of violence and exploitation and those with disabilities."[17]

The 2014-2017 UNICEF Strategic Plan operationalises this mission and gives special emphasis to equity and resilience. The equity agenda, launched in 2010, emphasises the most disadvantaged and excluded children and families and seeks to ensure that "all children have the opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential, without discrimination, bias or favouritism" through action for children's rights.[18] Resilience is highlighted throughout the strategic plan and described as aiming to ensure that support to communities and families allows achievements for girls and boys are sustained "even when families are confronted with volatility and shocks, whether caused by economic shift, climate change, natural disaster, disease or violent conflict."[19]

Peacebuilding is also incorporated in the education outcomes of the 2014-2017 Strategic Plan with a commitment to "strengthen understanding and best practices in education and peacebuilding, and to build on this knowledege to support countries in assessing and managing risks."[20]

UNICEF is also guided by the principles and provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC establishes that "children's rights are not subject to derogation and they apply both in peacetime and in conflict when children are most vulnerable."[21] Based on UN Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict a Task Force on monitoring and reporting (MRM) co-chaired by the UNICEF Country Representative monitors grave violations against children in conflict affected countries. This includes "engaging with parties to the conflict to develop means to stop, prevent and respond to grave violations against children."[22]

1.3 EVALUATION FEATURES

Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation was to systematically assess the extent to which UNICEF achieved PBEA programme outcomes and made identifiable contributions to peacebuilding, social cohesion and/or resilience at the individual, community, institutional and/or systems levels.

Objective and outputs

This outcome evaluation aimed to trace the contribution of the PBEA to its intended results and assess PBEA's progress against its accountabilities. It is meant to provide another

16 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, accessed at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ on 31 July 2015
17 UNICEF, *Mission Statement*, accessed at http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_mission.html on 31 July 2015
18 UNICEF, *UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014-2017*, accessed at http://www.unicef.org/strategicplan/files/2013-21-UNICEF_Strategic_Plan-ODS-English.pdf on 31 July 2015
19 Ibid
20 Ibid
21 UNICEF, *Technical Note on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding*, EMOPS, 2012
22 Ibid

reflection point for UNICEF PBEA implementing units. It is also an important data point in determining whether the original PBEA idea should be funded through a follow-up programme to extend its learning trajectory, and/or whether peacebuilding programming should be repositioned under other components of UNICEF's agenda.

The objectives of the evaluation reflect the dual purposes of accountability and learning as follows:

1. To assess the extent to which PBEA outcomes were achieved, contributed to the strategic result of "strengthening policies and practices in education for peacebuilding" and are making quantifiable progress towards building peace and social cohesion among beneficiaries (accountability).
2. To articulate and confirm (or disconfirm) the programme impact pathways (or theories of change), assess the PBEA's approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning and capture programme and organisational learning that will help inform future programming and approaches to peacebuilding (learning).

The evaluation ToR asked to make recommendations on PBEA's potential for scale-up and/or integration of the work into the UNICEF work of fragility and risk-informed programming.

The main outputs of the evaluation were:

1. An inception report explaining the evaluation methodology and approach,
2. A desk review and analysis report presenting the preliminary findings from remote data collection and areas for further investigation, and
3. This final evaluation report presenting the consolidated findings, conclusions and recommendations from the desk review, rapid outcome harvesting with all PBEA countries, field visits and global and regional interviews conducted during the evaluation.

Evaluation scope

The evaluation covered all five PBEA outcome areas for 14 PBEA country programmes and the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya.

In addition, the evaluation:

- Reviewed PBEA *management and governance* structures for effectiveness and degree of organisational learning. This includes efforts across various implementing units including UNICEF Country Offices (COs), relevant UNICEF Regional Offices (ROs) and the PBEA programme management team (PMT) at UNICEF Headquarters (HQ), as well as the Technical Working Group (TWG), the Strategic Programme Advisory Group (SPAG) and the Accountability Committee.
- Ensured *thematic coverage* of all key cross-cutting areas of intervention that have been used in the implementation of PBEA activities, namely, Early Childhood Development (ECD), Child protection, Communication for Development (C4D), youth and adolescents, and gender. The evaluation examined inter-sectoral relationships between education and other UNICEF sectors for strengthening linkages between development and humanitarian programming and to determine whether PBEA monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices can be transferred to other programmes of comparable complexity.
- Examined relationships with *external partners* at national, regional and global levels that have been assigned various roles and were brought into PBEA through a number of contracting modalities.

The evaluation attempted to capture intended and unintended outcomes in both peacebuilding and education. It also sought to determine whether or not PBEA managed to find the right balance between flexibility and adherence to a results-based programme approach.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

This sub-chapter provides an overview of the methodology used in the evaluation. It explains the evaluation design and approach, the consolidated data analysis framework, steps used to collect and manage data, and the iterative data analysis approach. Finally, the advantages and limitations of the methodology are discussed.

The overall scope and dimensions of the methodology used in this evaluation were guided by objectives, themes and questions found in the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) developed by the UNICEF Evaluation Office (EO). The evaluation scope was partly informed by the Evaluability Assessment, which was conducted in 2013, during the second year of implementation.

Evaluation design

The evaluation was designed to take a bottom up approach to identifying the results achieved and factors that support or inhibit results. Data collection took place over three months in two phases followed by a four-week period for data analysis and drafting.

Five evaluation themes were established by the EO in the ToR to guide the evaluation. These five themes are:

1. Achievement of outcomes,

2. UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning,

3. External partnerships,

4. Management and governance, and

5. UNICEF-wide collaboration and learning.

21 evaluation questions were developed under these five themes and based on the draft detailed questions provided in the ToR.

A set of five evaluation criteria were linked to the themes and evaluation questions and considered in the analysis stage. These criteria, shown in Table 1, mostly represent OECD Development Assistance Committee evaluation criteria with the addition of scalability[23].

All themes, questions, and criteria are included in an evaluation matrix found in Appendix 1.

TABLE 1 **Evaluation criteria**

Effectiveness	Measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of outputs.
Relevance	Concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities and consistent with intended effects.
Coherence	Assesses the consistency in approach and whether policies/ guidance take into account standards and human rights considerations.
Scalability	Considers the ability of an intervention shown to be efficacious on a small scale to be expanded to reach a greater population while retaining effectiveness.
Efficiency	Measures the ratio of outputs achieved to the total inputs contributed (cost efficiency, timeliness, and comparison to other alternatives).

[23] Definition of scalability adapted from: Milat, King, Bauman and Redman, *The concept of scalability: increasing the scale and potential adoption of health promotion interventions into policy and practice*, Health Promotion International, Oxford University Press, January 12, 2012.

Significant emphasis was placed on engaging all 14 PBEA COs in a participatory process using a combination of rapid outcome harvesting[24] and mixed methods evaluation techniques (qualitative and some quantitative data collection and analysis regarding broad programme factors and attributes). Outcome harvesting was identified as the most appropriate method during the scoping stage. Through its use the evaluators aimed to enable CO staff to think about outcome level results, or the greatest level of results achieved, and work backwards to identify how the PBEA contributed to results. Rapid outcome harvesting proved difficult to conduct remotely in a compressed timeline. Combining rapid outcome harvesting with other evaluation methods was also challenging and required greater time commitments from CO than UNICEF had envisioned, posing difficulties for some COs. As such, the statements vary in depth and verifiability.

Three country visits (Burundi, Pakistan and South Sudan) were designed to provide deeper insights and engagement with beneficiaries and programme partners. Global stakeholders in UNICEF HQ, ROs and partner organisations were also engaged to identify results, contributions and explanatory factors.

Consolidated analysis framework

To ensure coverage of the five evaluation themes a high level analysis framework, shown in Figure 1, was developed in the inception stage. The analysis framework seeks to ensure that priority is given to the question of outcome achievement as this was identified as the most important theme during consultations with evaluation users during the inception phase. The analysis framework covers the remaining themes through the lens of contributing factors and poses some overarching questions to frame the evaluation conclusions and recommendations.

Data collection and management process

Data collection took place in two stages and used 13 primary methods.

Stage 1 involved a six-week period of remote data collection involving all 14 PBEA implementing countries and global programme literature. The methods used to collect data during this phase are as follows:

- Rapid outcome harvesting (see Figure 2),
- Collection and review of CO programme documentation and external documentation,
- Individual and group interviews with CO key informants on results achieved and broader programmatic factors,
- Drafting of result statements to capture what the programme achieved, how it contributed to changes and what was significant about the change,
- Iterative review, feedback and incorporation of CO input to revise result statements, and
- Collection and review of global PBEA documentation, records and statistics.

Stage 2 involved a 5-week period of on-site and remote data collection using these methods:

- Three CO visits (Burundi, Pakistan and South Sudan[25]) to conduct participatory workshops, individual and group interviews with staff, partners and beneficiaries, and observation of programme activities,

[24] Outcome harvesting is designed to be a participatory process, often over an extended period of time with facilitated in-person workshops and dialogue. The approach was modified for brevity and the remote nature of engagement with the 11 COs not visited.

[25] CO visit selections were made by the EO. Burundi was chosen to examine the nature of reported inter-sectoral programme design and implementation. Pakistan was chosen based on a large funding allocation and efforts to measure social cohesion. South Sudan was chosen due to a large funding allocation and instances of natural disaster and conflict during implementation.

FIGURE 1 Analysis Framework

Results Evaluation theme 1 Accountability / summative			**Contributing Factors** Evaluation theme 2, 3, 4, 5 Learning / formative			**Lessons** Accountability and Learning, Future guidance
Global outcome areas	**Actual**	**Expected**	**Programme**	**Strength**	**Weakness**	**Conclusions and Recommendations**
1. Policy 2. Institutional capacities 3. Capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty bearers 4. Access to quality, relevant, conflict sensitive education 5. Learning: generation of evidence and knowledge 6. Other unexpected	Finding	Finding	Peacebuilding Approach	Finding	Finding	• Is approach fit for purpose? • Are pathways and concepts clear and understood? • Did PBEA programming choices establish or follow good practice? • Do UNICEF's position and comparative advantages support PBEA?
			External Partnerships	Finding	Finding	
			Management and Governance	Finding	Finding	
			UNICEF-wide collaboration	Finding	Finding	

- In-person and remote interviews with HQ staff and global partners,
- Review of external literature on peace-building,
- Follow-up review of additional PBEA programme literature, and
- Additional remote interviews and written feedback with the 11 CO not visited to ensure maximum participation and refine country case profiles.

Data management was controlled using a combination of outcome harvesting workbooks (spreadsheets to record the iterative process of developing result statements) for each country and databases for interview records and document review notes.

While the evaluation used a number of data collection methods, participatory yet rapid outcome harvesting produced the most data.

The evaluation engaged over 285 key informants. Table 2 shows key informants by stakeholder group not including 30-40 beneficiaries whose names were not available. A stakeholder analysis is presented in Appendix 2 and key informants list in Appendix 3.

TABLE 2 Key informants engaged

Level	Stakeholder Group	# of Key Informants
Global	UNICEF HQ Staff	17
	Global Partners	10
	Donor	1
Regional	UNICEF RO Staff	19
Country	UNICEF CO Staff	94
	Implementing Partners	75
	Government	32
	Beneficiaries	31
	Substantiators	4
	Development Partners	1
	Donor	1
TOTAL		**285**

Data analysis

Two stages of data analysis took place following each stage of data collection. The **first stage** of data analysis relied on remote data and literature review results as follows:

- Coding of all draft result statements followed by coding checks by one or more other team members based on rubrics for intercoder reliability.
- Per country, triangulation of data from interviews and document review to produce draft country case profiles covering results achieved and explanatory factors.
- Cross-country triangulation of data and analysis of result statements harvested.
- Consolidation and triangulation across literature sources and synthesis regarding global patterns on results achieved and explanatory factors.

The results of this preliminary analysis were captured in a desk review and synthesis analysis report in late May.

The **second stage** of data analysis involved finalisation of country case profiles and a final consolidated analysis against each evaluation theme and question. The steps completed in this stage of analysis included:

- Revisions of country case profiles to incorporate new data and feedback.
- Stakeholder analysis and theory of change development for the three countries visited.
- Recoding of final result statements and completion of multiple coding checks for intercoder reliability.
- Coding (and checks) of data per country related to explanatory factors.
- Contribution analysis using a consolidated outcome harvesting database including result statements, their coded attributes and overarching CO programme management attributes.
- Consolidation of global staff and partner interviews and synthesis of results by stakeholder group per evaluation question.
- Consolidation, triangulation and synthesis of data from literature by evaluation question.
- In-person team analysis (over 4 days) to triangulate and synthesise data across all sources per evaluation question.

Some key definitions and examples of PBEA global outcome areas were developed for the coding of result statement data. Presented in Table 3, these definitions can help the reader to interpret the findings in Section II. Examples of results statements are provided in Boxes 1-5.

TABLE 3 Key coding definitions

Term	Definition for Coding
Degree of Change	
Activity	Actions undertaken as part of the programme that have not yet resulted in outputs or outcomes.
Output	Tangible and intangible products that result from programme activities that have not yet resulted in outcomes.
Intermediate outcome	A change in capacity, skills or knowledge that is being applied but has not yet led to the targeted changes in behaviour, relationships or actions of social actors.
Outcome	Observable changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities and actions of 'social actors' including those individuals, groups or organisations that were influenced directly or not, intentionally or not, by the PBEA programme.
Scale of Change	
High	Changes that affect large numbers of people and cover most geographic locations.
Medium	Changes that affect an intermediate number of people and cover about half of possible geographic locations.
Low	Changes that only affect few people and cover few geographic locations.
Substantiveness of Change	
High	Changes that represent a high magnitude of difference from the described original state and have a high degree of importance/ consequence for the people affected.
Medium	Changes that represent a moderate magnitude of difference from the described original state and have some degree of importance/ consequence for the people affected.
Low	Changes that represent a low magnitude of difference from the original state and have a low degree of importance/ consequence for the people affected.
Verifiability of Change	
High	Changes that are evidenced and triangulated based on multiple primary and secondary sources of data including documentation, records and internal and external key informants.
Medium	Changes that are evidenced and triangulated based on a few primary and secondary sources of data.
Low	Changes that are not well evidenced or triangulated across primary and secondary sources of data, often only based on a few key informant interviews.

Limitations and advantages of the approach

The main advantages of the evaluation methodology used relate to its rigour and ability to cover evaluation themes within a prescribed short time frame. Key advantages include:

- Systematic coverage of all agreed evaluation questions across all UNICEF units implementing PBEA.
- Robustness of consolidated findings based on triangulation across data sources and implementation sites.
- Intercoder reliability based on agreed definitions and rubrics and multiple independent coding checks.
- Clarity and utility of the findings.

The main limitations of the approach related to the timing of the evaluation and the breadth and depth of discovery possible within a compressed period of time for a programme spanning 14 countries, ROs and HQ over 4 years. These included:

- The timing of the evaluation, which began 1.25 years prior to the end of the PBEA programme as many activities were only beginning. An end-of-programme evaluation with better timing likely would have captured additional and more substantiated results.
- One week field visit schedules that only allowed for a few sub-national site visits and limited time to engage with each stakeholder.
- The level of engagement by COs varied due to time constraints, leading to varying degrees of result statement development and information on other key evaluation questions, based on access to documentation and key informants.
- Limited access to stakeholders involved in the early stages of PBEA design and implementation due to staff rotation.
- Challenges in comparing results and explanatory factors across countries due to the highly contextualised nature of PBEA programmes.

Data quality and completeness also presented limitations for particular evaluation questions. Outcome level measurement systems and common indicators are not in place for PBEA at the global level, making systematic comparison of results harvested with previous reports difficult. Financial data related to PBEA expenditures is not linked to particular programme activities or outcome areas making cost efficiency analysis impossible.

Early in the evaluation Programme Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with implementing partners were deemed too sensitive to share with the evaluators, eliminating a potential source of documentary evidence on partner roles, accountabilities and financing of activities.

Despite these limitations, the evaluation team believes the findings and conclusions of the evaluation are reliable given the systematic collection and comparison of data across levels and sites and the iterative participatory process used to allow for verification and validation of findings.

CHAPTER 2

GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR PBEA AND PEACEBUILDING WORK

This chapter provides the context and state of the peacebuilding field. It is meant to provide the reader with an understanding of the operating environment of PBEA.

2.1 PBEA CONTEXT

Within the growing peacebuilding agenda established in the 1990s, recent years have seen a heightened focus placed on the role of social services in peacebuilding approaches. For education, international efforts have been made in terms of research, policy and practice to better understand the education and peacebuilding interface and apply it in practice.

Some new approaches, such as methodologies for education sector-specific conflict analysis and conflict-sensitive education have been developed to help align education programming with peacebuilding goals. Additional efforts have focused on integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into national education policies and sector plans.

At the same time, challenges remain. Despite increasing attention, there is a small but growing base of evidence as to how education causes, exacerbates or mitigates conflict, presumably due to the context-specific nature of linkages between conflict drivers and education interventions in a given context and to the interconnectedness of a number of system variables that impact conflict dynamics. Tools and resources for programming for peacebuilding for education and social services more broadly are still limited.

As yet, there is limited human capacity within the field in terms of applying the dual lenses of education and peacebuilding in a multidisciplinary fashion. Conceptual ambiguity between conflict sensitivity (i.e. "do no harm") and peacebuilding, as well as between education for peacebuilding and peace education, results in different understandings of approaches and applications of the terms. This also creates risk that efforts for promoting peace through education remain narrowly focused on more traditional peace education models in classrooms instead of broader interventions that harness the education system's transformative potential. As a result, theories of change and identification of entry points for programmatic interventions can be uncertain.

2.2 GLOBAL AND COUNTRY UN ARCHITECTURE FOR PEACEBUILDING

Many components of the United Nations system have some role in peacebuilding. In 2006 the UN architecture for peacebuilding was solidified with the establishment of three entities[26]:

- The Peacebuilding Commission – an intergovernmental body that advises the General Assembly and Security Council and supports peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict,

[26] The United Nations, *The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, New York, October 2010

- The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) – a global fund that supports programmes and projects through an Immediate Response Facility (early interventions) and a Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (longer-term programmes), and
- The Peacebuilding Support Office – an office of the UN Secretariat that supports the Peacebuilding Commission with strategic advice and policy guidance, administers and raises funds for the PBF and develops and shares lessons learned and good practices.

PBEA programmes operate in countries with a diverse architecture of peacebuilding actors and mechanisms. Ten of the fourteen PBEA countries include some form of UN Missions and in the State of Palestine a unique UN agency exists to provide social services to Palestinian refugees. Table 4 shows the presence of UN Missions in PBEA countries.[27]

Eleven PBEA countries have also received funding and support from the PBF. The PBF has provided a cummulative total of US $548.89 million (as of December 2014) to 28 countries[29].

TABLE 4 **UN Missions in PBEA countries**

PBEA Country	Political[28]	UN Mission Peace-keeping	Integrated Peacebuilding
Burundi	BNUB		
Chad			
Côte d'Ivoire		UNOCI	
Democratic Republic of Congo		MONUSCO	
Ethiopia			
Liberia		UNMIL	
Myanmar	Good Office		
Pakistan		UNMOGIP	
State of Palestine	UNRWA was established in 1949 with a mandate for direct relief and works programmes for Palestinian refugees		
Sierra Leone			UNIPSIL
Somalia	UNSOM		
South Sudan		UNMISS	
Uganda			
Yemen	Good Office		

27 UNICEF PBEA, *Overview and Lessons Learned for Conflict Analysis*, 2015 (Draft marked 16 March)

28 UN political missions in four PBEA countries have a role in peacebuilding. BNUB had a mandate including transitional justice and reconciliation. The Good Office of the Secretary General mandate in Myanmar includes mediating between the government and opposition. The UNSOM mandate includes policy advice in support of the Federal Government's peace and reconciliation process. The Yemen Good Office also has a role in mediation.

29 Cummulative funding data source: United Nations General Assembly, *The Peacebuilding Fund, Report of the Secretary-General, Sixty-ninth session, Agenda item* 109, 29 January 2015

Table 5 shows the cummulative PBF funds received by PBEA countries.

TABLE 5 **Cummulative PBF funding to PBEA countries**

PBEA Country	UN Peacebuilding Fund	
	Date joined	Cummulative funding through December 2014 (US $ millions)
Burundi	2006	61.74
Chad	2010	4.79
Côte d'Ivoire	2008	32.73
Democratic Republic of Congo	2009	28.00
Ethiopia		
Liberia	2007	51.87
Myanmar	2012	3.63
Pakistan		
State of Palestine		
Sierra Leone	2008	52.16
Somalia	2009	4.00
South Sudan	2010	16.52
Uganda	2010	15.46
Yemen	2010	20.70

Since its inception the PBF has provided 49% of its funding through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNICEF is the second largest recipient of PBF funds with 8.6% of total funding[30]. Yet, only a small fraction (6%) of the number of projects funded by the PBF in 2014 address equitable access to social services. The remaining projects focused on areas including security sector reform, rule of law, disarmament and demobilisation, political dialogue, reconciliation, governance, employment, state capacities and extension of state authority.

2.3 GLOBAL CONTEXT FOR SOCIAL SERVICE DELIVERY FOR PEACEBUILDING

A focused comparative review of external global literature was undertaken to identify good practices in peacebuilding against which UNICEF PBEA programming choices could be assessed.[31] Operating through peacebuilding architecture is a fairly young field[32], as is intersection of peacebuilding with social services – as peacebuilding traditionally has had a security and/or political focus. In general, there is increasing attention on the role of social services and education in peacebuilding, though from a small base of research and discussion. There is a paucity of documentation on good practice for peacebuilding, either for social services more broadly or education in particular, and much of what exists does not focus specifically on good practices for approaches to peacebuilding programming.

30 Source: UN Peacebuilding Support Office

31 The external literature review focused on three key thematic areas: peacebuilding and conflict sensitivity; social service delivery and peacebuilding; and education and peacebuilding (including broader work on education and conflict). Documents reviewed were limited to those in English including both scholarly publications and grey literature. Materials were only reviewed if published/released since 2005, both given the need to hone in on best practices within a relatively new field and the decision to date global efforts linking education/social services and peacebuilding back to the establishment of an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Co-operation Directorate (OECD-DAC) work stream on service delivery, and specifically education, in fragile states in 2005-2006. To focus on global best practices, materials were excluded that did not take this view, for example, singular country case studies.

32 Johan Galtung first created the term peacebuilding in the 1970s, emphasising decentralised strategies for coercing a culture of violence into a culture of peace. The concept was popularised in the international community hrough UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report 'An Agenda for Peace'. A UN peacebuilding architecture was initiated at the 2005 World Summit with the founding of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office in 2005 and the UN Peacebuilding Fund in 2006. Source: PBSO website http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pbun.shtml

A few key findings can be highlighted in the areas of analysis and programme design, capacity, and management and implementation.

Analysis and design

The literature points to a strong consensus within the international community about the fundamental need for conflict analysis (CA) to serve as the core of any peacebuilding focused programme. For social services in particular analysis is required to understand the social contract[33] and it is also critical for understanding the established patterns of exclusion[34]. It is noted that conflict analysis does not always but should inform programming. Peacebuilding is premised on responding to conflict drivers wherein programming for peacebuilding must systematically pay attention to these drivers of conflict and cannot just be developed from a menu of technical issues[35].

Similarly, analysis cannot be undertaken as an end in itself but must be the basis for adjustment of priorities and adaptation of approaches and programming interventions in response.

Effective CA for peacebuilding has a number of characteristics. It ensures different levels of analysis, as views and perspectives are represented differently. It is undertaken continuously and even built directly into monitoring. It is undertaken in a participatory and inclusive fashion with communities, government and other partners in a way that ensures transparency and helps to build buy-in for programming. A process-oriented approach to analysis builds ownership as well as serves as a means of managing stakeholder/participant expectations, particularly important for social services programmes for peacebuilding.

Ensuring relevant and deep CA can help to ensure that programmes are designed with a peacebuilding lens from the outset. As Novelli and Smith found: 'within the education sector a peacebuilding lens is often retroactively applied rather than planned in advance'[36].

One explanation is that peacebuilding by its nature is political and thereby sometimes avoided: "It is possible to be sensitive to the post-conflict environment, but still take an essentially technical approach to education. However, a peacebuilding analysis may diagnose the need for deep structural and institutional changes, and this inevitably means attempts to change existing power relations within a society"[37].

Capacity

Capacity for peacebuilding approaches is required for a range of stakeholders and a capacity building strategy should be inclusive of all stakeholders. The need for local capacities for peacebuilding is critical, in particular with the government at central and local levels. Building the capacity of government and civil society can also help to advance government legitimacy and improve state-society relations[38]. Implementing agencies must often also build internal capacity, particularly for understanding the context.

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33 McCandless, E. 2012. *Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding*. New York, UN Peacebuidling Support Office

34 West, A.R. 2013. *Addressing Perception in the Delivery of Education in Conflict and Crisis. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*. 37 (1)

35 Novelli, M., Higgins, S., Ugur, M. and Valiente, O. 2014. *The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts*. London, UK Department for International Development

36 Novelli, M. and Smith, A. 2011. *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: a Synthesis Report of Findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*. New York: UNICEF

37 Novelli, M., Higgins, S., Ugur, M. and Valiente, O. 2014. *The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts*. London, UK Department for International Development

38 McCandless, E. 2012. *Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of Administrative and Social Services to Peacebuilding*. New York, UN Peacebuidling Support Office

Moreover, capacity and capacity building must be considered at multiple levels, not just in terms of the individual but also at organisational and institutional levels. Capacity building for peacebuilding is not just a technical exercise. Efforts must also be made to understand and articulate why capacity is being built and to remove barriers, such as addressing vested interests against change.

Management and implementation

Consensus exists that buy-in and engagement by national/local actors is critical for peacebuilding, including community support for programmes. Feedback loops that move reflections from bottom upwards and integrate participation and prioritisation of communities are important.

According to the literature, there is a lack of methodologies for organisational mainstreaming of perspectives on peacebuilding. Greater efforts should also be made to mainstream conflict sensitivity across all partners.

Coordination and coherence of initiatives is critical for peacebuilding, including having a coherent and sustainable political strategy for peacebuilding. In addition, it is clear that compartmentalised approaches that don't work across institutional partners weaken planning and implementation and should be avoided.

Agencies should work across national government ministries or departments in order to address crosscutting issues and leverage cross-sector collaboration[39].

From the side of monitoring and evaluation, use of relevant and appropriate indicators is a key concern. While some traditional education indicators may be used, where they relate to conflict, new and additional indicators are required[40].

[39] Novelli, M., Higgins, S., Ugur, M. and Valiente, O. *The Political Economy of Education Systems in Conflict-Affected Contexts.* London, UK Department for International Development, 2014.

[40] Sigsgaard, M. 2012. *Conflict-Sensitive Education Policy: A Preliminary Review.* Doha, Education Above All

CHAPTER 3

PBEA PURPOSE AND DIMENSIONS

This chapter provides the purpose, background, and broad dimensions of the PBEA programme. It is meant to provide the reader with an understanding of the subject of the evaluation.

3.1 OVERVIEW

UNICEF's PBEA Programme is a four year (2012-2016) and 150 million USD programme funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN). The vision of the PBEA is to "strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-affected contexts" while its strategic result is to "strengthen policies and practices in education for peacebuilding". To achieve these, PBEA has targeted five global outcomes areas:

1. Increase inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict reduction policies, analyses and implementation;
2. increase institutional capacities to supply conflict sensitive and peace education;
3. increase capacity of children, parents, teachers and other duty bearers to prevent, reduce and cope with conflict and promote peace;
4. increase access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace; and,
5. contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

PBEA is being implemented in 14 countries: Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Myanmar, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and Yemen. PBEA is also being implemented in the Dadaab refugee camp in eastern Kenya.[41]

The PBEA programme represents an unprecedented effort for UNICEF to go beyond its development and humanitarian approaches to address the root causes of conflict and interupt cycles of violence. It has required UNICEF to overcome many conceptual and practical challenges as peacebuilding remains a difficult and under-defined area of work and the role of social services (such as education) in peacebuilding have not previously been tested at scale.

As a result, innovation, adaptation and learning are a necessity and were designed into the programme from the beginning. Inevitably, developing and improving approaches takes time.

PBEA represents a programme of linked country-level interventions, not a fund allowing maximum flexibility. As a distinctly funded intitiative the PBEA was also set up as a stand-alone project rather than being integrated into the global education sector programming. This has posed significant management challenges for coordination, coherence and connectedness.

[41] PBEA activities in the Dadaab refugee camp are being managed under the East and Southern Africa RegionalOffice (ESARO) and implemented by the Kenya Country Office.

Programme implementation has been difficult. PBEA operates in some of the poorest and most fragile states in the world[42], facing politically sensitive contexts around past and current conflict, security restrictions, low levels of development, and emergencies (e.g. Ebola, natural disasters, civil war). While most PBEA countries represent post-conflict contexts, some countries are experiencing active conflict (Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen) and the threat of impending conflict (Burundi).

UNICEF's PBEA Programme is one of the first major programmatic efforts to try using education as a tool for peacebuilding and, in so doing, gain deeper understanding of how social services may contribute to peacebuilding at system, institutional, community and individual levels.

PBEA reflects the status of the broader education for peacebuilding field in which it is situated. Requisite efforts within PBEA to adapt general conflict assessment methodologies to education for which no sector-specific tools were available, exemplifies the gaps in programme tools for peacebuilding for education.

For PBEA, different understandings about whether the programme is essentially an education programme or a peacebuilding programme reflect the conceptual lack of clarity within the broader field of practice, which has practical impacts for achieving results.

The use of conflict analyses as a foundation for programme design was unfamiliar within UNICEF and in many cases took longer than expected to complete as it is important to get the analysis right using participatory methods. This led to delays in initiating programme interventions and slowed progress towards results.

Implementation is still in progress at the time of this evaluation and more results are expected by the close of the programme.

3.2 PBEA ORIGINS

The development of the PBEA programme is a result of increased attention to education in crisis and conflict contexts over the last 10-15 years. PBEA is the second partnership UNICEF has undertaken with the GoN on education in conflict contexts. The first initiative – Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transitions (EEPCT) – was a 201 million USD, 5-year programme (2006-2011) focused on education response including increased resilience of the education sector and better prevention and preparedness for natural disasters and conflict. To achieve these goals, EEPCT provided funding for work implemented in 44 countries. As such, EEPCT contributed to an increased global profile for education in emergencies.

Research conducted under the EEPCT[43] led to important learning that informed the design and implementation of the PBEA. One recommendation stemming from this research was to move away from generic programming towards education interventions that are informed by high-quality conflict analysis and sensitive to local contexts while emphasising that the education sector has transformative potential in post-conflict societies. EEPCT studies also recommended that UNICEF leadership should clarify the organisation's commitment to peacebuilding and develop clear understanding of peacebuilding concepts and how it relates to other UNICEF programmes. Learning from EEPCT also directly influenced the focus and approach selected for the PBEA management structure as EEPCT was implemented as a fund without an overarching management capacity and structure.

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42 Source: The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index 2015.

43 Novelli and Smith for UNICEF, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding*, December 2011

As EEPCT came to a close, two shifts in the strategic environment were taking place. First, in 2011 the GoN adjusted its development cooperation policy to focus efforts on four "spearheads" including i) security and the legal order, ii) water, iii) food security and iv) sexual and reproductive health and rights, with education and health care being identified as "non-priority themes".[44] Around the same time UNICEF undertook a review of its medium-term strategic plan 2006-2013, which called for "more explicit integration of humanitarian and development programming to promote resilience."[45]

PBEA was conceptualised in the context of these strategic shifts. Research conducted under EEPCT on the role of education in peacebuilding[46] served as a foundation for PBEA design. As a result, EEPCT and PBEA vary significantly. For instance, the EEPCT end-of-programme evaluation concluded that EEPCT served as a global fund by which countries could access funding for crisis-related programming, while the PBEA was designed as a global programme implemented through COs[47] for their specific context. Participation in PBEA requires significant commitment on the part of a CO in terms of engagement in PBEA-related processes, such as the conflict analyses that were undertaken at the outset, and human capacity including for extensive M&E.

EEPCT funds were primarily directed at education service delivery in acute and chronic crises. PBEA was designed to bridge humanitarian support and development work. PBEA funding, while significant for a global programme, represents a small amount at the country level compared to other education sector funding. Therefore, most COs set out to integrate PBEA programming into broader education work.

3.3 DEFINITIONS FOR KEY PBEA CONCEPTS

To ground the reader in a common understanding of core concepts and approaches employed within the PBEA programme definitions are needed. UNICEF considers conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding as closely related. While both require a conflict analysis and a comprehensive understanding of conflict causes, drivers and dynamics, the two concepts are distinct in terms of their overall goal and therefore their operationalisation. Conflict sensitivity is the capacity to work "in conflict" while peacebuilding means working "on conflict". Table 6 provides a comparison of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. Appendix 3 provides further consolidated definitions collected from UNICEF and UNICEF-cited external documentation.

The evaluability assessment found that UNICEF staff held various interpretations of key programme concepts and their inter-linkages and recommended steps to address conceptual ambiguity. Findings related to the current state of understanding are presented in chapter 5.

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44 The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Letter to the House of Representatives presenting the spearheads of development cooperation policy*, 18 March 2011.

45 UNICEF, *The UNICEF Strategic Plan*, 2014-2017, 11 July 2013, pg. 3.

46 Novelli and Smith, *The Role of Education in Peacebuilding: A synthesis report of findings from Lebanon, Nepal and Sierra Leone*, UNICEF 2011

47 UNICEF Education Section, *Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education, Presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands*, New York, October 2011, pg. 41.

TABLE 6 Comparison of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding

Comparison of Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding[48]	
Conflict Sensitivity	**Peacebuilding**
Definition: The capacity of an organisation to understand its operating context, understand the interaction between its interventions and the context, and act upon this understanding to avoid negative impacts ("do no harm") and maximise positive impacts on conflict factors. Conflict sensitive service delivery ensures that the provision of social services does not reinforce inequalities or contribute to tensions, grievances and conflict, for example, through inappropriate language of instruction or curriculum content in terms of education provision.	**Definition:** A multidimensional range of measures to reduce the risk of a lapse or relapse into conflict by addressing both the causes and consequences of conflict. The transformative process that a post conflict society needs to go through is supported by transforming institutions and strengthening national capacities at all levels for better management of conflict dynamics and to lay the foundation for supporting the cohesiveness of the society and building sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding outcomes manifest depending on the context and fall into one or more of the following three areas: • Resilience and social cohesion strengthened; • State accountability, legitimacy and capacity advanced, state-society relations improved; • Conflict drivers mediated and/or conditions set to address root causes of conflict through policies/structures/processes.
Aim: Work IN the context of conflict to prevent negative and, if possible, maximise positive impacts of programme on conflict and violence factors.	**Aim:** Work ON conflict to explicitly reduce conflict causes and factors to contribute to the foundations for sustainable peace.
Application to Programmes: All programmes of all types (humanitarian or development) in all sectors, at all stages of violence and conflict (early/latent factors, open conflict, post-conflict) must be conflict sensitive. Conflict sensitivity is understood as the 'minimum' for programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.	**Application to Programmes:** With conflict sensitivity as a prerequisite, peacebuilding can be integrated into development programmes in all sectors, at all stages of violence and conflict. Can serve as an explicit overall goal or objective for a programme, depending on context and the results framework.
PBEA Example: An education programme in a conflict affected area incorporates information about conflict drivers into teacher training materials and sessions. UNICEF supports teacher training colleges with materials and advice on how to help teachers avoid reinforcing negative stereotypes, discriminatory practices, selective historical references and inequities in schools.	**PBEA Example:** An education programme targets districts affected by inter-communal violence to address inequitable access, which was identified as a conflict driver. Community structures are established to support education offerings and UNICEF teaches community leaders reflective practices and conflict mediation techniques. Community leaders take ownership over conflict management and resolution resulting in agreements to share resources and support equal access to shared schools.

[48] Adapted from: UNICEF, *Technical Note on Conflict Sensitivity and Peacebuilding*, 2012

3.4 PBEA ACTIVITIES AND STATISTICS

This section provides a high level overview of PBEA activities and statistics. It includes a description of other major evaluative activities followed by general programme implementation statistics.

PBEA evaluative activities

In addition to this outcome evaluation, two major global evaluative activities were conducted or are underway to support accountability and learning: the PBEA evaluability assessment and the PBEA developmental evaluation.

An evaluability assessment for PBEA was undertaken in 2013, during the second year of implementation. The assessment found that the majority of PBEA implementing countries (10 of 14) were still in the process of conducting or finalising their conflict analyses and/or in the process of aligning their programming with associated conflict drivers. Key findings from the evaluability assessment included the following: lack of clarity on the key concepts in peacebuilding and the relationship between education for peacebuilding and the challenge it poses to tracking intended outcomes; the need to narrow the focus of country programmes to better capture a feasible level of change; inadequate M&E systems due to low capacity at country level coupled with the lack of clear definitions, measures and baseline data for tracking outcomes; a centralised management structure; and, inadequate emphasis on programmatic (as opposed to financial and operational) risk management.

In particular, the evaluability assessment recommended that while it was useful to retain the 'global approach', many of the critical technical decisions should be devolved to the country level where accountabilities for programming reside. This recommendation provided opportunity and latitude for PBEA implementing countries to further refine programme outcomes based on their conflict analyses (rather than implement all five outcomes), narrow down the scope of their programmes and develop context specific indicators that were more suited to measuring the contribution of the PBEA towards intended outcomes. This outcome evaluation builds on this evaluability assessment and its findings.

The PBEA evaluability assessment also made strong observations on the need to balance accountability to donors with seizing the opportunity to capture emergent learning. As a result, UNICEF commissioned a developmental evaluation (DE) for two PBEA sites, Myanmar and Ethiopia[49].

The DE was initiated in order to systematically capture the learning that can be infused into the programme to heighten its chances for success. The DE effort was meant to work with programme implementers in each site to develop a "learning framework" to stimulate evidence-driven reflections on how the programme is proceeding, to allow for adjustment of the intervention according to the lessons learned, and to adjust expectations about what the programme can realistically achieve. The outcome evaluation team met with the DE team to share preliminary country analysis from this evaluation for overlapping countries and discuss approaches, taking into account the different but complementary purposes. Given the DE's intensive focus on a few countries and longer timeline only limited information sharing was possible.

[49] DE is an approach that injects evaluative thinking and supports adaptive learning in complex initiatives. This design combines the rigor of evaluation methodologies with the flexibility and creativity that is required in seeking solutions to development problems, typically involving innovation, high levels of uncertainty, and tackling social complexity (Patton, 2008; Gamble, 2008; Dozois, Langlois and Blanchet-Cohen, 2010).

PBEA implementation activities

Implementation of PBEA activities has occurred at country, regional and global levels. The majority of expenditure and activities have taken place at the country level across 14 UNICEF COs plus the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Northern Kenya.

Based on data captured by the global monitoring system maintained by the Programme Management Team (PMT) the consolidated results of the programme (2012-2014) by global outcome area are shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7 **Consolidated PBEA results by global outcome area[50]**

Global outcome area	Results	
1. Policy	Education policy (national and sub-national)	74
	Curriculum (national and sub-national)	18
	Peacebuilding policy	5
2. Institutional capacity	Schools	34,387
	Partner organisations	2,400
	Community / school associations / clubs	1,151
	National / sub-national government bodies	107
	UNICEF offices	46
3. Individual capacity	Children	1,433,250
	Adolescents and youth	367,061
	Community members	92,979
	General public through online tools	81,194
	Parents	14,540
	Teachers	13,971
	Volunteers	1,717
	Government staff	911
	Partner organisation staff	149
4. Access to conflict sensitive education	Children accessing education	710,834
	Adolescents and youth accessing education	16,179
	Materials disseminated	46,524
	Materials developed	340
	Facilities constructed	135
5. Knowledge and evidence	Research	34
	Case studies	34
	Conflict analyses / needs assessment	14
	Best practices / lessons learned	5
	Knowledge, attitude and practice surveys	3
	Evaluations	2

[50] Source: UNICEF, *PBEA Consolidated Annual Report 2014 - DRAFT,* June 2015 – aggregated from data in 25 individual country, regional and headquarters section and division results frameworks.



Photo: © UNICEF/UNI6750/El Baba

SECTION II

FINDINGS BY THEME

This section presents findings corresponding to the five themes of the evaluation. Overall, the evaluation found that PBEA results are beginning to make meaningful contributions to peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience. However, more time is required to realize sustainable changes, at the desirable scale.

CHAPTER 4

PBEA OUTCOMES AND OTHER RESULTS

This chapter provides the findings of the evaluation related to PBEA results. It begins by presenting the overall analysis of outcome harvesting data and then presents programme achievements within each of the five PBEA global outcome areas.

4.1 OVERVIEW

The vision of PBEA represents ambitious and aspirational goals of building peace and social cohesion. These are long-term, even inter-generational aspirations. In a short period of time the PBEA programme has achieved results by developing context specific programmes and building on core UNICEF tools and relationships that take account of conflict drivers (conflict sensitivity) or work on mitigating them (peacebuilding).

One important objective of the evaluation was "to assess the extent to which PBEA has achieved intended outcomes of strengthening the education system for peacebuilding programming, building institutional and personal capacities of UNICEF education staff, key partners and beneficiaries, and increasing knowledge on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding".

This part of the evaluation investigates whether PBEA achieved the results that it set out to achieve. Results statements were classified as outputs, intermediate outcomes, and outcomes. Table 8 illustrates the differences in result statements that were deemed outputs, intermediate outcomes and outcomes with examples from the evaluation.

Not all of the results achieved are at an outcome level, are large in scale, or high in substance (see Table 3). Yet, outcomes have been achieved and other outputs and intermediate outcomes can be plausibly expected to lead to long-term impacts if activities are sustained.

Country programmes achieved the greatest scale, substance and verifiability of results when they focused early in their programming on addressing conflict drivers within an overarching theory of change (the "why") followed by holistic programme design, attainment of peacebuilding expertise in staff/partners, sensitisation of key stakeholders and capacity development before turning their attention to intervention types, activities, and outputs (the "what").

Section 4.2 presents the synthesised analysis of results achieved, based on desk research, the outcome harvesting exercise, field visits, and global interviews. First, it provides an overview of results harvested. Next, it explains the country level results by PBEA outcome area, followed by presentation of findings on results at the regional and global levels.

4.2 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: AN OVERVIEW

The outcome harvesting approach commenced by identifying, from country programme documents, 'results' in terms of meaningful changes that occurred that could be associated with the PBEA. Programme staff were asked to review

TABLE 8 Examples of output, intermediate outcome and outcome level result statements

Degree of change	Examples
Output	**In Chad** in 2014, the capacities of national MoE staff and guidance to contract, build and renovate conflict/disaster sensitive schools was strengthened with the aim of mitigating potential conflict in the school construction process and constructing child-friendly, safer, more resilient and more accessible schools in 3 regions.
Intermediate outcome	**In Burundi** between 2013 and 2015, conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding were integrated into education content and practice via education reform in Burundi. Reforms that incorporate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding include curriculum reform, teacher training and capacity development, community management of school development, and the rollout of child friendly school policy and institutional standards.
Outcome	**In Sierra Leone** children and adolescents have been empowered to advocate and inform their communities on the negative effects of corporal punishment and promote alternative practices resulting in behavior change in 2013 and 2014. 400 children in 40 children's groups report the ability to influence change as a result of the training. 3,475 participants have been reached through theatre for development, drama, and songs. 11,111 children and adults have been reached through community dialogue sessions in 31 communities in Pujehun and Tonkolili districts. As a result, 911 schools are now practising alternative forms of discipline.

and verify the results, and were encouraged to think beyond the links between outputs and global outcome areas captured in their operational matrices to allow identification of cross-cutting or unintended results. Of the 78 results statements, 24 were coded as outputs, 26 as intermediate outcomes and 28 as outcomes. The number of statements for each outcome area by degree of change are shown in Table 9. Some result statements cut across more than one outcome area (thus the number of statements in Table 9 totals more than 78).

TABLE 9 Result statements by global outcome[53]

Outcome area	Outputs	Intermediate Outcomes[51]	Outcomes[52]
1. Policy	10	7	4
2. Institutional capacity	9	9	8
3. Individual capacity	6	9	11
4. Access to conflict sensitive education	2	3	13
5. Knowledge, evidence and advocacy	2	0	2

51 A change in capacity, skills or knowledge applied, that has not yet led to the targeted changes in behaviour, relationships or actions of social actors.

52 Observable changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities and actions of 'social actors', believed to be influenced by the PBEA.

53 Some result statements pertain to more than one global outcome area.

The distribution of results in Table 9 shows that overall, the highest number of results fell under institutional and individual capacity development while the highest number of outcome level results were linked to access to conflict sensitive education. More importantly, PBEA was successful in that more than 69 percent of the results were either intermediate outcomes, or full outcomes.

PBEA beneficiaries

PBEA activities and results have extended beyond UNICEF's traditional beneficiaries to engage adolescents and youth and to include more holistic community interventions. Table 10 shows that while in-school children received the most distinct beneficiary focus under PBEA (25 percent of the result statements) a significant number of results pertain to focused work with adolescents and youth (13 percent of statements). More holistic community interventions that targeted all beneficiary categories were most common (48 percent of statements).

Result statements were also classified by scale in terms of number of beneficiaries and geographical coverage, and by substantiveness (as described in Table 3) and verifiability. Across all countries 30 result statements were coded as high in scale of result, 35 high in substantiveness of result and 30 high in verifiability. Figure 2 shows the relationship between results for each global outcome area in terms of scale, substantiveness and verifiability.

Individual capacity development results were on average high in substantiveness but low in scale. This reflects the importance of changes to the individuals reached but suggests lasting changes will require sustained efforts at larger scale.

Institutional capacity development results and access to conflict sensitive education were highest in substantiveness but also achieved medium to high scale. Policy results were high in scale, reflecting nationwide influence, and medium to high in substantiveness. Knowledge, evidence and advocacy efforts were verifiable but lower in scale and substantiveness. These results are interrogated further in subsequent sections of this chapter.

TABLE 10 **Results by beneficiary type and global outcome area**

Outcome area	Early childhood	In-school	Adolescents and youth	Adults	All or general
1. Policy	1	4	2	0	14
2. Institutional capacity	1	6	1	3	15
3. Individual capacity	2	5	7	3	9
4. Access to conflict sensitive education	3	8	2	0	5
5. Knowledge, evidence and advocacy	0	1	0	0	3
TOTAL	**7**	**24**	**12**	**6**	**46**

FIGURE 2 **Average scale, substantiveness and verifiability of results by global outcome area**



A number of institutional characteristics were identified as contributing to PBEA results. A correlation analysis[54] conducted on the result statements against PBEA and CO characteristics imply that the following aspects positively impact the degree of change (progression towards full outcomes) achieved:

- Having experienced peacebuilding experts as part of the PBEA team;
- Having an overarching theory of change;
- Mainstreaming peacebuilding across other UNICEF sectors; and,
- Reporting line for PBEA to the Representative of Deputy Representative.

In terms of substantiveness of results (magnitude of difference from reported original states), experienced peacebuilding staff, focus on conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, the institutionalisation of peacebuilding and direct engagement of the Repesentative or Deputy Representative present a positive effect on substantiveness of results. Table 11 shows which variable characteristics were correlated with higher degrees of change and substantiveness, thus better positioning UNICEF for peacebuilding work.

Each result statement was analysed based on whether it reflected conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding.[55] Statements found to represent outcomes were much more likely to represent contributions to peacebuilding (96%) than were statements for intermediate outcomes (73%) and outputs (59%). Overall, most PBEA interventions were found to be conflict sensitive. Fewer PBEA interventions were found to achieve peacebuilding results. Examples of this distinction are provided in the following sections regarding results per global outcome area.

The remainder of this sub-chapter explores results for each of the PBEA global outcome areas and provides examples of result statements that were substantive and verifiable.

54 X^2 tests, error assumed 10% or below.

55 Conflict sensitive results were came from activities which took conflict drivers into account, but simply applied "do no harm" principles, while peacebuilding results came from activities which specifically worked to address conflict drivers so as to mitigate their effects or reduce the drivers themselves.

TABLE 11 Correlation between PBEA CO characteristics and degree of change and substantiveness

PBEA and Country Office Characteristics	Degree of Change		Substantiveness	
	X^2 test value	p-value	X^2 test value	p-value
Education sector specific CA	1.498	0.683	0.761	0.859
Geographically specific CA	1.657	0.647	0.001	1.000
Experienced PB staff	7.867	0.049	8.272	0.041
PBEA programme focus	2.984	0.394	6.334	0.096
Overarching theory of change	13.212	0.004	17.647	0.001
PB mainstreamed	24.865	0.000	40.344	0.000
PB institutionalized	6.957	0.325	12.852	0.045
Reporting line	7.154	0.067	17.423	0.001

4.3 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: POLICY

Twenty-one (21) policy results were identified and validated in 11 of 14 PBEA implementing countries (see Table 9).

Monitoring data consolidated by the PMT suggests PBEA influence on 74 national and sub-national education policies, 18 national and subnational curricula, and 5 peacebuilding policies. The evaluation followed a different methodology and did not seek to verify these results.

Three of the four policy result statements that achieved outcomes also involved institutional capacity development and two also cut across individual capacity development and access to conflict sensitive education. This illustrates that policy development needs to be linked to other interventions and global outcome areas to result in changes in behaviour and actions.

Achievement of tangible policy results also depended on context specific factors, including the timing of national policy, strategy and curriculum reform processes and the capacity of government to implement new policies. It is therefore understandable that more 'outputs' were registered under Policy than the other four PBEA outcome areas.

Other policy results revolve around the incorporation of conflict-sensitive and peacebuilding approaches into national and sub-national education sector plans. This has led to strengthening education systems via, for example, the Education Management and Information System (EMIS) and curriculum reform. Few examples were found of PBEA achieving its original policy goal of integrating education into peacebuilding policies and plans.

Initial sensitisation, advocacy and policy dialogue made up for the bulk of PBEA activities in the first two years of the programme in many countries. Policy efforts required significant groundwork, consensus building and developing buy-in from national government partners related to key conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding concepts.

Intervention types used for policy results and the conflict drivers they sought to address were analysed to identify patterns and can be found in Appendix 4. The most frequent conflict drivers addressed by policy work included a culture of violence, weak governance, exclusion, inequitable distribution of resources and inequality. Participatory conflict analysis, advocacy, education policy and sector plan development were the most frequent interventions, often in combination, to achieve policy results.

As it is to be expected, policy results were found to improve the environment for additional peacebuilding programming. One exception was found, in three of the seven education sector plan interventions (43%) peacebuilding results were not achieved as they simply added language about conflict sensitivity to the plans. However, PBEA country teams emphasised the fact that windows of opportunity to influence policy cannot always be sequenced to preceed other activities.

In Ethiopia government education plans, at the national level and in the four Developing Regional States (DRS), are increasingly conflict sensitive and incorporate peacebuilding aspects. The fifth Education Sector Development Plan is informed by the context analysis and includes elements of peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience. Relevant peacebuilding and DRR interventions are incorporated in the annual work plans of the MoE, the four Regional Education Bureaux (REBs) and target woredas (districts), based on the context analysis.

In Somalia and South Sudan PBEA research is being used to develop education sector plans as part of GPE processes.

In Pakistan in 2013 and 2014, the Social Cohesion and Resilience (SCR) Analysis and technical inputs from the SCR team informed UNICEF's and partners' programming at the policy and service delivery levels. This includes the Education Sector Plans of the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces.

4.4 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

Selected country level results

Twenty-six (26) results were identified and validated under the institutional capacity outcome area (see Table 9). Monitoring data consolidated by the PMT states that institutional capacity building efforts have reached 34,387 schools, 2,400 partner organisations, 1,151 community, school associations and clubs and 107 national or sub-national government bodies.

The outcome harvesting found that PBEA contributed to institutional capacity development within UNICEF (6 COs), Ministries of Education and other government education sector actors (8 COs), community systems and groups (5 COs), justice systems (2 COs), national volunteer systems (2 COs) and in a mine action group in Myanmar. To some extent all COs invested in building capacity to enable implementation, though many such efforts were general in nature for UNICEF staff or partners working across outcome areas.

Intervention types used for institutional capacity development and the conflict drivers they sought to address were analysed to identify patterns and can be found in Appendix 4. The most frequent conflict drivers addressed by institutional capacity development work included a culture of violence, weak governance, exclusion, inequitable distribution of resources and inequality. Participatory conflict analysis, capacity development, advocacy, curriculum development and reform and teacher training were the most frequent interventions used, often in combination, to achieve institutional capacity results.

Most activities were aimed at enhancing capacities of UNICEF and partners in conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. Some capacity development activities are more standard for UNICEF, such as teacher training, but were done in a manner that increased capacities for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding. The use of a participatory conflict analysis, on the other hand, represents an example of using a "new" PBEA-specific activity to build institutional capacities as found in Chad, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and the Conflict Analysis (CA) update commissioned for Uganda.

Roughly one-third of institutional capacity building results are outcomes. These outcomes represent instances where the increase in

institutional capacities led to actions such as new programming approaches or the rollout of systems to address violence in schools.

In two of the five results (40%) where training of principals and school administrators took place the activities were not found to be conflict sensitive due to a disconnect between identified conflict drivers and the focus of interventions. One focused on strengthening of a national EMIS system and the other focused on traditional education in emergencies programming.

One-third of child friendly schools/education interventions have not addressed a specific driver of conflict. One of these interventions was found to have no relationship to the conflict analysis (continuation of a previous programme). The other two were found to only emphasise awareness of potential drivers of conflict, rather than working to support reduction of the influence of specific conflict drivers.

In Myanmar, capacity was strengthened within UNICEF (and EiE sector partners) to provide conflict sensitive services that incorporate peacebuilding. Myanmar CO has discussed and designed a wide non-state actor (NSA) engagement strategy to frame their work in non-government controlled areas. Guidance on engaging with NSAs and providing support to non-government schools is in the process of being finalised. The CO has also identified programmatic entry points, such as mine risk education or the Ethnic Language Policy, through which they can engage both NSAs and the Government of Myanmar and begin collaborative peacebuilding work.

In Ethiopia education stakeholders at decision- making and planning levels were better equipped to create and analyse disaster risk information and elaborate development and education plans accordingly. The four Regional Education Bureaux and target woredas prepared disaster risk management plans that are conflict and disaster risk sensitive and improve resilience to man-made and natural shocks.

Capacity development is an ongoing process and, in the majority of cases, the higher level changes as a result of improved institutional capacity are in progress but not yet achieved.

Selected regional level results

Regional Offices (ROs) played a key role in providing guidance and support to country offices implementing PBEA, especially in WCARO and ESARO. RO support included building of UNICEF peacebuliding capacities through regional training sessions, workshops and conference calls, and one-on-one technical backstopping. Country offices reported that this support helped develop their knowledge

BOX 1 **Example institutional capacity result statements**

In Myanmar, capacity was strengthened within UNICEF (and EiE sector partners) to provide conflict sensitive services that incorporate peacebuilding. Myanmar CO has discussed and designed a wide non-state actor (NSA) engagement strategy to frame their work in non-government controlled areas. Guidance on engaging with NSAs and providing support to non-government schools is in the process of being finalised. The CO has also identified programmatic entry points, such as mine risk education or the Ethnic Language Policy, through which they can engage both NSAs and the Government of Myanmar and begin collaborative peacebuilding work.

In Ethiopia education stakeholders at decision- making and planning levels were better equipped to create and analyse disaster risk information and elaborate development and education plans accordingly. The four Regional Education Bureaux and target woredas prepared disaster risk management plans that are conflict and disaster risk sensitive and improve resilience to man-made and natural shocks.

and skills in programme areas such as M&E, research, and knowledge management. ROs also supported country office staff recruitment and partner contracting, developed context tailored guidance and tools (including translation of materials), and consolidated lessons and good practices from the country offices.

In WCARO, PBEA staff advocated for and provided technical support to integrate a component on conflict analysis into a guide for an education sector-wide analysis tool supported by UNESCO and Pôle de Dakar. ROs also reported results in increasing capacity in other sectors through sensitisation and learning events, and day-to-day interactions between PBEA RO staff and other technical advisors.

In ESARO PBEA approaches led to formation of a regional management team working group on fragile states and partnerships with UNESCO for integrating disaster risk reduction into education sector planning within the region. Capacity has also been enhanced with development of a real-time online data management platform for monitoring PBEA performance data and integrating political economy training into Country Representative induction training.

Selected global level results

Institutional capacity building results specifically achieved by the PMT and corraborted by country offices include development and dissemination of programme guidance, creation of programme management systems, and building capacity of CO and RO staff through technical support and PMT-led annual PBEA meetings, webinars and workshops. The PMT also delivered training on child-friendly schooling for peacebuilding for COs and engaged the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) to provide conflict sensitivity training to UNICEF and partner staff at country level.

HATIS' contribution to building UNICEF capacity includes developing guidance (e.g. concept notes on peacebuilding terminology, theory of change guidance) and designing a capacity development platform for peacebuilding expertise within UNICEF (for PBEA and beyond). Other TWG members contributed towards building UNICEF capacities for peacebuilding work. Examples include the following:

- The Adolescent Development and Participation (ADAP) focused on empowering adolescents as agents of change by identifying ways to include them in conflict analyses and programmes that build skills and competencies, developed guidance on adolescent inclusion, and conducted a desk review of knowledge, attitudes and skills for peacebuilding. They also developed a Adolescent Kit for Expression[56] and Innovation for use by facilitators and piloted it in South Sudan.
- The Child Protection Section contributed to a report on the mental consequences of "Growing Up on Conflict". This research on social norms condoning gender-based violence has resulted in a global Communities Care Toolkit and institutional knowledge for facilitating social norms transformation processes in post-conflict societies.
- The Communications for Development (C4D) Section worked with Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, South Sudan and Uganda to designed a multi-media package to use of participatory theatre, participatory video, community radio, mobile phones, and other (ICT) to influence positive change and mitigate conflict drivers. They also facilitated webinars on the use of the "Most Significant Change" methodology.
- The Communication for Education and Gender Equality (CEGE) team in the Division of Communications (DOC) has contributed

[56] See www.adolescentkit.org

to building UNICEF and partner PBEA capacity to advocate for peacebuilding and education, and to position UNICEF as a knowledge leader in these areas. In 2014 DOC presented information on communication and advocacy at global and regional PBEA meetings and contributed to development of a communication and advocacy strategy for ESARO. DOC also supported the Learning for Peace website which had almost 46,000 page views and 30,000 visitors in 2014.

- The ECD helped establish the Pathways for Peace Consortium, which serves as a platform for ECD research institutions and organisations to advocate for the role of ECD in peacebuilding. The unit aslo held a webinar to promote its guidance note on ECD and peacebuilding in 2014 and supported a PBEA workshop for WCARO.

- The Gender section worked with the Uganda CO on a project for Gender Socialisation in Schools in Uganda (GSSU) and an impact evaluation in Karamoja, Uganda. The section has also provided technical support to HQ, RO and CO PBEA implementing units including a dedicated session at the PBEA annual meeting and discussions with ROs and COs about entry points for strengthening gender dimensions of the PBEA.

4.5 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

Selected country level results

Twenty-six (26) results were identified and validated under the individual capacity outcome area (see Table 9). The highest number of outcome level results were found under individual capacity building, as well as the widest variety of pilot intervention and/or activities. A pilot was defined for the evaluation as a project or programme conducted as a test before introducing the approach more widely or at scale.

Intervention types used for individual capacity development and the conflict drivers they sought to address were analysed to identify patterns and can be found in Appendix 4. The most frequent conflict drivers addressed by individual capacity development work included a culture of violence, weak governance, exclusion, mobilisation of ethnic and religious divisions and inequality. Sports, camps and play, community dialogue, life skills education, community conflict mediation and gender-based violence were the most frequent interventions used, with peacebuilding messages integrated into traditional programme approaches to achieve institutional capacity results.

Important outcome level results were achieved in multiple intervention areas. PBEA monitoring data consolidated by the PMT shows considerable numbers of beneficiaries under this global outcome area including over 1.4 million children, 367,061 adolescents and youth, and 92,979 community members. Sports, play, arts (theatre, children's radio, song, poetry, writing, dance, art) and camps built the capacities of children and youth to prevent, mitigate and manage conflicts, and to improve social cohesion. Peaceful relations were strengthened through dialogue between and within community groups in conflict over access to resources. This area also involved a number of interventions targeting adolescents and youth.

Monitoring systems in half of the cases were not sufficiently strong to capture how community conflict mediation interventions were addressing a driver of conflict. This also reflects the early stage of implementation among these interventions as communities have been trained about conflict drivers but have not yet used this knowledge to mediate a related conflict.

The effects of individual capacity development interventions such as changes in attitudes, knowledge, and/or practice and perceptions, were more difficult to verify as M&E systems are underdeveloped. PBEA staff in ESARO have

BOX 2 **Example individual capacity result statements**

In Burundi preliminary results from PBEA activities indicate a reduction in student-teacher violence in targeted schools, and improved friendships and reduced stereotypes and division between children from different groups at risk of conflict (IDPs, returnees, host families) in 14 targeted provinces. The Ministry of Education has tracked a decrease in corporal punishment in schools and increased school performance between 2008 and the present.

In South Sudan between 2014 and 2015, a total of 8,000 children and youth (30% female) in five States, including sites for Protection Of Civilians (PoCs, engaged in PBEA-supported sports and social activities. This intervention was aimed at mediating conflict and building peaceful relationships within schools and communities. Overall, beneficiaries increasingly reported a sense of belonging to their country.

developed surveys to measure and monitor these changes going forward. Though more difficult to measure, these results are often considered significant because of their potential to address a culture of violence at the local level. Changes in individual beliefs and practices are important for addressing root causes of conflict and preventing violence. Interupting and shifting cultural mores and long-held beliefs that reinforce conflict drivers requires long-term commitments among many actors.

4.6 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: ACCESS TO CONFLICT SENSITIVE EDUCATION

Selected country level results

Eighteen (18) results were identified and validated under the outcome area of access to conflict-sensitive education, the majority (13) of which were at the outcome level (see Table 9). Monitoring data consolidated by the PMT states that 710,834 children and 16,179 adolescents and youth have gained access to education due to PBEA programmes. The success of work under this outcome area stems from UNICEF's ability to leverage its institutional skills, expertise and experience in the education sector.

PBEA work on access to conflict sensitive education benefited strongly from the high prioritisation of equity within UNICEF education programmes. Related interventions aimed to improve the way that education was delivered and increase access to conflict sensitive education.

Intervention types used for access to conflict sensitive education and the conflict drivers they sought to address were analysed to identify patterns and can be found in Appendix 4. The most frequent conflict drivers addressed by work to increase access to conflict sensitive education included a culture of violence, reintegration of returnees and IDPs, weak governance, exclusion, and inequality. Early childhood development, go-to-school, back-to-school and stay-in-school campaigns, primary education, school construction and teacher training were the most frequent interventions used, often in combination, to improve access to conflict sensitive education. While these interventions represent traditional UNICEF approaches, PBEA employed them to target children, adolescents and youth whose exclusion related to a conflict driver and worked to integrate conflict sensitive approaches into their education.

School construction was a common intervention (the "what") in this outcome area often in combination with other activities to address a conflict driver. School construction interventions were linked to peacebuilding in 10 result statements. For instance, exclusion and inequitable access to education was a frequently

BOX 3 **Example access to conflict sensitive education result statements**

In Somalia tensions between host communities and IDPs due partly to inequitable access to education was identified as a conflict driver. Between September 2012 and June 2013, the early stages of the PBEA programme made education part of the peace dividend by creating 127 learning environments in six Central South Zone (CSZ) regions and distributing education supplies to 74,273 children. Monthly teacher incentives ensured continued education for 74,273 children. The participatory process engaged the community, contributing to a peaceful co-existence of IDPs and host communities.

In Uganda between 2012 and 2014, 32,464 out-of-school children (18,240 boys and 13,959 girls) returned to school in 28 target districts - the most marginalised districts in Uganda. This included a Go to School, Back to School and Stay in School (GBS) campaign and building capacities of 1,322 schools and community-based ECD centres to follow Basic Requirements and Minimum Standards (BRMS) and Early Learning Development Standards (ELDS) that work towards gender and conflict-sensitive education delivery. 2,791 caregivers were trained in conflict resolution skills by 2014, compared to a baseline of zero in 2012; and supporting district-community dialogues leading to 30% of PBEA target districts developing and enforcing district ordinances, by-laws and action plans to keep children in school.

identified conflict driver. Efforts to combine school construction and changes in enrollment rules/outreach led to access to education by marginalised or excluded groups, such as minorities and IDPs, returnees and refugees. The other third took drivers of conflict into account (e.g. through site selection) but did not include participatory processes that sought to reduce instances of conflict.

4.7 PBEA PROGRAMME RESULTS: LEARNING, EVIDENCE AND ADVOCACY

Selected country level results

All PBEA countries engaged in research to conduct conflict analyses, which established an evidence base for programming and advocacy. The outcome harvesting process considered work on conflict analyses and their outputs based on their contribution to other results, rather than crafting results statements solely focused on conflict analyses. Section 5.4 provides additional information on the PBEA experience with conflict analysis.

Excluding conflict analysis, comparatively fewer PBEA result statements were identified in the area of learning, evidence and knowledge generation than in other outcome areas (a total of 4 results as shown in Table 9). Only one country established a comprehensive research agenda as part of PBEA (Burundi) and used the research to influence policy design, programme development and national priorities. However, many countries have developed case studies and participated in research and evidence generation led by Regional Offices or HQ units that has been used to inform UNICEF policies and government strategies.

Research related results were split between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding, with three of the seven (43%) only studying and identifying drivers of conflict rather than operationalising the findings to address a conflict driver.

While learning by doing was the most prominent reported approach across country offices, research was not prioritised in the first two years due to pressure to get conflict analyses completed and to utilise funding. Emphasis on research and documenting lessons learned increased in 2014 with the introduction of case study requirements for reporting and as monitoring mechanisms began to yield more data. Also several country offices hosted HQ led

BOX 4 **Example learning, evidence and advocacy result statements at the country level**

In Burundi research evidence on peacebuliding has been generated. Outreach and advocacy efforts stemming from this research have influenced the Ministry of Education in Burundi to incorporate peacebuilding into the curriculum and action plan, while the Belgian Development Agency has integrate an ECD component into a public works program.

Evidence-based research through the PBEA programme also influenced UNICEF in Burundi to scale-up work with adolescents to better respond to emerging and worsening conflict drivers in the country. The research also influenced the UN peacebuilding priority plan, especially the youth pillar, facilitated an opening of dialogue with the Ministry of Education to address conflict drivers in the national education system diagnosis (RESEN) sector analysis in 2015. According to numerous informants, the evidence generated by the programme and collaborationg with UNICEF has transformed understanding and perceptions regarding the inter-generational transmission of violence among key stakeholders.

In Uganda between 2012 and 2015, PBEA supported policies and their implementation were influenced by UNICEF's research on the bi-directional relationship of education and conflict which resulted in the recognition of conflict risks and the need for conflict prevention and response through policies and programming.

research and pilot projects (see Section 3.4). More results under this global outcome area are expected to emerge towards the closing of PBEA and beyond.

Selected regional level results

ESARO supported a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey in four countries (Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia), which provided the first cross-programme baseline from which to measure PBEA contributions to outcome level changes among individual people. A follow-up survey is expected to take place during programme close-out to document changes. A regional research strategy, case studies and development of advocacy tools and bulletins have also enhanced learning.

WCARO supported country offices and regional learning with technical assistance missions to develop country case studies. Regional case studies to compare lessons across countries were also developed.

EAPRO is leading an initiative on Language, Education and Social Cohesion (LESC), which is a component of PBEA. LESC initiatives combine interventions with research to analyse how language policies and practices in education can promote social cohesion in Malaysia, Myanmar and Thailand. The analysis is inteded for use as a basis for advocacy.

Selected global level results

The most identifiable PBEA results at global level relate to learning, evidence and advocacy. Significant PBEA resources were dedicated towards planning, and developing monitoring and reporting frameworks. For instance, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) was contracted to support M&E at country level and contribute to other learning at the global level. Both the PMT and TWG provided country offices with technical and quality assurance support for research projects.

The global PBEA research strategy was developed in early 2013. Based on the analysis of CO programme plans and consultations with SPAG members, consultants and research partners, the research strategy settled on four themes, namely:

1. Linkages between education inequality and conflict;

2. Policy integration (education into peacebuilding policies and vice versa);

3. The role of teachers as a critical link and actor; and,

4. Youth agency for peacebuilding (formal and informal).

An additional crosscutting theme relating to violence and gender was integrated across research projects. The global research strategy is being implemented by a combination of external research partners[57] and managed by the PMT. An example is provided in Box 5.

Beyond the global research strategy, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) was contracted to study methods of measuring peacebuilding, advocacy and strategic level results (focusing initially on collaboration with Burundi and Uganda COs). This work complements the work in ESARO to use KAP surveys to measure changes linked to social cohesion. Work is expected to be completed in late 2015.

The Child Protection Division at HQ is engaged in two PBEA funded projects including action research on community groups, child protection and social cohesion, and a Gender-Based Violence (GBV) initiative.

The action research project completed its first phase of work between 2013 and 2014, focusing on enhancing evidence on the role of formal and informal community groups in preventing conflict, facilitating relationships and establishing lasting social cohesion in Chad and Burundi. Research findings have supported development of a draft theory of change and a M&E framework.

The PMT commissioned a study on Child Friendly Schooling for Peacebuilding resulting in a 2014 publication and lessons that were incorporated into training for COs.

BOX 5 **Global research result example**

In 2015 FHI 360 completed research funded by PBEA under the PMT global research strategy titled "Does horizontal education inequality lead to violent conflict?". Drawing from two newly created datasets that span across more than six decades covering 95 countries and over 200 sub-national regions in 24 Sub-Saharan countries from 1989-2012, the study examines inequalities between ethnic, religious, and sub-national groups in educational attainment of youth aged 15-24 and the likelihood of violent conflict. The key findings represent an important global result for the PBEA and included:

- There is no theoretical evidence that education inequality between groups is the cause of violent conflict but there is a statistically significant and quantitatively large relationship between higher levels of inequality in educational attainment between ethnic and religious groups and the likelihood that a country will experience violent conflict at the global level after the year 2000.
- There may be an indirect yet causal relationship whereby systematic inequality in education experienced by some sub-groups and the formation of group-based grievances eventually lead to conflict.
- Sub-national regions that are disadvantaged relative to the nation as a whole are more likely to experience conflict-related fatalities than more advantaged regions. This is valid across all five decades although findings for sub-Saharan Africa are inconclusive.

More research is deemed necessary to understand why educational inequality is only in the most recent decade associated with conflict, whether the relationship between horizontal inequality and conflict differs by the type of conflict and the effect of conflict on educational inequality.

[57] FHI 360 is the lead for Theme 1. Themes 2, 3 and 4 are being undertaken by a research consortium between the University of Amsterdam, University of Ulster and University of Sussex, along with national research partners.

The GBV in Emergencies unit has led a PBEA funded project called "Communities Care". This project implements interventions to engage the community in collective action to prevent sexual violence, provide support for survivors of sexual violence and strengthen care. In 2014 the project finalised a social norms survey tool based on an in-depth psychometric study. A longitudinal trial has been launched with a sample of community members in Somalia and South Sudan. A toolkit was also finalised in 2014 and disseminated to IPs of the project and community members have been trained

Global PBEA support was also provided to the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA) for their flagship publication 'Education under Attack'. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was engaged as a result of collaboration between the Education and Child Protection Sections in a global PBEA partnership to develop practical guidance and conceptual clarity among policy-makers in education and transitional justice to establish synergies between these sectors to respond to human rights violations.

The PMT also played a key role in positioning and linking UNICEF to other global peacebuilding actors. As a result UNICEF was able to gain access to external expertise, and to contribute towards raising the profile of the role of social services in contributing to peacebuilding through advocacy and inputs to the UN Secretary General's Report on Peacebuilding, as well as ongoing discussions about the UN's peacebuilding architecture.

4.8 UNINTENDED OUTCOMES AND CONSEQUENCES

The evaluation identified relatively few unintended outcomes and consequences. Many programme participants view the PBEA as a deliberate opportunity to pilot approaches and learn while doing and thus results were not always forecast in advance.

On the positive side, Sierra Leone PBEA supported community reflective practice sessions resulted in resolution of local conflicts over natural resources. In Liberia and Burundi skills gained from PBEA livelihoods and capacity development led to community development initiatives (community infrastructure and inter-province marketing cooperatives respectively). In the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict sensitive capacities gained by the Ministries of Education led to ministry staff convincing other ministries to adopt conflict sensitive programming. Unexpected but positive benefits to girls enrolment and retention in formal education were observed in South Sudan, Uganda and Dadaab Refugee Camp.

In a few COs negative unintended consequences or challenges were recognised that led to programme adjustments. In one, a livelihoods intervention sparked grievances among communities due to inequitable distribution of programme resources until PBEA staff adjusted the programme approach. In Uganda it was reported that raising awareness of the negative consequences of harmful practices against children caused some communities to "take justice into their own hands" rather than trusting government to apprehend and prosecute the alledged perpertrators. Although these purported links could not be verified by the evaluators they merit further investigation to prevent potential negative consequences.

4.9 KEY FINDINGS ON PBEA OUTCOMES AND OTHER RESULTS

The extent to which PBEA has contributed to peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience depends on the approach to programme design and implementation. In essence, programmes were more likely to contribute to these aims when implementation was based on an analysis of contextual needs and priorities (CA) informing the programme goal and theory of

change/methods, rather than first focusing on activities to implement (what). The key findings of the evaluation on PBEA outcomes and other results are as follows:

- PBEA achieved greater results when COs focused on addressing conflict drivers, within an overarching theory of change (the "why") followed by holistic programme design, attainment of peacebuilding expertise, sensitisation of stakeholders and capacity development (the "how"), before turning their attention to discreet intervention types, activities and outputs (the "what").

  Implications: Effective programme design is a current area of focus for UNICEF senior management. If these efforts result in improved early consideration of risk analysis, holistic programme design, stakeholder engagement and capacity development, UNICEF programmes will be more effective. This applies to peacebuilding and all other programming.

- PBEA policy results improved the environment for peacebuilding programming, but windows of opportunity are critical and could not always be sequenced to proceed other activities.

  Implications: Country level peacebuilding programmes need to seek synergies between programme and policy factors as noted in the UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014-2017. These programmes should take into account policy cycles and position UNICEF to take advantage of windows of opportunity for peacebuilding programmes to benefit from the authorisation and operating space afforded by policy changes.

- Work on institutional and individual capacity development was critical to PBEA implementation and establishes the foundational capacity for attitudinal and behaviour changes. This area represented the largest number of overall results, (output, intermediate outcome and outcome), even though the scale of the change was as yet sometimes still small.

  Implications: The UNICEF Strategic Plan emphasises the importance of strengthening individual, community, government and partner capacities as a core implementation strategy. While this is a means to an end, adequate attention to capacity development should be adequately estimated and invested in to support programmatic outcome achievement.

- Other than conflict analyses PBEA has thus far underperformed in the number of results achieved under the area of learning, evidence and advocacy due to delays and prioritisation of other activities. However, global research and country monitoring has shown utility and is beginning to yield important evidence and learning.

  Implications: The effectiveness of UNICEF's work in peacebuilding depends on applying evidence of what works and lessons learned to future programmes. Consolidating and sharing this evidence will be critical to inform future programme decisions, and to advocate more broadly for appropriate prioritisation of the role of social services in peacebuilding.

- PBEA interventions achieved greater relevance where it engaged stakeholders in conflict analysis and prioritisation of programmes and extended beyond traditional school-based education work to focus more on engaging adolescents and youth and more holistic community interventions.

  Implications: Contributing to peacebuilding results requires new and creative consideration of the best ways to meet context

specific needs. Engaging adolescents and a holistic set community structures in identifying risks, desiging approaches and implementing interventions increases the likelihood that peacebuilding programmes will be in line with local needs.

- PBEA work on access to conflict sensitive education benefited from UNICEF's equity focus has shown the ability to be brought to scale and achieved the most outcome level results. Conflict drivers related to a culture of violence, exclusion and inequality are best linked to UNICEF's mandate and experience.

  Implications: Closely linking UNICEF's peacebuilding work to its mandate, strategies and capacities to address context specific conflict drivers provides the best opportunity to reach scale as other sources of funding and initiatives to increase access can be adapted to reach peacebuilding goals.

- The PBEA underestimated the time and resources needed for initial sensitisation, advocacy and capacity development required to engage effectively in peacebuilding work. This resulted in delayed implementation and spending compared to initial plans.

  Implications: When UNICEF engages in new areas of work proper attention must be paid to the time and resources required to establish the space and capacity to operate. Failure to do so results in unrealistic commitments and expectations for results.

CONCLUSION

This section presented an analysis of PBEA results, and the extent to which PBEA's has achieved intended outcomes of strengthening the education system for peacebuilding programming, building institutional and personal capacities of UNICEF education staff, key partners and beneficiaries, and increasing knowledge on linkages between education, conflict and peacebuilding.

Two overarching conclusions can be made from the results;

1. **That the PBEA has, by and large achieved substantive results in each of the 5 PBEA outcome areas and is following appropriate and the most promising practices for peacebuilding programming, but also that a number of important lessons were learned about programming choices that are required for UNICEF to increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable peacebuilding results; and,**

2. **That the PBEA has demonstrated that the choice of using social services such as education for delivering peacebuilding results is the right one, in that it provides an opportunity to address inequality, for individuals and communities to develop conflict management skills and tools, and an opportunity to strengthen the policy framework required for reducing vulnerability and disruptions due to conflict, even though some of the necessary building blocks are yet to be put in place.**

CHAPTER 5

UNICEF'S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding has evolved over the course of PBEA implementation, gradually benefiting from increased knowledge and understanding of core concepts and growing involvement of sectors and units beyond education. The evaluation set out to examine UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its mandate and institutional strengths and examine the effectiveness of the tools that were deployed in PBEA implementation. It also set out to determine the extent to which the organisation is well positioned to undertake focused peacebuilding work based on core institutional strengths and learning from the PBEA. This chapter presents findings and conclusions on these issues.

5.1 UNICEF'S INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

The evaluation identified a number of institutional strengths that have supported PBEA implementation and position UNICEF well for focused peacebuilding work. A non-exhaustive list includes:

- UNICEF's mandate and renewed focus on equity, the comparative advantage of working with children and youth, and the reach of UNICEF-supported education programmes;
- experience in humanitarian and development work, and human-rights based approach to programming;
- experience combining upstream policy and downstream implementation in a holistic approach,
- UNICEF's decentralised structure, which enables easier adaptability in the face of changing contexts and risks, and,
- UNICEF's relationships with government at national and sub-national level, and with a variety of actors at the community level.

UNICEF's mandate for protecting and promoting the rights of children and its focus on equity provide it with a clear entry point to engage in peacebuilding. As the only external actor working on education at scale in many countries, UNICEF is well positioned to incorporate conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into education programmes. With many decades of working alongside countries on child rights and development the organisation's role as convenor of child-rights forums in many programme countries, UNICEF is accepted as a credible party at community and national levels on issues related to children. By framing peacebuilding work within a child rights framework

UNICEF has shown an ability to engage key stakeholders in conversations about drivers of conflict that might otherwise be viewed as too sensitive or difficult.

The evaluation found that UNICEF's strategic focus on equity to be an institutional advantage for the PBEA, understandably so because inequitable access to education (along with other social services) was often found to be a driver of conflict in implementing countries, hence PBEA programmes already had a natural entry point in conjunction with existing CO priorities. The focus on equity in programmes created the space for PBEA staff to add a component of conflict sensitivity or peacebuilding messaging to existing models of UNICEF programming, and in some cases support scaling up of programmes meant to improve access or quality of education. For example, in Pakistan PBEA adapted existing alternative learning programme models and school enrollment campaigns to better target marginalised children and youth and integrate social cohesion into curricula.

Countries with active conflicts and those that are in a post conflict recovery situation or are at high risk for conflict often provide services for emergency relief and long term programmes to meet other development needs. Since UNICEF has this dual focus, its combined experience working in humanitarian and development work positions it well to work in these environments. PBEA staff and CO managers come from both emergency and development backgrounds and were able to balance the impetus to alleviate immediate suffering with the need to address root causes of conflict.

For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo PBEA is managed by an education specialist with responsibility for PBEA, EiE and serves as the Democratic Republic of Congo's Education Cluster Coordinator. As such, PBEA funded activities covered a spectrum from traditional education in emergencies responses to system-level approaches to ensure peacebuilding through the sector. National level policy work was undertaken to ensure that conflict analysis and equity are integrated into the education sector review and EMIS to support longer-term peacebuilding. At the same time, IDPs in conflict-affected regions had access to quality non-formal and formal education in safe protective learning environments with recreational and psychosocial support via the distribution of educational kits.

Peacebuilding requires changes in behavior and systems. Hence UNICEF's experience, and commitment (as per the current strategic plan) to combining upstream policy and advocacy work with downstream programme implementation is an advantage for peacebuilding work. Many other peacebuilding actors work either at the individual and community level or at the institutional and systems level. Working at both levels in a holistic approach enhances credibility for advocacy and engaging communities.

UNICEF's ability to adapt its programming to address changes in contexts and risks is further discussed later in this chapter (5.5) and its relationships with governments are covered in chapter 6.2.

5.2 COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF PEACEBUILDING CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

At the beginning of the PBEA programme, peacebuilding concepts were not commonly understood between sections, teams and COs engaged.[58] The evaluation found that PBEA implementing units have gained a sound understanding of the key concepts - conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding and social cohesion - as per the 2012 definitions paper developed by EMOPS [59].

[58] United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office. *Evaluability Assessment of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (PBEA)*. UNICEF, New York, NY, United States, 2013; Search for Common Ground, *M&E System Development Case Study*. SFCG, 2013.

[59] United Nations Children's Fund. *Key Peacebuilding Concepts And Terminology*. Updated 2014.

A number of concept notes[60] contributed to improved clarity. HQ staff has also included emphasis on building conceptual clarity at global meetings and developed a new peacebuilding capacity development training package (led by HATIS) that has been implemented from early 2015.

In 2015, 10 country offices used peacebuilding, social cohesion, resilience and conflict sensitivity in similar ways to global PBEA definitions. A number of COs engaged key stakeholders in discussions to define context specific understanding of concepts. For instance, social cohesion has been used inter-changeably as a term with peacebuilding in some countries. COs did not use the term "human security" (included in the original vision) in interviews during the evaluation process, mirroring recent guidance that moves away from the term as a guiding concept for PBEA.[61] Instead, country offices have developed more contextualised definitions, and adjust them regularly, based on stakeholder consultations.

The evaluation found that a shared and deeper understanding of the conceptual underpinnings for peacebuilding work is greater among PBEA teams with resident peacebuilding specialists, and among other programme staff that have a closer working relationship with the PBEA programme. Unfortunately only 7 PBEA countries[62] hired dedicated peacebuilding specialists and capacity development modules for training staff in peacebuilding were only developed in 2014. UNICEF has only a handful of peacebuilding experts in regional and HQ offfices, which means that the organisation will need to commit significant resources to grow a critical mass of peacebuilding practitioners if a decision is made to assume a bigger role in peacebuilding work.

5.3 UNDERLYING THEORIES OF CHANGE

Throughout its implementation, PBEA teams attempted to follow good programming practices, that is, providing a clear articulation of the situation that the programme aims to remedy through their conflict analyses, and what change will look like in terms of outcomes, pathways to achieving the desired change in terms of interventions, programme inputs, and assumptions.

At a global level many documents contain elements suggesting a broader programme-wide theory of change. From these and other inputs from key informants during the inception phase, the evaluators diagrammed an "inferred" foundation theory of change. This was a depiction by the evaluation team, of what the PBEA was intended to achieve (the strategic result and five PBEA outcomes), as well as the processes and the inputs required to achieve the intended outcomes. Figure 3 presents the 'foundation' theory of change.

The foundation theory of change provided a graphic representation of a "menu of options" for programming approaches for education and peacebuilding. Rather than prescribing building blocks for a replicable programme in education and peacebuilding or elaborating on how each outcome would contribute to the programme vision, the open-ended theory of change provided a framework for innovation and context-specific theories of change at the country-level. In other words, the foundation theory of change is not used in the traditional sense as a conceptual and/or analytical framework for the evaluation.

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60 United Nations Children's Fund. *Education and Resilience*. UNICEF, New York, NY, United States, 2014; United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office; United Nations Children's Fund Programme Division. *Mainstreaming Resilience into Sector Programme*. Internal Working Document. August, 2014; UNICEF Learning For Peace, 2014; McCandless, E, Nilaus-Tarp K. *Social Service Contributions to Resilience though Peacebuilding. Programme Guidance, Theories of Change and Indicators.* 11 November, 2014.

61 United Nations Children's Fund. *Key Peacebuilding Concepts And Terminology.* Updated 2014.

62 Burundi, Chad, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda.

To that end, all PBEA COs elaborated theories of change for individual outcome areas in their operational matrices. Most of these used simple "if/then" statements without clearly identified assumptions about the links between outputs and outcomes, or the influence of mitigating or moderating environmental factors. Only three of the reviewed country offices developed a holistic theory of change for their entire PBEA programme (Burundi, South Sudan and Uganda). These holistic theories change were recognised by their comprehensive description in narrative and graphic illustrations of how and why the PBEA programme's change would occur in their country for specific target areas and groups. These theories of change clearly linked vertical results (outputs to outcomes) and identified synergies between horizontal results (outcomes) that crossed over multiple activities and approaches, while also pinpointing assumptions throughout the programme results chain. Two of the three country programmes were also found to have highly mainstreamed peacebuilding in their work.

Based on the fieldwork done in three countries, the evaluation team developed country level theories of change (two by inference, and one graphical interpretation based on the articulated programme-wide theory of change for Burundi[63]). Each of these country specific broad PBEA theories of change are highly adapted to the context and conflict drivers in the countries. While some strategies and intervention types are the same, comparison of the three theories of change shows different programme focus based on specific conflict drivers, operating environments and stakeholder interests. This supports the earlier findings that quality implementation needs to be linked to local needs and priorities in order to address contextual needs and drivers of conflict.

Programmes that address conflict drivers are distinct from other programming initiatives in that conflict dynamics, drivers and consequences are unique to each context. This means that programme developers may need different theories of change for different implementation sites of the same programme. On the other hand, applying overarching results and best practices in programme design is desirable. A context-specific theory of change can then identify the building blocks to achieve the agreed long-term goals. Hence the PBEA was stronger for insisting on the use of context-specific theories of change because peacebuilding programmes are inherently context-specific – there is no replicable formula for peacebuilding.

The development of programme-wide context-specific theories play a critical role in designing effective peacebuilding programmes by determining how the desired results will be achieved and identifying underlying assumptions, explaining the strategic advantage of the chosen theory of change over other theories, ensuring programme components are aligned, helping programmes adapt to changing circumstances and allowing UNICEF's peacebuilding initiatives to integrate with the efforts of other actors.

However, a foundation theory of change would still be a valid holistic explanation of UNICEF's programme approach and how well it plays with the strategies that UNICEF has outlined in the organisation's implemtation strategies (in the strategic paln, for instance). It would also serve the purpose of providing guidance that countries could draw from as they develop their context specific theories of change.

63 The Burundi CO developed its PBEA theory of change to create a unifying concept of how multiple sectors within UNICEF could contribute holistically to addressing conflict drivers. This is the only example found of a CO dedicating effort to develop and document a programme-wide theory of change, though some others have held ongoing discussions about programme theory that are undocumented.

FIGURE 3 Inferred PBEA global theory of change



Assumptions

UNICEF and partners have adequate will, conceptual clarity, skills, and resources to implement the PBEA strategy.

Addressing interventions at the policy, institutional and individual/household/ community levels is sufficient to contribute to peacebuilding through education.

Conflict analyses are in place and identify causes, drivers and effects of conflict. Country offices have the methods, tools and skills to use the conflict analyses to inform a context-specific programme design that addresses conflict.

Addressing the identified potential gaps between education and peacebuilding is sufficient to result in strengthened policies and practices for peacebuilding.



Education is a transformative social institution when it is equitably available, good quality, relevant and conflict sensitive. It forms the bedrock of a country's economy, good governance, gender equality, identity and culture.

Education is central to identify formation, promotes inclusion, contributes to state-building and can address inequalities that generate conflict. PBEA design can produce evidence on the link between education and peacebuilding.

Education lays the foundation for durable peace, sustainable development and social cohesion. Through peacebuilding, it also contributes to the resilience of individuals and communities.

5.4 PBEA'S EXPERIENCE WITH PROGRAMMING BASED ON CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Education specific conflict analysis was a key principle of the PBEA programme and featured prominently in the original PBEA proposal for funding submitted to the Government of the Netherlands in 2011.[64] The evaluation reviewed available conflict analyses (or summaries) for all PBEA countries and found that the approach and focus of conflict analyses has differed across countries, along with their utilisation and influence on subsequent programming choices. Consolidated information on the CA for each PBEA country is provided in Appendix 5.

All 14 countries used PBEA funds to conduct conflict analysis, though in some cases only education specific analysis was conducted to complement pre-existing macro conflict analysis (see Appendix 5). Seven country programmes have since updated their original conflict analysis, while eleven programmes included education sector analysis and conducted conflict analysis down to sub-national levels.

Country offices utilised several approaches to conduct their conflict analyses; (i) as desk-based reviews or field-based reviews involving stakeholders at all levels the country (ii) as part of regular UNICEF processes (UNICEF SitAn or multit-agency Situation Analysis) or by consultants or research institutions hired by UNICEF; (iii) as a one time initiative versus a regularly updated process that includes conflict scans and full updates; (iv) those with education specific components versus those with broad non-sectoral analyses; and, (v) those based on national level analysis versus those that included sub-analyses.

Quality of CAs were judged based on whether they were multi-level (national and sub-national), multi-sectoral, context sensitive, conducted in a participatory approach, and resulted in dedicated resources, expertise and commitment to use and update the CA. Five CAs were classified as high quality, and 8 as medium quality.

Utilisation of conflict analysis and its influence on programming varied considerably. Of the 14 PBEA implementing country offices:

- 11 indicated that the CAs were used in the design of their programme. Among those, some activities primarily used CA information to guide conflict sensitive programming (do no harm), while other activities directly addressed drivers of conflict (peacebuilding).
- 7 noted that CAs influenced broader UNICEF programme design in the Country Programme Document (CPD) and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), and
- 7 reported that CAs influenced the programmes of other development partners, national governments and/or other actors in their country.

The 7 country offices that regularly monitored conflict drivers (through conflict scans, research and monitoring) and updated their CA reported that this practice allowed their programmes to address emerging issues and adjust programming. The 8 COs that facilitated highly participatory CAs report significant advantages related to establishing stakeholder buy-in, identifying windows of opportunity for programming, building trust and capacities, and sensitising stakeholder groups on the need to conduct healthy dialogue about conflict.

Overall, PBEA countries used over 20 types of interventions, sometimes in combination with one another, linked to a wide array of conflict drivers (grouped into 9 categories). Table 12 shows that the PBEA most frequently focused its interventions on conflict drivers addressing a culture of violence[65], exclusion and inequality. UNICEF's comparative advantage in working with children and expertise in education provides a unique entry point among UN agencies into addressing the social causes and consequences of conflict and violence.

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64 UNICEF, "Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education, Presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands", October 2011

65 Culture of violence is defined as, "aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) - that can be used to justify or legitimise direct or structural violence." Source: Galtung, Johan, *Culture of Violence*, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 27, no. 3, 1990

TABLE 12 Result statements by intervention type and conflict driver

MAIN INTERVENTION TYPES	Chronic insecurity	Culture of violence (and its many forms)	Reinte-gration of returnees (and IDPs)	Weak governance	Exclusion (youth, women, children, ethinc groups, etc.)	Low levels of development and inequitable economic development	Mobil-isation of ethnic and religious divisions	Inequality between identity-based groups and access to services and resources	Gender-based identities and discrim-ination
Teacher Training	1	11	1	3	3	0	2	7	4
Advocacy	4	9	2	3	8	3	1	6	1
Sports / Camps / Play	1	9	2	1	4	1	5	5	0
Capacity development general (workshops, advice...)	2	3	1	4	8	4	4	9	2
Adolescents and Youth	2	6	0	1	5	0	0	1	0
Community Dialogue	2	8	2	1	3	0	4	2	0
Child Friendly Schools/ Education	0	6	1	1	3	0	0	2	2
Education Policy	1	7	0	2	5	1	0	3	0
School Construction	0	2	4	1	1	1	1	4	1
Community Conflict Mediation	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Early Childhood Education / Development	0	5	3	2	2	0	2	3	2
Life Skills	1	7	1	1	5	1	3	3	0
Primary education	0	4	1	4	5	2	0	4	1
Curriculum Development and Reform	0	3	0	4	2	0	2	5	2
Education Sector Plan	0	2	0	4	4	1	1	4	0
Participatory conflict analysis	2	6	1	4	7	3	1	4	0
Research	2	6	0	2	4	1	0	2	1
Child Protection	0	5	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Gender-based Violence	0	4	1	1	3	0	3	3	3
Reducing school violence	0	4	0	1	1	1	0	1	0

While other agencies working in peacebuilding often focus on governance and security, UNICEF has the ability to work both upstream at the institutional level and downstream at the individual and community level across a range of social services including education. This capacity, combined with a comparatively unique focus on children and youth, allows UNICEF to address the transmission of conflict and violence across the life-cycle including at the earlier stages of life and enable children and adolescents as potential change agents for peace.

Table 12 also shows that PBEA used a wide range of interventions to address culture of violence in the different countries (from working in early childhood development (ECD), and primary education, to youth activities, camps, plays, dialogues and mediation, life skills education, and also capacity building, including at individual and institutional levels, along with extensive policy work and research, education reforms, conflict analysis and GBV).

Exclusion and inequality were addressed through capacity development, interventions with youth and adolescents such as sports and camps, and also through development of education sector plans, curriculum reform, primary education strengthening and participatory conflict analysis. To a lesser extent weak governance was addressed through capacity development, education sector plans, curriculum reform, primary education strengthening and participatory conflict analysis as well.

Box 6 describes the lessons consolidated by the PBEA Programme management Team (PMT) from CAs conducted under the PBEA programme.

The evaluation found evidence to support the lessons identified in this synthesis report, in particular the need to examine both macro and sector specific aspects of conflict drivers and including sub-national and local analysis was corroborated by the evaluation. Another lesson confirmed by the evaluation is that conflict analyses need to better identify how education (and social services more broadly) interacts with and potentially reinforce conflict drivers through the delivery of social services.

For instance, in Pakistan the CO found that communities identified additional drivers of conflict beyond the national analysis when consulted and prioritised conflict drivers differently across provinces, including emphasis on inequitable access to social services. Many CO also found that macro conflict analyses emphasised drivers related to overarching economic, governance and security issues rather than issues that relate to social service delivery.

The evaluation also found that conducting conflict (or social cohesion) analysis can strain UNICEF's relationships with governments where conflict related issues are particularly sensitive and politically nuanced. Country offices faced with such situations (e.g. Ethiopia and Pakistan) had to carefully balance long-term relationship factors with the need for objective analysis of conflict drivers. Through efforts to sensitise key stakeholders, outsourcing CA work to partners and careful management of CA information these COs were able to collect the needed information to inform their PBEA programmes.

BOX 6 **Lessons on PBEA conflict analysis**

LESSONS LEARNED FROM CONFLICT ANALYSES

In 2015 UNICEF published a comparative analysis of the methodologies of the 14 PBEA countries' CAs entitled "Overview and Lessons Learned for Conflict Analysis: How conflict analyses informed UNICEF's peacebuilding and education programme". The paper aims to: analyse and share the practical experiences of undertaking a CA; identify key elements of CA and show how these were employed across fourteen countries; highlight organisational learning and challenges that have emerged from these experiences; identify key contextual challenges to consider when planning a CA; and summarise key implications of CA for policy and programming.

UNICEF's approach to conflict analysis:
UNICEF summarises its approach to the PBEA CAs as an institutional approach that is sensitive to different contexts and ensures engagement with partners. CA is multi-level and multi-sectoral and serves as the foundation for an evidence base as well as programming.

Methodology:
Five main elements for CA methodology identified in the review include:

- Profile/Situation Analysis, i.e. a CA often based on existing sources
- Causal Analysis, i.e. identification and classification of existing and potential causes of conflict including structural/root causes, proximate causes, conflict triggers and conflict consequences via a literature review plus consultation
- Stakeholder Analysis, i.e. review of local, national, regional and international actors that are influenced or who influence conflict including their perspectives, relationships and how to engage them
- Analysis of Conflict Dynamics, i.e. analysis of the interactions of causes with stakeholders as well as connecters and dividers plus windows of opportunity for programming
- Prioritisation, i.e. a multi-stakeholder strategic planning process to determine which causes of conflict are most relevant for interventions across and within sectors

Lessons learned:
A number of lessons were captured about how CA should be undertaken within UNICEF:

- Analysis needs to capture both historic perspective and contemporary political developments
- Analysis needs to explore the relevance of macro drivers of conflict to education, perhaps through a broad multi-level cross-sectoral analysis that is complemented by focused education-specific analysis
- Level of analysis should include cross-border, national, sub-national, districts and communities
- The nature of the UN presence and UNICEF's role should be examined and strategic links made between PBEA and the higher-level peacebuilding agenda of the UN
- Challenges remain in terms of concepts and language
- Balance teams between international and local expertise in order to take backgrounds and potential biases into account
- Ensure strong and continued interaction between Education and Peacebuilding Specialists in programme design and implementation

5.5 PROGRAMME ADAPTATIONS WITHIN THE DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE

The PBEA has proven adaptable to changes in context and mitigated risks in many environments, increasing programme relevance and effectiveness and protecting UNICEF's positioning for peacebuilding work. Heightened sensitivity to discussions about conflict and peacebuilding posed a significant risk to programme implementation. However, the evaluation found that PBEA programming was adapted successfully to address a number of concerns in several coountries.

In Pakistan sensitivity within the government and among other key stakeholders resulted in an extended period of sensitisation and trust building around core peacebuilding and social cohesion concepts in conjunction with the CA. The programme was reframed as Social Cohesion and Resilience and careful use of terminology was adopted. Over time and with other contextual events (including a highly publicised attack on a school) this approach built stakeholder buy-in and positioned UNICEF well for PBEA implementation.

Similar approaches to adopting less sensitive terminology, building buy-in through participatory CAs and slowly sensitising stakeholders through capacity building and outreach have shown similar success in positioning UNICEF for PBEA work. Cote D'Ivoire CO took a more low-key role than originally planned in the increasingly politicised national truth and reconciliation process to maintain its neutrality in the country. Chad focused on an extended period (one year) of training and sensitisation (including engagement in participatory conflict analysis) with MoE and subnational education stakeholders to build buy-in on PBEA programme objectives.

Other examples of positive programme adaptation in the face of new shocks include the following:

- Ebola virus disease (EBV) response: In Liberia and Sierra Leone national youth volunteers recruited and trained to conduct PBEA work were retrained and deployed to conduct social mobilisation and spread important public health messages to communities along with some messages about social cohesion.These efforts built on and reinforced the high levels of community trust in these PBEA volunteers and kept them engaged so they could continue PBEA work as the outbreak was brought under control.
- Conflict response: In South Sudan the PBEA programme addressed trauma through counselling and reconciliation activities for teachers and students. UNICEF began to engage in POC sites after the conflict outbreak in mid-December 2013 to increase social cohesion among inter-ethnic and mono-ethnic communities through sports and other recreational activities. As part of UNICEF's work on transitional justice, in Côte d'Ivoire youth were engaged in self-reflection on their role as victims and perpetrators of violence to transform their role into active citizens for peace. In Burundi, the CO and its partners advocated for children's rights and protection in schools in response to the recent militarisation and targeting of schools by the police and military during the election crisis.
- Natural disaster response: UNICEF integrated conflict-sensitivity principles and peacebuilding approaches into its emergency responses to natural disasters in order to protect longer-term development objectives and avoid conflict. For example, in Chad frequent wind and flood emergencies affect areas with high risk of conflict and instability. Integrating peacebuilding efforts with DRR and response allows PBEA to potentially prevent the effects of disasters from further damaging social cohesion and leading to conflict.

In some cases shocks were simply too overwhelming for PBEA to adapt and programme implementation was halted for a period of time. In Yemen the evacuation of CO staff has completely stopped programme implementation. In the State of Palestine the initial implementation of the programme was delayed one year due to conflict in Gaza and programming was again stopped in part of 2013 and 2014 when the conflict resumed. In South Sudan peaks of conflict and violence have led to the CO evacuating and reassigning PBEA staff for periods of up to 6 months for cluster coordination and emergency response roles. Yet, it should be highlighted that the PBEA team in South Sudan showed a high level of adaptation to changes in context and risks through programme adjustments to PBEA and the wider education portfolio after the mid-December 2013 crisis.

Overall, PBEA represented a new way of working in many country offices and examples of positive adaptation were found to address potential limitations and risks posed by traditional implementing partners, siloed sectoral approaches and highly contextualised programming based on the results of CAs. Many country offices highlited the need to identify and select new implementing partners with peacebuilding experience (see section 4.3) and in some cases took risks, which yielded positive results to engage with non-traditional partners.

Conflict analyses often identified conflict drivers that were difficult to address through education programmes alone and adapted by engaging other sectors, or in a few cases making PBEA a cross-cutting inter-sectoral programme all together. In countries where conflict analyses included the sub-national level (rather than relying on national level data analysis), PBEA programmes were frequently adapted to address specific conflict drivers and engage in work to address very specific issues rather than a one-size national implementation approach. These inter-sectoral adaptations and the ability to tailor programmes to local needs enhanced UNICEF's responsiveness, and further illustrate the organisation's position as a relevant peacebuilding actor.

Risks and challenges to UNICEF's strategic positioning

From interviews with CO staff and partners, annual reports and other country-level documentation, the following common risks and challenges in PBEA implementation were identified, some of which may complicate UNICEF's positioning for peacebuilding work.

Political sensitivities between national government and other partners around terms such as 'peacebuilding' and 'conflict': Many countries do not label themselves as conflict-affected and are therefore resistant to conflict analyses, conflict-sensitive approaches and peacebuilding programming. With dedicated efforts to sensitise key stakeholders and adapt programme language most COs were able to create buy-in for peacebuilding (often called social cohesion) work in these contexts.

Education's potential roles as a conflict driver and a means to address conflict drivers was previously unrecognised in many contexts. Finding entry points to change the attitudes and perceptions of the peacebuilding community and education practitioners on education as a conflict driver and enabler of peace was identified as a challenge at global and country levels, especially in the first two years of the programme. With time and effort, most COs were able to overcome this sensitivity due to UNICEF's strong position in the education sector.

Conceptual underpinings of programmatic interventions often reflect a dilution of education's role in peacebuilding by limiting it to peace education. Among a wide range of practitioners and researchers in the field a tendency exists to reduce peacebuilding in education to issues of peace education, which is focused on teaching skills, knowledge and attitudes for peace primarily via curricular interventions. This speaks to the inherent challenges of breaking free of dominant (and sometimes flawed) global paradigms that may not be relevant to local contexts.

Diffusion of resources across many countries limits the scale of capacity building and programmes and as a result the degree of systemic change possible. The amount of funding made available for each PBEA country is small compared to other education sector funding. Therefore, most COs set out to integrate PBEA programming into broader education work rather than building dedicated capacity to design new programmes to address conflict drivers. The limited scale and duration of programmes due to funding limits makes widespread behavior and systems change more difficult. While piloting peacebuilding across many countries has increased the likelihood of identifying promising practices, UNICEF's strategic positioning could be strengthened by concentrating resources on fewer interventions and countries if funding remains limited.

Programme targeting choices will sometimes only lead to small-scale results but can raise expectations for programme expansion and continuation that are hard to meet and manage. With effective communication COs were somewhat able to mitigate this risk, yet the long-term nature of peacebuilding work means short-term commitments can undermine UNICEF's positioning.

The lack of exit strategies for peacebuilding programmes potentially goes against "do no harm" principles and could jeopardise UNICEF positioning if programmes are abruptly halted.[66]

5.6 KEY FINDINGS ON UNICEF'S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING

UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding has evolved over the course of PBEA implementation, gradually benefiting from gains in knowledge and understanding of core concepts. The key findings of the evaluation on UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding are:

- Eight country offices facilitated highly participatory CAs engaging communities, partners and governments at various levels. This supports effectiveness of peacebuilding with advantages for stakeholder buy-in, identifying windows of opportunity, building trust and capacities and sensitising key stakeholders.

  Implications: Many actors have a high stake in peacebuilding interventions, high influence over outcomes and best understand the factors that undermine peace. Broad consultation and engagement are essential for effectiveness.

- PBEA effectiveness and relevance were enhanced by its demonstrated ability to adapt to changes in contexts and mitigate risks posed by shocks (disease outbreaks, natural disasters and conflicts), obstacles in the authorising environment and organisational structures.

  Implications: The need for peacebuilding work corresponds to volatile and insecure envirnoments which demand a high degree of adaptability. Initiating peacebuilding work where it has not been an area of focus for UNICEF requires new approaches both internal (cross-sectoral) and external (consensus building and contextualisation).

- UNICEF's mandate, strategic committments and focus on equity position it well to engage in peacebuilding, especially where a culture of violence, exclusion and/or inequitable access to social services are key conflict drivers. This allowed PBEA to be more scalable and effective by integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into broader education and child protection initiatives.

[66] Operational principles for peacebuilding programming recommend an exit strategy as an integrated part of the strategic plan in order to ensure that peacebuilding and other humanitiarian or development gains are sustained. A poorly timed or unplannned exit may result in worsening conflict due to unmet expectations or dependence on support that other actors cannot fulfill.

Implications: Positioning UNICEF's peacebuilding work within its mandate and core strategies rather than as a stand-alone programme can enhance credibility and take advantage of larger initiatives and increase reach.

- The decentralised nature of PBEA enhanced relevance and supported peacebuilding by facilitating focus on context-specific conflict drivers. Sub-national conflict analysis further enhances relevance.

  Implications: Conflict drivers may be categorised but they differ down to the most local of geographic locations and stakeholder priorities. Consultative processes have the best potential to ensure local needs and priorities are matched to programme design.

- Regular monitoring of conflict drivers and updates of CAs helps ensure relevance and is a good practice for all risk informed programming that should be sustained into future programming. This allowed adjustment of programmes to address emerging issues.

  Implications: Drivers of conflict can emerge quickly or change over time. Continuous risk scanning allows adjustment of programmes to address emerging issues.

- Global concept notes, training and workshops have enhanced coherence and PBEA implementing units now broadly understand key concepts regarding conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding and social cohesion. These concepts need to be contextualised and updated based on stakeholder consultations and changes in context.

  Implications: Coherence in peacebuilding requires both global support as well as participatory contextual adaptation.

- Holistic theories of change (at country level) with clear assumptions and information about mitigating and moderating factors support coherence by helping understand complexity and ensuring complementarity across interventions. A detailed global theory of change is not possible or desirable as peacebuilding must be context specific.

  Implications: Simple if/then theories of change for each outcome area favor siloed programmes. Overarching theories of change can better guide peacebuilding programme strategies if grounded in context specific analysis.

CONCLUSION

This section presented an analysis of UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its mandate and institutional strengths, and how well it is positioned to engage in peacebuilding programming.

Two overarching conclusions can be made from the results;

1. **UNICEF is well-positioned to engage in peacebuilding work based on its mandate and institutional strengths. However, the organisation needs to navigate sensitivities, identify entry points, focus resources on high risk environments to achieve scale and emphasise the primacy of context specific programming.**

2. **PBEA emphasis on conflict analysis based programming was the right approach and leads to responsive context specific programmes that can contribute to peacebuilding.**

CHAPTER 6

PARTNERSHIPS FOR PBEA WORK AND BEYOND

UNICEF-wide collaboration and external partnerships have been critical to PBEA's success. The evaluation examined how well PBEA was able to mobilize internal expertise and mainstream peacebuilding goals. It also set out to determine the extent to which PBEA engaged external partners well and efficiently. This chapter presents findings and conclusions on this set of issues.

6.1 UNICEF-WIDE COLLABORATION AND LEARNING

PBEA teams at HQ and in country offices have sought to incorporate other sectors and units in programme implementation as opportunities arose. A few positive examples of mainstreaming and institutionalisation were found that suggest the potential for sustainability of peacebuilding within UNICEF structures. However, leadership support for peacebuilding work was found to be a crucial factor in support of mainstreaming and institutionalisation.

Collaboration and coordination with other divisions and efficiencies

The initial PBEA concept and proposal were developed jointly by the GoN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UNICEF Education Section based on key learning from a study on education and conflict commissioned under the EEPCT programme. Consultations were expanded as the proposal was finalised to include the PRS unit (then under EMOPS) and other sections. Initial debates on whether the programme should be cross-sectoral were resolved before the proposal was submitted, reportedly based on donor interest to keep programme management and focus under education. Subsequently, a muti-sectoral[67] technical working group (TWG) was formed in the first year of implementation

Since PBEA was initially designed as primarilly an education focused programme, the Programme Management Team (PMT) assumed a lead-sector partnership model under the Education Section, and incorporated activites with support from the TWG. An alternative model for the PMT could have been to assemble a cross-sectoral management team, or to situate the programme under HATIS, which leads crosscutting initiatives including other peacebuilding support. Yet, it is less likely that an alternative partnership approach would have been more successful in achieving efficiencies as decision-making power and influence within UNICEF is reportedly based in sector teams.

That notwithstanding, EMOPS provided strong support for developing conflict analysis methods and core peacebuilding guidance during

[67] The Health and WASH sectors have not been engaged significantly in the PBEA at the global level, and only rarely at CO levels.

the first few months of PBEA implementation. With the support of PBEA funding, TWG members identified opportunities to test and employ tools and solutions from theirs sectors, including the peacebuilding capacity development toolkit developed by a new PD unit, HATIS (formerly the EMOPS-based PRS).

The TWG is reportedly one of the few inter-sectoral mechanisms of its kind and it helped PBEA bring different expertise and perspectives into the programme thinking. However, TWG members reported that this structure was less about collaboration or coordination, but more information sharing, and that their influence was somewhat limited to their delegated project activities.

The evaluation found different models of collaboration and coordination with varying degrees of efficiency in country offices. In a few country offices where PBEA staff are direct reports of the Representative or Deputy Representative, greater efficiency for cross-sectoral programming was enabled in that leadership had a broader perspective to influence cooperation from other sectors, and to engage the Representative's Office in peacebuilding advocacy. In the other COs, cross-sector collaboration was primarily driven by good working relationships between individuals, rather than designated proceses and structures.

The lead-sector collaboration model was most effective and efficient where programmes remained focused on education interventions and conflict drivers linked to inequitable access. Where COs worked to address other conflict drivers, such as a culture of violence, broader cross-sectoral models were found to be more effective and efficient.

Mainstreaming peacebuilding processes in UNICEF programming

The evaluation considered the extent to which PBEA has resulted in mainstreaming and/or institutionalisation of peacebuilding. Mainstreaming was defined as integrating peacebuilding into programmes of one or more sectors. Successful mainstreaming should result in adjusting organisational structures, systems, strategies, and/or policies to emphasise peacebuilding and demonstrated through funding, communications, leadership commitment and staffing. Mainstreaming of peacebuilding has taken place to a varying extent in PBEA implementing countries.

At HQ many key informants referenced broader initiatives to incorporate conflict analyses into UNICEF systems. This shift was supported by elements of the Strategic Plan related to resilience and a long-running process to develop an organisational policy paper on resilience with peacebuilding as a core component. Within the Education sector, an indicator linked to the strategic plan also supports conducting risk analysis, which is interpreted to include conflict analysis. Recent HATIS work to develop a capacity development package on peacebuilding also presents potential for greater institutionalisation.

TWG members reported early stages of mainstreaming peacebuilding into their work with sector/thematic concept notes, theories of change and research at varying levels of development. Key informants believe this work will have a lasting influence and continue beyond PBEA, but they also note that some products may not have been disseminated or used widely within PBEA countries or beyond as of yet.

In WCARO there is strong evidence of mainstreaming peacebuilding into 'education in emergencies portfolio through the influence of PBEA staff member who was formely responsible foe EiE work. Building on the work of the Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peacebuilding team (HARP) in ESARO, efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity into institutional and individual capacity building and humanitarian and development response are being realigned with the broader resilience agenda. As earlier noted, this includes establishment of the Fragile States Working Group and political economy training for Country Representatives

as well as integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches into SitAns and Country Programme Documents throughout the region.

As shown in Figure 4, all PBEA implementing countries were found to have mainstreamed peacebuilding processes into their education sector responses, albeit to varying degrees. Burundi was the only CO that mainstreamed peacebuilding fully into all components of their country programme. The next level of success in mainstreaming was achieved by Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone and South Sudan, where peacebuilding was mainstreamed fully into education, and at least one other sector. In Chad, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia and Uganda, peacebuilding processes were mainstreamed into the education sector response, but only beginning to take hold in other sectors working on PBEA, such as Child Protection.

Ethiopia, State of Palestine and Yemen were the least successful in mainstreaming in that peacebuilding process were introduced only within the education sector. However, conflict analyses was integrated into UNICEF's SitAn processes and used to inform country programme planning in 7 of the 14 country offices. The evaluation found that strong country leadership support for peacebuilding or conflict sensitivity was instrumental in mainstreaming to other sectors.

At HQ, each sector is required to develop its own concept for implementing risk informed programming. As a result, staff at all levels speak of the importance of UNICEF at least operating in a conflict sensitive way. Within the Education sector, an indicator linked to the strategic plan also supports conducting risk analysis, which is interpreted to include conflict analysis. Recent HATIS work to develop a capacity development package also presents potential for further mainstreaming of peacebuilding work.

Mainstreaming of peacebuilding within UNICEF is not sustainable at this stage. Clear direction from senior leadership on UNICEF's role in peacebuilding is required for management at all levels to commit consistently to further peacebuilding work. Also, more effort is required to consolidate learning and to ensure that peacebuilding capacities are retained if the positive trends from PBEA implementation are to be sustained.

FIGURE 4 **Mainstreaming in PBEA COs**



BOX 7 **Example of mainstreaming in South Sudan**

By 2015, the UNICEF South Sudan Education (EiE, PBEA, Youth LEAD, Global Partnership for Education (GPE)), Child Protection, HIV/AIDS, Health, WASH, and C4D sections mainstreamed conflict sensitive and peacebuilding approaches in their respective programmes, resulting in programmes that directly took into account, mitigated and in some cases, addressed conflict drivers and causes.

Some of the specific results include:

- The UNICEF GPE programme ensured conflict sensitive programming in its 2014 school constructions in Warrap, Northern Bahr Ghazal, Western Equatoria State and Eastern Equatoria State and ensured education access to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
- The EiE-led Back to Learning campaign provided peacebuilding and life skills education to IDP and out-of-school children and youth in all ten States, teacher training on LS+PE, delivered peacebuilding messages and established Learning Spaces as Zones of Peace (LSZoP) in conflict-affected states.
- WASH, supported through a PBEA-EiE-WASH collaboration, ensured conflict sensitive programming while aiming to prevent conflict by facilitating and supporting agreements between communities on the use of water sites.

6.2 EXTERNAL PARTNERSHIPS

In addition to cross-sector collaboration within UNICEF, a range of external partnerships was identified as essential for UNICEF's implementation of the PBEA programme, including identification of new types of implementing partners. Partnerships contributed to programme implementation and knowledge and innovation.

The original PBEA proposal to the Government of the Netherlands[68] envisioned partnerships with UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Education Cluster (co-led by UNICEF) and other donors that support education and peacebuilding initiatives including the European Commission (EC), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Among these potential partners, the evaluation found evidence of DFID's involvement linked to the global PBEA research consortium, and national level coordination with the Education Cluster (e.g. South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo).

In practice, The PBEA team at HQ engaged in strategic consultations with PBSO and the Government of the Netherlands, worked with INEE as an implementing partner for conducting conflict sensitivity training, engaged Search for Common Ground on M&E and peacebuilding guidance, and commissioned 3 academic institutions to undertake research. Knowledge exchange and advocacy took place with USAID and GIZ and information and knowledge were shared through the Fragility Working Group of INEE. Other than that, little evidence was found of cooperative and strategic global partnerships with other key peacebuilding actors such as UNDP. This is a missed opportunity to share knowledge on good practice.

Among the most active global partners key informants indicated that UNICEF is making valuable contributions to the discourse on the role of social services in peacebuilding. UNICEF's credibility in this area is seen as growing as the lessons from PBEA allow it to take a proactive role in debates about peacebuilding within the UN and contribute to good practice discussions more broadly. Global level partnerships were also formed to support the research strategy and M&E.

[68] UNICEF Education Section, *Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education, Presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands*, New York, October 2011.

PBEA partnerships at the country level

At the national and local levels, UNICEF formed programme implementation partnerships with many of the right actors - civil society organisations, faith-based organisations and NGOs - based on their mandates, capacities, peacebuilding expertise, and with individuals with legitimacy and credibility in their communities. Implementing partner roles included delivering traditional and alternative eductation; developing or revising curriculum; training of teachers, children, adolescents and youth in life skills; facilitating community dialogue and mediation; and undertaking research and conflict analysis. Apart from national and sub-national governments, only a few implementing partners were involved in work related to policy though regular coordination with other actors on policy and curricular reform does take place.

PBEA country teams invested significantly in building conflict sensitivity and/or peacebuilding knowledge and capacities of pre-existing and new implementing partners. New partnerships proved important for PBEA. As noted in the report on implementing the UNICEF Strategic Framework for Partnerships and Collaborative Relationships, "In humanitarian contexts, the growing focus on resilience and disaster risk reduction implies building new partnerships across traditional dividing lines…..and partnerships can achieve both greater value for money and efficiencies when each partner brings their respective comparative advantage."[69] In 5 country offices, partnerships were formed with peace committees, religious institutions, and conflict mediation groups. These new partners' areas of expertise or focus did not previously lead UNICEF to engage them for its work in education or other sectors. These partnerships provided critical access to communities where conflict risk was prevalent which has successfully contributed to PBEA results.

While individuals with a combination of both peacebuilding and education capacities were in short supply among implementing partners, most country offices reported that their partners had acquired the capacity, skills and knowledge to implement PBEA by the last year of implementation. The substantial investments made by the PBEA in partner capacity and knowledge building in the earlier stages of PBEA did pay off by increasing UNICEF's ability to implement a wide range of projects with greater reach and coverage in latter stages of PBEA.

In country visits where more in-depth interaction with partners was possible UNICEF's partners viewed UNICEF as a credible partner in peacebuilding work given its mandate for child rights, experience in conflict settings and initiative to build its own and partner capacities.

Some implementing partners could have played a more significant strategic role in PBEA. IPs work primarily in isolation to one another and are not well informed of other work being done at different levels of the programme. One exception to this is the global research consortium. Partners also reported that their roles are limited to a purely contractual relationship where information provided and advice sought on more strategic issues is limited. This presents potential missed opportunities to gain from broader experience and knowledge of peacebuilding partners and for linkages or synergies between partners and workstreams.

Partnerships with national and sub-national governments played a critical role for all PBEA countries. Strong relationships with government served as an entry point, where and when windows of opportunity existed, for PBEA to influence policies, build government capacities for conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding and support policy implementation.

For instance, in Uganda strong relationships with the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Sports (MoESTS) allowed PBEA to influence the Conflict and Disaster Risk Management (CDRM)

[69] UNICEF, *Report on the implementation of the strategic framework for partnerships and collaborative relationships, Executive Board,* Second regular session 2012, 13 July 2012

framework at the national level and build capacities of national and sub-national education officers to implement the framework. The MoESTS sits on the PBEA advisory committee.

In Pakistan relationships with the provincial education departments in Sindh and Balochistan were strong due in part to UNICEF's administrative/coordination roles with the Global Partnership for Education. These relationships allowed PBEA to incorporate conflict sensitivity into education plans and initiate alternative learning programmes.

Benefits and risks of PBEA partnerships

Overall UNICEF capacities were significantly strengthened in two main ways by engaging in implementing partnerships: facilitating buy-in to PBEAs approach to peacebuilding and enhancing PBEA implementation. The 2013 PBEA Consolidated Annual Report documented that effective partnerships facilitated a shift in perception surrounding the role of education and buy-in to PBEA's approach towards peacebuilding.[70]

The expertise, community access and credibility of partners selected enhanced PBEA implementation, especially after capacity building by UNICEF to balance education and peacebuilding knowledge and skills. Internal and external key informants frequently stressed that UNICEF would be unable to implement PBEA without such partnerships (with the exception of upstream policy work). UNICEF often selected IPs based specifically on their skills and presence vis-a-vis the work PBEA needed to do based on the CAs.

Implementing partners also reported benefits of partnerships including increased knowledge and skills in subjects they had not previously worked on (education and peacebuilding) and overall capacity enhancement. National and sub-national government partners benefited from linkages created between education systems and the range of IPs and community structures (some newly created) working on the programme.

COs also experienced risks with PBEA partnerships, especially in areas and communities where UNICEF lacks regular access for reasons of security, geography or capacity. For instance, UNICEF engaged new, non-traditional and lower capacity NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) to ensure access, trust and credibility with targeted communities. Often these organisations had difficulties meeting UNICEF's reporting and financial accounting requirements.

COs felt these capacity building trade-offs were worth the investment because traditional INGO partners that have the infrastructure and experience to meet reporting and accounting standards lacked the key attributes needed for successful peacebuilding work. Similarly faith-based organisations (FBOs) were found to have extensive peacebuilding experience and high degrees of access and trust in some countries and proved important as IPs (Burundi, Pakistan, Uganda).

While partnerships broadly enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of overall PBEA implementation, a number of key UNICEF institutional processes got in the way of realising greater efficiency. UNICEF process for identifying, vetting and contracting implementing partners and corporate requirements for conducting capacity and financial assessments, put in place to prevent corruption, were cited by UNICEF staff and implementing partners across all country offices and at global level as causing significant delays to PBEA implementation. These delays were most significant for non-traditional or new IPs that had not previously been assessed, creating a disincentive to COs for selecting the best partner based on peacebuilding capacities.

[70] United Nations Children's Fund. *Peacebuilding, education and advocacy in conflict-affected contexts programme: UNICEF 2013 Annual Consolidated Report*. June 2014.

Often duration of PCAs was too short to fulfil long-term objectives (sometimes due to short funding cycles). Once contracts lapsed programmes were delayed (by up to one year in one CO) until new PCAs could be signed.

6.3 KEY FINDINGS ON PARTNERSHIPS FOR PBEA AND BEYOND

UNICEF-wide collaboration and external partnerships were critical to PBEA implementation. The key findings of the evaluation on coordination of PBEA within UNICEF are as follows:

- The PBEA management team at HQ coordinated effectively with other divisions to advance the objectives of the programme. At country level peacebuilding was being mainstreamed mostly within the education sector, Only a few country programmes made progress to integrate peacebuilding or conflict sensitive programming in other sectors.
- Some countries are beginning to integrate CA is into SitAn development processes.
- Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity across sectors or entire country programmes was a success factor in PBEA. However, there may be good justification for a sector-based approach to peacebuilding programming in some countries.
- Leadership support for peacebuilding work is a crucial factor for effective mainstreaming and/or institutionalisation and efficient cross-sectoral collaboration at all levels.
- The sector lead construct should be considered against alternatives given the nature of conflict drivers. The collaboration and coordination strategy employed by PBEA team at HQ represents a good practice for ensuring accountability for results.

The key findings of the evaluation on PBEA partnerships beyind UNICEF are as follows:

- UNICEF formed traditional and non-traditional implementing partnerships at the national and local levels, many of which made important contributions in enhancing PBEA effectiveness over time.
- Greater emphasis should be placed on coordination and forming partnerships with other peacebuilding actors within the UN system and beyond, and ensuring that each partner's role is maximised.
- Partnerships with national and sub-national governments played a critical role in enhancing effectiveness by providing entry points, identifying windows of opportunity and creating space for peacebuilding work, while non-traditional partners provided critical access to communities (through presence and local trust) increasing programme relevance.
- Inefficiencies in selecting implementing partners due to internal procedures disproportinately affected non-traditional partners, thereby creating a disincentive for selecting the best partner based on peacebuilding capacities. The duration of PCA's and contract lapses caused further inefficiencies.

CONCLUSION

This section presented an analysis of PBEA internal collaboration leading to mainstreaming and institutionalisation and the extent to which PBEA has formed effective external partnerships.

Two overarching conclusions can be made from the results;

1. **PBEA demonstrated that conflict-sensitve and/or preacebuilding programming that attemts to address drivers of conflict requires strong leadership support to enable cross-sectoral collaboration and ultimately mainstreaming of peacebuilding solutions.**
2. **Programme implementation partnerships, including new partners, have enabled UNICEF to increase its reach and access and deliver peacebuilding results. Additional emphasis is needed on high level advocacy and coordination partnerships and on managing implementing partners to better share knowledge across organisations.**

CHAPTER 7

PBEA MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

PBEA management and governance arrangements improved over time. The evaluation examined how well these arrangements were able to balance the need for accountability at the centralized level with context-specific needs. It also examined how well programme management arrangements supported the design, adaptability to the decentralized implementation structure, monitoring and reporting, as well as efficiency and transparency in the resource allocation process. Findings and conclusions on this set of issues are presented in this chapter.

7.1 IMPROVEMENTS IN MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE CAPACITIES

Management and governance roles and responsibilities were initially designed to address lessons learned from the EEPCT programme. They were set forth in the UNICEF proposal for funding to the Government of the Netherlands[71], and updated to increase efficiencies as the need arose. Hence the main components of the PBEA structure included the following:

- Programme Management Team
- CO management and PBEA teams
- RO PBEA teams
- Technical Working Group
- Accountability Committee
- Strategic Planning Advisory Group

While the first the groups do have management role, the TWG and the SPAG had technical and advisory roles, while the Accoutability Committee has a governance role. The first five components are UNICEF structures while the SPAG includes UNICEF and non-UNICEF members. This section describes capacities of all but the Allocations Committtee, which will be addressed as part of the resources allocation discussion (Section 6.3). It also discusses improvement of technical capacities.

PBEA Programme Management Team (PMT)

The Education Section in UNICEF's Programme Division in HQ assumed responsibility for the overall management and coordination of the PBEA through the Programme Management Team. Initially assembled in the third quarter of 2012, the PMT consisted of a Programme

[71] UNICEF Education Section, *Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education, Presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands,* New York, October 2011.

Manager, Knowledge Manager and an M&E Specialist. A fourth PMT peacebuilding and education specialist position was added in 2014. The PMT was situated within the Education Section, under the portfolio of the Senior Advisor for Education in Emergencies.

The PMT was established to "carry out the core functions necessary - strategic, financial, communications and monitoring and evaluation - to design and maintain a global programme."[72]. There was an expectation also, that the PBEA would be managed in a way that addressed key challenges associated with the EEPCT (its predecessor) by ensuring that global programme systems, guidance and accountability mechanisms were in place and followed.

The evaluation found that programme planning and implementation guidance was not adequate in the first years of the PBEA, but have improved over time. This partially reflects the pilot nature of the programme where key theories and concepts were being tested throughout the programme. But it also reflects early management decisions to delay hiring of staff at multiple levels, which limited initial programme coherence. The very slow start up of the PBEA programme has led to some missed opportunities for outcome achievement, impacting efficiency and effectiveness.

From the accounts of internal key informants at all levels the PMT has steadily worked to establish capacities and made necessary adjustments based on learning and feedback from COs and other units over time (including a shift away from direct CO backstopping assignments to functional roles as recommended by the evaluability assessment and changes in the envisioned global results framework).

Management capacities in PBEA implementing Country Offices

PBEA management capacities in country offices depended on the structures chosen to operationalise PBEA, PBEA team's access to peacebuilding expertise, senior management support, in particular, the involvement of country leadership in the program.

By 2014, 13[73] countries had hired a total of 30 dedicated PBEA programme staff, 10 of which were M&E brought in to support the M&E fuction, while 8 were peacebuilding experts. In 12 of 14 country programmes the PBEA team reported to the Chief of Education, and were direct reports of the Representative or Deputy Representative in two country offices.

All country programmes reported improved knowledge, skills and acceptance of peacebuilding among UNICEF management and staff over the course of PBEA implementation. Programmes that were able to hire staff with peacebuilding backgrounds earlier in the programming reported a positive impact on their ability to implement PBEA. In essence, country programmes with more dedicated PBEA human resources or a strong cross-sectoral team supported by senior management demonstrated greater effectiveness.

The role of the Regional Offices

RO capacity has improved with the hiring of PBEA dedicated education specialist and a M&E/ knowledge management specialist in WCARO 2013, a programme specialist in ESARO in 2013, and a knowledge management officer in ROSA in 2015. EAPRO, with only one PBEA programme in Myanmar, has provided some focused support to the bilingual education project.

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72 UNICEF Education Section, *Proposal on Peacebuilding and Education, Presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands*, New York, October 2011.

73 One CO allocated all PBEA responsibilities on a part time basis to existing staff. Many other CO assigned responsibilities to staff in other sections on a part-time basis.

In WCARO and ESARO (each with 5 PBEA COs), PBEA teams increasingly assumed technical backstopping role, and became the primary focal point for PBEA support. As recommended in the evaluability assessment this has included technical support for M&E, research and knowledge management (case studies, human interest stories, newsletters and bulletins), cross-country learning and support for contextual programme adaptation. WCARO and ESARO also served as a middle level of quality assurance for reporting. Some COs also highlighted the important advocacy role played by the RO when it was felt that HQ did not coordinate global research activities in particular countries or on the need for contextual adaptation when HQ was requesting COs to fit programmes into global frameworks.

Technical and/or advisory roles

Technical Working Group (TWG): The TWG was established early in the programme (in 2012). Its membership included representatives of other PD sections and units, namely, Child Protection, Department of Communications, Gender Rights (GRACE), HATIS, EMOPS, ADAP, the Evaluation Office, Communications for Development (C4D), Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and Early Childhood Development (ECD) and representatives of the PMT.

Stakeholders noted that the TWG platform was a relatively unique formation, which served as an effective forum for information sharing across sectors. TWG members contributed by developing tools and technical capacities for peacebuilding in their areas of expertise (see Section 4.4) and advising country offices through PMT led annual planning and reporting processes. These contributions increased the ability of PBEA to be relevant in contexts where conflict drivers could not be addressed through education interventions alone.

While TWG units managed discreet PBEA projects they were not intended to play a direct role in overall management of PBEA. Key informants from the TWG reported that the potential for this forum to serve as a more strategic coordination platform had yet to be realised but felt it had effectively served its purpose.

Strategic Planning Advisory Group (SPAG): As an advisory strcture chaired by the UNICEF Associate Director of Education, the main responsibility of the SPAG was to "provide strategic and technical input that informs the programme's progress towards achievement of the strategic result and overall outcomes".[74]

SPAG membership comprised of UNICEF senior management (Education, Child Protection, Evaluation Office, PARMO, EMOPS, Supply Division and the Innocenti Research Center, and the PBEA Programme Manager. External members are the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, UNDP's Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNHCR, Save the Children, the World Bank, Human Rights Watch, INEE, and the International Rescue Committee and a representative of the Government of Netherlands, the PBEA donor.

The SPAG met 6 times between 2012 and 2014, with variable attendance from the 7 UNICEF sections/offices (3 of which attended only one meeting), Five of the 9 external members attended 2 meetings or less. However, a few key SPAG members were consulted bilaterally by the PMT on a regular basis, resulting in positive contributions of peacebuilding expertise and environmental awareness.

Overall the SPAG failed to serve its intended strategic planning and advisory role. Internal and external stakeholders observed that the SPAG served as a forum for programme updates and some discussion of strategic issues but played little role in guiding the PBEA programme. This was perceived as a missed opportunity to more

[74] UNICEF, *MINUTES, Meeting of the Strategic Planning Advisory Group for the Advocacy, Peacebuilding and Education in Conflict-Affected Contexts Programme.* 11 April 2012.

actively engage strategic external organisations playing an active role in peacebuilding. It was not clear whether low participation levels were the result of how UNICEF engaged (or failed to engage) with the SPAG, or that some external participants simply could not lend the time due to competing priorities.

Beyond his attendance of the SPAG, the Deputy Director of the Programme Division actively followed and supported PBEA implementation, while the Associate Director of Education contributed through regular management oversight and guidance.

7.2 IMPROVING TECHNICAL CAPACITIES

Between 2012 and 2014, UNICEF amassed a wealth of guidance for the PBEA programme. The guidance was produced by the PBEA PMT, UNICEF sections and crosscutting teams at HQ, and by UNICEF partners in PBEA. Written guidance consisted primarily of:

a) sector-specific guidance for integrating peacebuilding in UNICEF education programming;

b) standardised tools for planning, reporting and monitoring for the PBEA programme (case studies, conflict scans, Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) surveys); and,

c) operational and technical guidance on approaches to peacebuilding, resilience and social cohesion, including definitions of concepts, and approaches for peacebuilding mainstreaming, and measurement.

Based on the document review, education sector-specific guidance comprised the most detailed and operational documents, although not all documents were finalised at the time of this report. Tools for planning, reporting and monitoring were well developed and evolved since earlier stages of the programme. Other sectors and crosscutting areas such as Child Protection and Gender have also developed specific guidance on peacebuilding in their areas of work over the past two years.

A major gap in programme guidance was that no overarching global programme document or programme guidance was created, other than the original proposal to the Government of the Netherlands. In lieu of an overall programme guidance document PBEA was guided by a combination of global planning and monitoring frameworks, reporting templates and definitional notes. Key informants at HQ reported that programme design has been identified as a widespread area of weakness within UNICEF and strategic initiatives are underway to address this.

Several other limitations related to written programme guidance were observed:

- Staff turnover and management changes at country level have undermined the continuity and application of tools.
- Nearly three-quarters of written guidance was finalised in 2014 or was in the process of finalisation in 2015. Hence very little guidance was formally available when is was mostly need (i.e, in the first two years of the programme), though ad hoc technical support was provided.
- Capacity to use guidance and tools was not sufficiently built, leaving a gap between theoretical knowledge and tools and application in analysis and programming.
- More than half of the guidance reviewed did not include a dissemination strategy or strategy to support COs in using and adapting the guidance to country contexts.

Problems about the late start on programme guidance nothwithstanding, by the end of the PBEA programme in mid-2016, a significant body of guidance and planning materials will exist, which could support future implementation of UNICEF peacebuilding activities.

Implementation support has improved over time, beginning in the second year of PBEA implementation when key PMT staff were hired. ROs (in particular WCARO and ESARO) have increasingly provided more directive support and guidance to Cos, and play a key

role in spreading promising practices and developing research and monitoring tools. At the HQ level, PMT and TWG members systematically provide support to COs for developing operational matrices (OMs) and annual reports. Other support from HQ takes a more ad-hoc on demand approach and is tailored to CO requests, with the exception of proactive organisation of annual meetings where guidance is provided.

Country offices reported that they received M&E guidance and support from HQ and RO (100%), including support for case studies, KAP surveys and reporting (90%) and general programme design (80%). About half of country offices cited support in adapting PBEA to their context, developing theories of change, and partnerships. All country offices that were interviewed reported that RO were responsive to their needs. COs particularly appreciated on-site support related to M&E and reporting. Numerous COs also specifically cited the strong support provided by SFCG in designing and implementing M&E systems, provided under the global partnership agreement. The annual PBEA meetings organised by the PMT were well received by all but one country office and frequently mentioned as a strong basis for experience sharing across COs.

On the negative side, concerns were raised about a high volume of templates and the rigid programme structure. Four country offices reported that programme guidance and support were too "top down," focused more on reporting than programme elements, and were not participatory. Numerous COs felt that the global outcome areas proved awkward for organising context-specific programming.

7.3 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT, M&E, AND RISK MANAGEMENT

The PBEA programme has invested heavily in activities for monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management. The effects of this work are only now beginning to be harnessed and communicated as learning about how social cohesion manifests itself has grown. There are potential overlaps between M&E efforts and knowledge management/research initiatives that have yet to be explored systematically. M&E systems at global level and in many COs focus on outputs with an underdeveloped system for rigorous outcome monitoring. Risk management has largely been integrated into broader CO processes and risk management plans.

UNICEF's overarching M&E system did not allow for systematic monitoring of peacebuilding outcomes. The PMT established a global results framework for PBEA, which also served as the programme's M&E framework. The last version of the global results framework was developed in 2013, which was deemed too late for effective deployment. Development spanned several iterations, requiring considerable effort of the PMT, ending with improved flexibility and adaptation to country-level context by increasing the scope and type of activities, outputs and a menu of indicators and country specific results frameworks rather than a global results framework.

Alongside the work on results frameworks, a number of tools and guidance were developed: some in response to recommendations proposed by the evaluability assessment and case study on PBEA M&E by SFCG in 2013.[75] These include case study guidance, a KAP survey, conflict scanning, and tools for collecting "most significant change" and human-interest stories. Global M&E has focused primarily on collecting activity and output level

[75] Search for Common Ground, *M&E System Development Case Study*. SFCG, 2013; United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office. *Evaluability Assessment Of The Peacebuilding, Education And Advocacy Programme (PBEA).* UNICEF, New York, NY, United States, 2013.

data through an annual global planning and reporting process using operational matrices, while annual reports and case studies have generated some summary evidence related to outcomes.

Some ROs and COs M&E efforts have gone beyond the requirements of the global PBEA programme to more fully explore the linkages between PBEA interventions and outcome level changes in behaviour, often focused on social cohesion. These include ESARO KAP surveys, Pakistan CO efforts to establish social cohesion measurement tools and WCARO planned regional comparative evaluations. While a few COs have budgeted for country specific evaluations, this global PBEA outcome evaluation and the ongoing PBEA development evaluation were planned from early in the programme to augment this information.

Knowledge management has taken two forms under PBEA: knowledge generation through research initiatives and knowledge sharing through formal and informal meetings and communications. Knowledge generation activities have been guided by the PMT under a PBEA Research Strategy in conjunction with external research partners in addition to RO and CO research. Knowledge management was integrated into the terms of reference or regional PBEA focal points and dedicated personnel were hired in ESARO, WCARO, ROSA and EAPRO. In 2014 a PBEA knowledge management plan was formalised and shared with the ROs to manage evidence generation. While the results of research commissioned by PBEA are only beginning to materialise this should contribute to important evidence on key gaps.

Knowledge sharing efforts have included pro-active and on-demand facilitation of cross-country information exchanges by the PMT and some ROs, global and regional workshops and meetings and development and dissemination of a few consolidated lessons-learned documents. COs broadly appreciated knowledge sharing efforts, especially the informal and formal aspects of annual global meetings and regional workshops that enabled cross-country exchange and networking.

The Learning for Peace website is also intended to be a platform for knowledge sharing within and outside of UNICEF. While the website has been populated and somewhat maintained, key research outputs and lessons learned documents have not yet been posted and internal stakeholders report that the architecture of the website makes it somewhat difficult to find key programme information vs. more advocacy and marketing oriented materials. Internal file sharing systems have also been set up at HQ, RO and CO levels (SharePoint, Dropbox).

Most COs report that standard UNICEF systems for financial management and partnerships address risks and are incorporated into the general CO risk management plans covering all programming. However, risk management was viewed differently across countries with some interpreting risk management as the risk of shocks (conflict, disaster, disease) and others interpreting the term as enterprise risk management (financial, contractual, reputational risks). The first category of risks (shocks) is covered by the CAs and UNICEF Situation Analysis and the application of these. Based on the recommendations of the Evaluability Assessment the PMT requested risk mitigation plans from all PBEA COs that addressed technical programmatic issues with 11 COs completing these plans.

7.4 ADAPTATIONS TO IMPLEMENT WITHIN A DECENTRALISED STRUCTURE

From its inception PBEA sought to find the right balance between being a global programme with accountability to the donor, being an element of programming within the decentralised structure of UNICEF and, assuming the context specificity required for peacebuilding work. PBEA worked with very limited programme management capacity at HQ during the first year of

implementation. That, and the need to move a certain volume of the funds because comitments on yearly spending targets meant that countries were requested to proceed with activities under 'fast track' approval, while focusing most of their attention on CAs to determine context specific conflict drivers. Once the programme management staff (the PMT) came on board, significant emphasis was placed on developing global systems for planning, monitoring and reporting using common templates and frameworks.

Efforts to ensure some standardisation and measurable accountability were prioritised by the PMT in the second year of PBEA. However, these were not seen as flexible enough to allow CO to adapt to their contexts, hence the evaluability assessment completed in late 2013 recommended shifting from a "global programme" to a "global approach" to allow greater autonomy for COs implementing PBEA in defining their outcomes and indicators based on the CA.

Even though reporting to the donor inevitably requires aggregating results across 14 very different programmes, informants at HQ and country offices noted that there is more autonomy and flexibility, and that the PMT has become more responsive to feedback. Informants identified an urgent need to integrate the PBEA monitoring and reporting system into standard UNICEF planning, monitoring and reporting systems to avoid duplication of efforts.

Overall, the PMT has succeeded in aggregating data at the output level, with complementary but selective lessons learned and examples of outcomes. In addition, the PBEA has become more adaptive and responsive to UNICEF's decentralised structure while maintaining systems to ensure accountability. This balance is inherently challenging given the original "global programme" design. Future programmes would benefit from further implementation of the evaluabilty assessment recommendation to shift to a "global approach" with a higher level of autonomy and some measure of results reporting and aggregation for global accountability.

7.5 EFFICIENCY AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS

PBEA was funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN) for a total of USD 150 million, to be programmed over a period of four-years (2012-2015). The initial programme design expected equal amounts of spending in each year of implementation ($37.5 million USD per year). This clearly underestimated the time required to complete conflict analyses, awareness building, and capacity building.

As a result the pace of funding usage was slower than expected, with only 57 percent of total original funding (USD 85.6 million) utilised across all implementing units (COs, ROs and HQ) by the end of 2014. However, available data shows that the utilisation rate is expected to be above 90 percent by the end of 2015 (while the remaining funds will be absorbed during the 'no cost' extention period ending in June 2016).

One of the major duties of the PMT was management of the PBEA funds, which included putting in place a proper fund allocation process, monitoring implementation of funds, and reporting. The allocation of PBEA funds consisted of the following steps.

- CO, RO and HQ PBEA implementing units present their plans and associated funding requests on an annual basis.
- The PMT reviews, advises on adjustments and consolidates the funding requests for presentation to the standing UNICEF Global Non-thematic Allocation Committee for approval.
- Once approved, funding requests are presented to the GoN.

- On an annual basis the GoN releases funds to UNICEF HQ based on this request (except semi-annual funding in 2013). Monitoring of expenditures is ongoing through UNICEF's Insight system.

Informants at all levels found the resource allocation process from HQ to country and regional to be reasonable, transparent, and communicated clearly, even when they didn't agree with their own allocation in comparison to others. Half of COs reported some concern about the efficiency of the resource allocation process, with reasons varying from the time required to make annual requests to internal CO allocation processes. Key informants noted, however, that resource allocation processes within country offices were sometimes not as transparent as they should be, partly because PBEA activities were sometimes linked to broader CO initiatives, which meant that funding was often co-mingled with other budgets and sources.

Some informants in HQ and country offices noted that decisions by the donor to split disbursement into semi-annual cycles after initial low expenditures have resulted in challenges for programme planning as HQ cannot commit to CO funding until funds are received. This had an impact on the length of PCAs and staff contracts. However, no instances were found of country office requests for funding being rejected.

The nature of PBEA's initial design as a "programme" inevitably brought greater requirements for accessing resources than would be the case for a fund with few requirements. While this arguably leads to a less efficient disbursement of resources the evaluation found that this was offset by greater coherence and effectiveness.

7.6 KEY FINDINGS ON MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

PBEA programme management at all levels has improved over time as capacity has developed, though different approaches in COs were observed with some linked to more positive results. The key findings of the evaluation on management and governance are:

- After initial delays, PBEA programme management and implementation support has drastically improved across all organisational levels. PMT refocus on accountability and knowledge management and the shift of backstopping to ROs has improved effectiveness. Enhancing the role of ROs to provide technical backstopping fits better with UNICEF's structure and allows the PMT to focus on strategy, accountability and knowledge management and improves support for COs.
- The SPAG did not contribute significantly to strategy though governace capacities have benefited from strong guidance and support of Senior Management and some individual SPAG members have provided critical bilateral advice.
- PBEA invested heavily in M&E and knowledge management, which contributed to accountability and can lead to organisational learning if successfully completed and communicated. However, PBEA planning, monitoring and reporting systems remain duplicative to standard UNICEF systems and present a challenge for COs in terms of efficiency and synchronisation.
- CO management of PBEA was most effective where human resources were dedicated to the programme or a strong cross-sectoral team was established and staff with peacebuilding expertise were hired.

- Programme management has become more responsive to the decentralised structure of UNICEF and context specificity of peacebuilding increasing the likelihood of relevance while maintaining systems to ensure accountability to the donor.
- Peacebuilding is inherently cross-sectoral, hence the TWG increased the relevance of PBEA by contributing non-education technical advice and tools needed to help COs address key drivers of conflict.
- Technical capacities among PBEA implementers have significantly improved. By the end of the programme an important body of materials will exist to serve as a foundation for future UNICEF work in peacebuilding, but these materials need dissemination strategies to support scalability.
- Resource allocation has been mostly efficient and transparent but alternative models should be explored that fall between a "global programme" and a simple fund. Allocation of funding should match a logical programme cycle rather than the initial expectation of equal funding per year regardless of the stage of implementation.

CONCLUSION

This section presented an analysis of PBEA programme management at all levels, adaptations to fit the decentralised implementation structure and the efficiency and transparency of resource allocation.

Two overarching conclusions can be made from the results;

1. **PBEA programme management has developed well to support accountability and learning and to mobilise support of multiple sectors. Adjustments to allow more flexibility for COs to focus on local needs and increased capacity for RO backstopping have improved performance. Dedicated programme staff with peacebuilding expertise significantly improve CO programme management.**
2. **The PBEA resource allocation process was, by and large reasonable, transparent, and communicated clearly. However, utilisation and management of funding was not as efficient as it should have been, mostly due to the fact that funds were disbursed from the center, but managed at country level with accountability for results decentralised.**

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SECTION III

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the evaluation concluded that PBEA represented an unprecedented effort for UNICEF to link aspects of development and humanitarian approaches together to address the root causes of conflict and interrupt cycles of violence, and recommends a clearer articulation of UNICEF's role in peacebuilding work.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter summarizes the evidence regarding PBEA's contribution to its programme outcomes and highlights evaluation conclusions. Because peacebuilding has been an under-defined area of work in UNICEF, PBEA has had to overcome many conceptual and practical challenges. As a result, innovation, adaptation and learning were designed into the programme from the beginning, with commendable results. Inevitably, developing and improving approaches takes time.

PBEA was operating in very challenging contexts, including many countries where there was on-going conflict, newly erupted conflict and/or epidemics as in the case of the Ebola virus disease in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It was a programme of linked country-level interventions and not a fund, hence it sometimes lacked the flexibility required to address the most pressing conflict drivers.

The use of conflict analyses as a foundation for programme design is not standard practice within UNICEF, hence it took longer than expected to mobilise and execute participatory CAs and to ensure that traditional educationists and some implementing partners understood how CAs could be used to strengthen education programme design. This led to delays in initiating programme interventions and slowed progress towards results. However, some major proramme components were still being implemented at the time of this evaluation, with more results expected by the close of the programme in June 2016.

8.1 SUMMARY OF PBEA RESULTS, BY COUNTRY

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, an evaluability assessment (EA) of the PBEA was completed at the end of the second year of implementation (2013). The evaluability assessment was intended to demonstrate evaluation readiness, that is, to provide the evidence required to determine the extent to which the PBEA had put in place technical and strategic elements to achieve intended programme results, and to demonstrate such results in future evaluations.

Table 13, adapted from the EA report, indicates evaluation readiness of the programme in 14 PBEA implementing countries as of late-2013. At that point, only a handful of countries (3-4) had completed their conflict analysis and designed programmes based on the conflict drivers. The rest of the countries were either still in the process of completing their conflict analyses, or beginning to use their conflict analysis for programme design.

Following a highly consultative process led by the PMT, a formal management response was issued, where countries committed to making adjustments and additional inputs to strengthen their programmes as suggested by the evaluability assessment, including selecting fewer conflict drivers to help narrow down the programme scope and focus on demonstrating substantial results.

With support promised by the PMT, HATIS, ROs and Search for Common Ground, country programmes also made commitments to establish baselines measures, articulate theories of changes, and to put in place measures that will assist in tracking progress towards outcomes. Table 14 below provides an indication of how the countries have performed at the beginning of the final year of PBEA implementation.

First, all 14 country programmes did complete their conflict analyses using PBEA funding, with PBEA teams in 13 countries programming on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Only one team (State of Palestine) made a choice to narrow the scope of their programme by working with only 3 of 5 PBEA outcomes, having pushed through policy work on the operating environment prior to PBEA commencement. The evaluation considers this a missed opportunity in that countries did indeed spread themselves too thinly in terms of their resources and capacity to implement. A possible explanation from available documentation is that even though the management response endorsed and encouraged programming on fewer conflict drivers, country programmes had very little opportunity to modify the scope of their programmes once 2014 workplans were approved.

Other than that, 11 country programmes indicated that they used the conflict analysis substantially in their programme design, 7 reported that CAs influenced UNICEF programme design in the Country Programme Document (CPD) and Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) more broadly, while 7 reported that CAs influenced the programmes of other development partners, national governments and/or other actors in their country as mentioned in Section 5.4.

TABLE 13 **Evaluability of country programmes, by category**

Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
• 4–5 country programme	• 4–6 country programmes	• 3–4 country programmes
• Conflict analysis still underway	• Conflict analysis mostly completed	• Completed conflict analysis
• Major inputs required over next months to complete conflict analysis	• Sufficient information for programme design	• Programming based on conflict analysis
• Major technical and governance elements required	• Some technical and governance elements in place	• Most technical and governance elements in place
• Implementation underway, by mostly on 'Fact Track' mode	• Implementation underway	• Implementation underway
Evaluation readiness cannot be determined	***Requires major inputs in all technical elements to enhance evaluation readiness***	***Requires manageable inputs to enhance evaluation readiness***
Somalia, Myanmar, Yemen, Ethiopia, Palestine	Pakistan, South Sudan, Burundi, Chad, DRC	Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone

Source: *Evaluability Assessment of the Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme (2013).* UNICEF, New York

Table 14 also indicates programme results that were identified and verified in terms of outputs, intermediate outcomes (i.e., changes in capacity, skills or knowledge that is being applied), and outcomes that signalled observable changes in the behaviour, relationships, and actions of individuals, groups or organisations that were influenced by the PBEA directly or indirectly, and intentionally or unintentionally. Credited with 5 or more intermediate outcomes and/or outcomes, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uganda produced the most admirable set of results, as reflected in the fourth column of the table.

Countries programmes received strong in-country and/or remote technical backstopping from ESARO and WCARO in M&E, KAP studies, cases studies and/or peacebuilding expertise. Other explanatory factors confirmed through a correlation analysis include having experienced peacebuilding experts as part of the PBEA team (for Burundi, Somalia and Uganda); having an overarching theory of change (for Burundi, South Sudan and Uganda); mainstreaming peacebuilding across other UNICEF sectors (Burundi), and, reporting line for PBEA to the Representative or Deputy Representative (Burundi and Sierra Leone). On the latter, several country programmes reported direct championing of the PBEA by the Representative and/or Deputy Representative was key to mobilising other sector specialists, and achieving results.

On the other end of the spectrum, 1 or 2 medium to high level results (intermediate outcomes and outcomes) were identified and verified for Myanmar, Pakistan, Palestine and Yemen. Three of these countries completed their conflict analyses in 2014, which means that they only had one year of full implementation at the time of the evaluation. Also, Yemen was experiencing active and protracted conflict during most of the period of PBEA implementation, while the other three countries experienced some disruptions, also due to conflict.

It should be noted, however, that some part of the success (or the lack thereof) in programme countries could be explained by level of effort that country teams applied to the evaluation and the rapid outcome harvesting exercise in particular, which would still reflect positively on the country teams that devoted time towards reporting and verifying their results.

In addition to some opportunities highlighted for deepening and/or expanding peacebuilding programming in each country, Uganda will begin a new UNICEF Country Programme in 2016-2020. Strategies that are outlined in the CPD include integrating peacebuilding and conflict prevention skills development into the basic education and adolescent development programme, as well as promoting peacebuilding and conflict sensitive education. 9 of the remaining 13 countries will have another moment within the next 12 to 18 months to consider whether to build on the gains of the PBEA in their CPD development processes. Of these 8 Country Programmes (Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen) have a CPD that is under 1 or 2 years extension, a further characterisation of fragility in the programming contexts.

TABLE 14 Summary of PBEA programme elements, achievements and opportunities by country

	Quality of the conflict analysis (CA) and its use	Results harvested and verified	Most notable programme achievements	Opportunities for deepening and/or expanding peacebuilding programming
Burundi	Medium: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Integrated conflict analysis into PBEA research strategy regarding the inter-generational transmission of violence and the connection between the macro- and microdynamics of violence, and the effects of conflict and violence on children and adolescents.	3 intermediate outcomes 5 outcomes	Reduced student-teacher violence; research on transgenerational transmission of violence; influenced youth pillar of UN peacebuilding priority plan; strengthened capacity of justice system to ensure child rights; embedded peacebuilding priorities in all CO planning programmes and monitoring.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** cross-sectoral approaches and ongoing conflict analysis show real potential for increasing peacebuilding impact; future partnerships with UN, media and local research organisations.
Chad	High: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Influenced the PBEA programme design and 2014 scale-up. In the process of influencing broader UNICEF and UN programming.	2 outputs 2 intermediate outcomes 1 outcome	Improved social cohesion and reduced conflict between nomadic communities, returnees, host communities, youth and adults in 4 regions.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** work on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and social cohesion in schools and among communities shows potential for significant and widespread peacebuilding outcomes.
Cote d'Ivoire	Medium: Programme working on all 5 PBEA outcome areas to some extent. CA had influence on programme design.	2 outputs 1 intermediate outcome 2 outcomes	Extended access to education for 1500 children in volatile and conflict affected communities on border; and built conflict resolution capacity for 800 students in peace messenger clubs resulting in reduced violence.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** the children / youth in peace messenger clubs and youth peacebuilding platforms are successes that PBEA can build upon in the future. Work with multi-ethnic mother clubs in ECD centres represents a positive adaptation of traditional programmes with potential to achieve peacebuilding and social cohesion results.
Democratic Republic of Congo	High: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Used as basis of programme design. Identified entry points for programming to address conflict drivers (around political and policy responses, structural and education reforms, and individual and interpersonal changes).	1 output 4 intermediate outcomes	Integration of conflict and risk indicators in new decentralised EMIS with potential to reinforce conflict sensitivity and equity in education sector policies and planning; integration of peace promotion and social cohesion elements in life skills part of primary curriculum; establishment of local mediation and peace committees and adolescent clubs to promote nonviolent approaches to conflict.	**CPD end date of September 2017;** efforts to institutionalise peacebuilding in the education sector system planning and EMIS are promising; opportunity to explore community-based models for conflict resolution have potential to reduce local tensions.

Table 14 (cont'd)

	Quality of the conflict analysis (CA) and its use	Results harvested and verified	Most notable programme achievements	Opportunities for deepening and/or expanding peacebuilding programming
Ethiopia	Medium: Programme working on all 5 PBEA outcome areas to some extent. CA not used on programme design, but to better adapt ongoing PBEA activities to the Ethiopian context and also to inform the policy work stream.	2 outputs 2 intermediate outcomes 1 outcome	Increased equitable access to education in previously excluded and marginalised communities to address structural and cultural violence against minority groups that are poorly served by formal education.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** possible scale up of activities with minority populations and beyond on the basis of learning once implementation and M&E progress.
Liberia	Not determined: Programme working on all 5 PBEA outcome areas, revised during Ebola response. Reported to have influenced programme design (e.g. developing theories of change and interventions). Fed into the Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation.	4 intermediate outcomes	Establishment of Junior National Volunteers and community peace committees to reduce and resolve conflict within their communities and contribute to better social service delivery, thereby increasing confidence in the government's ability to deliver equitable social services.	**CPD end date of June 2017;** Continued support for Junior National Volunteers for peacebuilding work, building on their expanded credibility following Ebola response, has potential to contribute to peacebuilding and youth empowerment.
Myanmar	Medium: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. CA informed the ongoing QBEP and the Mid Term Review of the CP, CA informed the improvement of both the access to and quality of basic education available in the regions most affected by conflict. Also used in the development of the strategy to collaborate with Non State Actors.	2 outputs 1 intermediate outcome 1 outcome	Increased access and quality of education in IDP camps, host communities and conflict affected states, including peacebuilding supplementary education and psychosocial support to reinforce prioritisation of the peace agreement.	**CPD end date of February 2017;** Continuous conflict analysis to monitor the transitional state of peace accords and human rights developments is critical. Further integration of conflict sensitive elements in education systems and delivery can help consolidate gains.
Pakistan	Medium: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes with greatest emphasis on outcomes 3 and 4. CA is basis of SCR programming. Used by partners who conducted a smaller CA at district level to identify conflict drivers. Interest from other sections to use CA going forward.	5 outputs 1 intermediate outcome 1 outcome	Increased access to education through Alternative Learning Programmes targeted for conflict affected locations with high rates of out-of-school children including marginalised groups and madrassa students.	**CPD end date of September 2017;** Pilot efforts to work with community-based peace committees and access madrassas show opportunities for expansion. Continued participatory sub-national CA is important.

Table 14 (cont'd)

	Quality of the conflict analysis (CA) and its use	Results harvested and verified	Most notable programme achievements	Opportunities for deepening and/or expanding peacebuilding programming
Sierra Leone	Medium: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Influenced design of programmes and built stakeholder buy-in by highlighting previously known aspects of operating environment and helping to prioritise interventions.	2 outputs 3 intermediate outcomes 2 outcomes	Reduced use of corporal punishment in 911 schools. Increased community ownership of conflict management, dispute resolution and prioritisation of safe learning environments.	**CPD end date of September 2018;** Redouble efforts to implement PBEA following Ebola response to solidify previous gains and build on youth volunteer credibility. Assess diffusion of focus by developing coherent programme theory of change.
Somalia	Medium: Programme working on all 5 PBEA outcome areas, but significant resources have been devoted to fast track intitiatives before the CA. CA influenced programme design, was disseminated via INEE, executive summary was shared with partners.	3 intermediate outcomes 3 outcomes	Increased access to conflict sensitive education for 1 million additional children. Rehabilitation of schools with high community involvement reinforcing peaceful co-existence of IDPs and host communities. Addressing economic drivers of conflict through youth education and skill building.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** further investment in empowering children and youth is required to make progress in mitigating and preventing conflict; periodic updates of the CA is key in this programming environment.
South Sudan	High: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Influenced programme design, update 2014 will inform country programme writ large (CPD though reduced version because of conflict context).	1 output 4 outcomes	Life Skills and peacebuilding approach built institutional and individual capacity resulting in prevention and mitigation of conflict; sports, inclusive dialogue and cultural activities built social cohesion and reduced local conflict. Inter and intra-communal peace dialogues led to resolution of a conflict between two ethnic groups.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** strategic and sustainable capacity development for government counterparts, partners, beneficiaries. CO is required to meet capacity gaps in education and peacebuilding as entry points for addressing conflict drivers and related dynamics to have stronger cumulative influence.
State of Palestine	Medium: CA used to program primarilly in outcomes 2, 3 & 4. The UNDAF conflict analysis reportedly influenced the CPD and the Social Cohesion programme design. CA is being incorporated into CO SitAn process. The East Jerusalem CA influenced activities in this area.	2 outputs 1 intermediate outcome 1 outcome	Increased access to pro-social and developmentally appropriate education for pre-school and grade one students in four regions, which increased tolerance, acceptance and respect for others.	**CPD end date of February 2016;** complete education specific CA for all areas and consider new approaches and initiatives would better address conflict drivers.

Table 14 (cont'd)

	Quality of the conflict analysis (CA) and its use	Results harvested and verified	Most notable programme achievements	Opportunities for deepening and/or expanding peacebuilding programming
Uganda	High: CA used to program on all 5 PBEA outcomes. Influenced programme design and research strategy. Also informed results framework of IPs, advocacy, was included in 2014SitAn that informed CPD 2016-2020.	1 intermediate outcome 6 outcomes	Increased equitable access to education for most marginalised districts through ECD, conflict sensitive approaches and life skills training. Mainstreaming of conflict sensitive principles in government policies, standards and practices. Research on the bi-directional relationship between education and conflict. Improved institutional-community and intra-and inter-communal relations.	**CPD end date of June 2020;** Complete efforts to invest in M&E to build evidence on various programme effects for future programmes. Continued cross-sectoral programming has potential to deliver strategic results for community social cohesion, peacebuilding and resilience.
Yemen	Medium: Planned activities in all 5 outcome areas interrupted by conflict. Early emphasis placed on outcome area 4. UNCT-wide CA and UNICEF education analysis used to identify priorities and education entry points for programme.	5 outputs 1 outcome	Increased access to quality education through child friendly schools programme contributing to social cohesion.	**CPD end date of June 2016;** jumpstart PBEA activities when conflict subsides based on new conflict analysis and emphasis on solidifying peace.

8.2 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RESULTS

Conclusion 1: PBEA has, by and large, achieved substantial results in each of the five PBEA outcome areas and is following appropriate and the most promising practices for peacebuilding programming, However, a number of important lessons were learned about programming choices that are required for UNICEF to increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable peacebuilding results.

There is broad understanding that peacebuilding is an ambitious goal involving significant change across many levels of society, sectors and actors beyond UNICEF's direct reach. PBEA's achievement of outcomes should be considered with this in mind and understood within the short timeframe it has been implemented. It is too early to expect sustainable large-scale outcomes (lasting peace, high social cohesion and resilience) in any PBEA country. However, a foundation will have been established to enable UNICEF to build on PBEA lessons by the end of its implementation period, and to make discreet but meaningful contributions to these aspirational goals over the long term if efforts and investments continue.

Conclusion 2: PBEA has demonstrated that the choice of using a social service such as education for delivering peacebuilding results is the right one, even though some of the necessary building blocks are yet to be put in place. PBEA has contributed to peacebuilding, social cohesion and resilience and achieved many intended results. Given that PBEA has piloted new approaches to working in and on conflict for UNICEF, the results achieved are satisfactory given the limitations of time and resources

spread across 14 countries and implemented for approximately 42 months at the time of the evaluation. Greater scale and substantiveness of results is possible if good programming practices for peacebuilding are followed (elaborated in the next section), programmes are sustained or expanded, and COs focus efforts where they can achieve the most substantive results.

Other than work on conflict analyses, most country offices did not demonstrate substantive results in the areas of learning, evidence generation. Rather, they focused their resources on activities aimed at achieving results for beneficiaries, creating partnerships, and monitoring of results. However, UNICEF and its partners have learned more about how to work 'in conflict' and 'on conflict' as a result of PBEA research, peer-to-peer learning and individual learning by doing. Evidence and learning from these efforts will continue to emerge in the last year of PBEA programming, and beyond.

For the foreseeable future, UNICEF will pursue education programming that covers both downstream results (building schools and providing services such as access to schooling, equipping schools, training teachers, and enhancing the quality of education) and upstream results (advocacy, policy and systems strengthening).

Programming for education service delivery will continue in priority countries, typically low-income countries where the majority of out-of-school children reside. Many of these countries also happen to be involved with humanitarian programming, either because they are in the middle of some conflict, or are transitioning out of one. Hence one of the important lessons of the PBEA was around mainstreaming peacebuilding approaches in the rest of the activities of the education programme.

8.3 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNICEF'S APPROACH

Conclusion 3: UNICEF is well-positioned to engage in peacebuilding work based on its mandate and institutional strengths. However, the organisation needs to navigate sensitivities, identify entry points, focus resources on high risk environments to achieve scale and emphasise the primacy of context specific programming. The PBEA approach has become increasingly fit for purpose over the period of implementation, after a slow start. The relevance and effectiveness of the approach have improved due to an increasing body of guidance and support, learning by doing at all levels and adjustments to enable decentralised decisions to be context appropriate.

Pathways and concepts for the programme have become more clearly understood over time and have been adapted to local contexts in consultation with stakeholders to ensure space and authorisation. The evaluation concluded that in pursuing context specific programming that seeks to address drivers of conflict, PBEA implementation is following the most important promising practice for peacebuilding.

Cumulative evidence shows that country offices achieved the greatest scale, substantiveness and verifiability of results when they followed a programme cycle indicated in Figure 5. These are country offices that focused on identifying and addressing conflict drivers within the framework of an overarching theory of change first (the "why" of programming), followed by laying the groundwork for a successful programme by recruiting staff with peacebuilding expertise, designing a holistic programme using participatory practices, sensitising stakeholders, and building UNICEF and partner capacity (the "how" of programming).

Holistic theories of change and programme design allowed country offices to better address drivers of conflict by combining different approaches and stakeholders. Hiring staff with peacebuilding expertise, sensitising key stakeholders and building UNICEF and partner capacity before launching interventions led to greater achievement of outcomes. Regular monitoring of conflict dynamics, reflecting on changes in the environment and adjusting programming accordingly is a good practice and necessity in

FIGURE 5 **Elements of a holistic peacebuilding programme management cycle**



fluid conflict prone environments. All of these good practices should be taken into account in future peacebuilding programming.

Fidelity to the cycle of activity depicted in Figure 5 was observed in Uganda and Burundi, and possibly South Sudan. Country programmes that followed this cycle closely also tended to develop more innovative, cross-sector and non-traditional tools, and better beneficiary focus and partnerships to achieve peacebuilding results. The types of interventions used and beneficiaries reached by UNICEF through its PBEA work included expanding emphasis on youth and adolescents, and establishing community engagement mechanisms and partnerships with community and faith-based organisations. Where linked to specific drivers of conflict and context specific needs, the likelihood of sustaining conflict sensitive programming and/or peacebuilding results increased.

Investments necessary to appropriately identify conflict drivers, articulate the programme design, and assemble adequate levels of programme implementation capacities (the WHY and HOW steps of this cycle) were vastly underestimated in the original global programme design. As a result country programmes made a choice to devote initial years of the programme to establishing a foundation for PBEA work, or to determine what intervention to implement (the WHAT step of the cycle). For instance, In Palestine and Yemen where intervention selection preceeded conflict analysis programme coherence, in particular across types of interventions, sometimes suffered.

Conclusion 4: PBEA's emphasis on conflict analysis based programming was the right approach and leads to responsive context specific programmes that can contribute to peacebuilding. A central feature of the programme management cycle depicted in Figure 5 and the starting point in determining the "why" of peacebuilding programme was to conduct a sound conflict analysis. A conflict analysis, coupled with sector and geographically specific analysis, provided a critical conceptual underpinning for good peacebuilding work.

The process of conducting a conflict analysis was itself important because it potentially opened up space for constructive dialogue about attitudes, practices and/or behaviours that propagate conflict. It should be noted, however, that conflict analyses (both the processes and products) are often complex and contested, as was the case in at least four PBEA implementing countries. A lesson from the PBEA is that decisions about identifying the entity that will conduct the conflict analysis (consultants, company, etc), which communities or geographical areas to target, or who to include in the consultations, all need to be handled in a mature and conciliatory manner. Also, adequate time should be planned for dissemination and consultations on the results of the conflict analysis so as to maximise its acceptance and utility.

8.4 CONCLUSIONS ON POSITIONING OF UNICEF

Conclusion 5: Programme implementation partnerships, including new partners, have enabled UNICEF to increase its reach and access and deliver peacebuilding results. High level advocacy partnerships and management of implementing partners for better knowledge exchange across organisations are required.

UNICEF is well positioned to play a significant role in peacebuilding. Its mandate for promoting child rights and focus on equity relates well to prevalent conflict drivers. With programming that spans emergency response and development UNICEF has the credibility and relationships to more proactively engage in conflict prevention through peacebuilding work. No other actors are focused on contributing to peacebuilding through social services with the institutional capacity to do so at scale.

UNICEF also has the opportunity to improve the range of partners with whom to engage in most PBEA countries. This requires looking beyond UNICEF's traditional sector based partnerships to identify organisations with expertise in peacebuilding and community relevance in sensitive environments, including community and faith-based organisations. Coordination with other major international and regional peacebuilding actors is also a critical area for improvement given the scale and multi-generational nature of the root causes of conflict.

Conclusion 6: PBEA demonstrated that conflict-sensitive and/or peacebuilding programming that attempts to address drivers of conflict requires strong leadership support to enable cross-sectoral collaboration and ultimately mainstreaming of peacebuilding solutions.

UNICEF's global scope and depth of experience in implementing education and other programmes in conflict affected and fragile environments gives the organisation an opportunity unlike many others to contribute to neglected areas of peacebuilding work. Notably these neglected areas include child centred approaches that position peacebuilding into education services and out-of-school interventions and other early childhood, child and youth and adolescent programmes.

UNICEF cannot work in isolation however and external partnerships are critical at knowledge and innovation, policy and advocacy and programme implementation levels to leverage the knowledge, skills, access and credibility of other actors. UNICEF was successful in forming partnerships with the many of the right national and local partners who played a critical role in effectively achieving results. UNICEF was less successful in coordinating with equal partners and managing across implementing partners – many partners worked in isolation and the evaluation identified missed opportunities for synergies that would have improved programme efficiency and effectiveness. Future programming would benefit from improved partner coordination and management and synergy based on holistic programme design.

8.5 CONCLUSIONS ON PBEA PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

Conclusion 7: PBEA programme management has developed well to support accountability and learning and to mobilise support of multiple sectors. Adjustments to allow more flexibility for COs to focus on local needs and increased capacity for RO backstopping improved performance. Dedicated programme staff with peacebuilding expertise significantly improve CO programme management.

Managing PBEA as a global programme allowed greater accountability to the donor and greater learning. It also highlighted inherent challenges with designing common programme objectives and aggregating data on results for peacebuilding programmes across highly contextualised country-level programmes. Systems developed to enable PBEA global reporting unintendedly promoted linear focus on individual outcome areas and simple output measures rather than holistic programme design and more meaningful context specific outcome measures. Development of tools for measuring context specific results, such as KAP surveys and proxy indicators and indices represent positive developments for future peacebuilding monitoring and reporting.

PBEA programme management has evolved over time to better balance these factors but future peacebuilding programming may require an approach that continues to support learning and capacity development from global and regional levels while allowing COs to design, implement and measure performance in context specific ways. Global aggregation of results may not be possible in a meaningful way without undermining the need to engage key stakeholders in programme design and focus on national and local priorities.

Conclusion 8: The PBEA resource allocation process was, by and large reasonable, transparent, and communicated clearly. However, utilisation and management of funding was not as efficient as it should have been, mostly due to the fact that donor accountability and accountability for funding decisions was at the global level, while accountability for results was decentralised.

At the regional and country levels, PBEA was most successful when senior management engaged with and supported the programme, human resources and staff with peacebuilding expertise were hired. The lesson learned from PBEA implementation is that a balance must be found that places the right resources and accountabilities at appropriate levels of UNICEF's organisational structure to both enhance learning and allow for context specific programming. An important example in ESARO was the establishment of the RMT fragile states working group, which offers avenues for mainstreaming conflict-sensitivity and peacebuilding approaches through organisational mechanisms.

An alternative resource allocation model could be designed that falls between the "global programme" approach employed by PBEA and its predecessor EEPCT. This would take the form of a programme-based financing mechanism such as the Peacebuilding and Revocery Facility (PRF) of the Peacebuilding Fund[76].

With this model, funding could be allocated on a preliminary basis and disbursed directly to the programme country to conduct in-depth conflict analysis. This would be followed by proposals to fund implementation that require clear articulation of context specific outcomes, theories of change, partnership arrangements, staffing commitments and clear leadership support. An expert committee could review proposals and select among them based on pre-identified criteria for coherence and quality. Such a funding mechanism would be open to any CO wishing to pursue peacebuilding programming, leading to greater self-selection that is more aligned with UNICEF's decentralised accountabilities.

[76] http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/the-peacebuilding-fund-pbf/

CHAPTER 9

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations presented in this chapter draw from the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, and attempt to identify key actions for UNICEF at different levels. Recommendations were validated by a reference group consisting of key PBEA stakeholders from HQ, ROs and COs, on their soundness and possible utility, and whether it would be feasible for UNICEF to come up with practical follow-up actions.

9.1 RECOMMENDATIONS ON PBEA RESULTS AND STRATEGIC CHOICES

According to the UNICEF Strategic Plan (2014-2017), UNICEF's mandate extends across the development-humanitarian continuum. This means that for the foreseeable future the organisation will continue to work in fragile and conflict affected contexts where a majority of children live in poverty, are essentially underserved by their states, and are therefore susceptible to all kinds of vulnerability. Indeed, the share of resources that are channelled towards countries that are experiencing or recovering from conflict, both ODA and national resources, has increased exponentially in the past two decades.

However, a lack of due diligence in the management of resources has become part of the problem by some accounts. Hence, in order for any long lasting improvements in the lives of children, there is a renewed sense of urgency for UNICEF and all its partners to use the foundation laid by the PBEA to embark on development and humanitarian programming that seeks to disrupt cycles of violence by addressing the root causes of conflict. This is probably the primary message of the evaluation.

Associated with Conclusions 1 and 2, the first recommendation addresses the need to articulate a clear vision for peacebuilding work and the role of UNICEF leadership in championing this work.

Recommendation 1: UNICEF should articulate a clearer vision for its role and contribution to peacebuilding in conflict affected and fragile contexts, and integrate this vision into corporate strategies, global programme policy, country programme strategies, and in key messages from UNICEF leadership.

UNICEF's mandate and accountabilities vis-à-vis the people it serves, the organisation's refocus on the equity agenda and various commitments to "strengthen involvement in systematic reduction of vulnerability to disaster and conflicts through risk-informed country programmes that help build resilience", all provide support for engagement in building social cohesion that is required for communities to live and relate peacefully. And while PBEA brought invaluable resources that helped to illustrate that UNICEF has an important role to play in harnessing their work in social sectors for purposes of promoting long lasting peace, it has also heightened awareness to the layers

of complexity in peacebuilding work, and a realisation that peacebuilding efforts have to be sustained over a long period of time with a predictable and sustainable stream of funding.

Peacebuilding processes are, in essence, one aspect of risk-informed programming and a potentially sustainable means of reducing vulnerability and disruptions due to conflict and/or natural disasters. On the other hand, peacebuilding results are a tangible way to deliver on the commitment of building resilience to conflict for individuals, families, and communities. UNICEF has to make the necessary connections and distinctions between all these processes and strategies. More importantly, there seems to be clarity and a foregone conclusion among all levels of UNICEF staff that conflict-sensitive programming is required in all contexts as a minimum programme of action. It is less clear, however, whether UNICEF leadership is willing to expend the necessary reputational resources on seeking peacebuilding results in situations where such are required, even though UNICEF documentation is not lacking of pronouncements on the organisations' commitment to programming for resilience.

It is important to confirm and emphasise the perception that peacebuilding programming will by definition introduce additional complexity to already difficult programming contexts, and that concerns about UNICEF's reputation are not misplaced. However, UNICEF has been found by this evaluation to be well positioned in terms of its reach, and its institutional strengths and partnerships (old ones, and those newly inducted through the PBEA) to facilitate meaningful contribution to peacebuilding results. Indeed, explicit commitment to peacebuilding work should be accompanied by additional resources in terms of global programme guidance and expertise to incorporate the necessary elements into CPD processes, as well as deploying the necessary expertise to the countries that require the most assistance in this regard. The role of Representatives and Deputy Representatives will be critical in carrying forth explicit commitments to peacebuilding, hence it would benefit the organisation immensely if senior positions in high risk countries were to be filled with personnel with heightened awareness of, and/or experience in working in conflict environments.

9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ON PBEA PROGRAMMING APPROACH

The evaluation has concluded that UNICEF is well-positioned to engage in peacebuilding work based on its mandate and institutional strengths, and that PBEA's emphasis on conflict analysis based programming was the right approach for responsivity to context specific factors (Conclusions 3 and 4).

Recommendation 2: As a minimum programme of action, UNICEF should institutionalise conflict analysis approaches as a part of the programme development cycle, and ascertain the use of conflict analysis findings in adaptation and design of programmes and policies, including mandating strict adherence to "do no harm" principles.

UNICEF has already embarked on an initiative to develop 'risk-informed' programming for all contexts, and as the concept of risk-informed programming is further developed, it should be possible to differentiate between enterprise risk and shock-based risk (conflict, disaster, disease outbreak). In cases of the latter, adhering to conflict sensitivity and "do no harm" principles are considered as minimum good practice for development and humanitarian work, with "do no harm" principles having been considered as mandatory since the late 1990s. UNICEF's own mandate supports these principles, and in practice this means that the Situation Analysis should include an analysis of the drivers of conflict, to be derived from existing, updated, or new conflict analyses commissioned by UNICEF or other UN partners.

PBEA processes and investments at HQ, ROs, and COs have yielded substantial tools and strengthened peacebuilding technical expertise

among education sector specialists, including commissioning and/or conducting conflict analyses. These efforts should be complemented by partners' tools and frameworks to establish a minimum standard to be applied to programme planning and implementation. Still, resources will be required in terms of UNICEF staff time to guide country offices on when and how to conduct and/or update conflict analyses, and to build up a cadre of peacebuilding experts in cases where peacebuilding programming is a key component of the Country Programme, as well as external expertise to shore up UNICEF internal peacebuilding capacities at all levels. An institutional commitment is required in order to move all these plans and good intentions to implementation, and a good place to begin will be to consolidate PBEA lessons in the education programming portfolio.

Recommendation 3: UNICEF should consolidate lessons learned from the two areas of mainstreaming peacebuilding into the education programmes and using education to deliver peacebuilding results in fragile contexts, and use them to develop resources for education sector planning.

UNICEF education sector programming has been enriched by the experiences of the PBEA in all 14 PBEA implementing countries in that peacebuilding processes have been mainstreamed into the education sector response, albeit to varying degrees. Where these gains are sustained, education sector specialists will seek to incorporate conflict analysis information to shape up the development of their programme components. However, while the evaluation has identified discreet contributions that the PBEA has made to the education sector planning processes in implementing countries, there is a great potential to spread these benefits more widely and to consolidate the learning and practice.

Incorporating conflict analyses information into education sector planning processes facilitates a more holistic coverage of conflict drivers in the education sector response in that it opens up the dialogue on the relative merits of implementing different programming strategies, and/or build in redundancies where necessary. Enriching education sector processes in this manner could be the key contribution of the PBEA to education sector practice, and yet another opportunity to consolidate learning on how social sectors can target their own outcomes while also programming for peacebuilding results.

9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS ON UNICEF'S POSITIONING FOR PEACEBUILDING WORK

The cost of programming without due consideration of conflict-drivers and/or conflict sensitivity is already manifesting itself in failure to achieve sustainable results. However, conflict-sensitive programming alone is, by some accounts, very close to the work that UNICEF is already doing in the humanitarian portfolio, including education in emergencies. Peacebuilding programming offers some new and innovative solutions for achieving more sustainable development results as the organisation considers new strategies to programme along the humanitarian and development continuum, and will continue to grow as long as fragility accounts for most of the operating context. More importantly, the work requires strategic partnerships within the UN Peacebuilding architecture, and external global, national and local partners.

Recommendation 4: UNICEF should develop a partnership strategy that will set parameters for its engagement with peacebuilding work, determine how to better leverage the capacities, experiences and skills of its partners (traditional and potential), and unleash the organisation's influence to heighten the likelihood to achieve peacebuilding results for children and youth.

PBEA has worked with many of the right partners during its implementation, and in some cases, built new relationships with non-traditional partners. While the evaluation cannot claim to have conducted a full skills audit, there is a realisation that a substantial amount of the capacities required for conflict-sensitive programming and/or peacebuilding work will almost always reside outside UNICEF.

In order to build the capacities required to bring conflict-sensitive programming and/or peacebuilding work to scale, and to ensure that the enormous risks associated with such initiatives are assumed by a wide array of development actors, the organisation needs to consider more strategic and lasting partnerships that cover all four categories of UNICEF's partnership strategy (programme implementation, policy and advocacy, knowledge and innovation and resource mobilisation partnerships), and delineate explicit goals for the its involvement in the partnerships, and an exit strategy.

Recommendation 5: For the next generation of peacebuilding programmes, UNICEF should continue to mobilise funding, earmarked, pooled, or other resources, to a level that will facilitate global visibility and learning, while ensuring proper financial and results accountabilities at the decentralised (country office) level.

UNICEF will always have a responsibiliity to work with the donor community to mobilise resources to develop aggressive solutions to problems that undermine efforts to ensure that children live in environments where they can survive, develop and thrive. Mobilising resources for EEPCT and the PBEA for peacebuilding and to strengthen education in fragile contexts are good examples of such efforts.

While we do accept that peacebuilding and similar programming should eventually be integrated into UNICEF planning and funding processes, there is a need for a sustained focus and global appeal to consolidate global learning on peacebuilding programming and practice, at least in the medium-term. From the lessons of both the EEPCT and the PBEA, UNICEF should consider a more regulated global resource mechanism with clear programme parameters and funding requirements for its young but promising peacebuilding work.

9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REMAINING PERIOD OF PBEA IMPLEMENTATION

Due to start-up delays associated with CA-based programming in the earlier days of the PBEA, many PBEA implementing country offices were still in the middle of implementing major programme elements less than a year away from the closing of the current cycle of funding.

Recommendation 6: Secure funding (new or unspent PBEA funding) to enable continuation of critical activities in PBEA implementing countries that are presently facing conflict and/or humanitarian crises, and to afford the rest of the country offices the opportunity to incorporate key PBEA lessons into their next UNICEF regular programming cycle.

A responsible wrapping up of current programme activities would include availing the necessary resources to allow each PBEA implementing country office to complete major activities, consider the lessons, and effect the necessary adjustments and transition into the development of their next CPD. Also, some PBEA countries laid a foundation for peacebuilding work only to be interrupted by crises (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Yemen). The investments made in these countries can be safeguarded if new or remaining funding is made available to implement restorative peacebuilding activities once the operating environment is conducive. In fact, the relevance of peacebuilding work in the wake of such crises will likely be greater.

Recommendation 7: The PBEA team at HQ should identify a mechanism to update country level result statements developed in this evaluation to ensure a full and final compilation of results for future learning, as well as make proper institutional arrangements for completion of PBEA research initiatives and management of knowledge products.

A significant amount of ongoing research and evidence collection commissioned by the PBEA programme represents a potential opportunity to contribute to the body of knowledge on the role of education, social services and child and youth centred approaches in peacebuilding. Completing, publishing and disseminating these results for internal and external audiences is important. This would support UNICEF, its multi-level partners and the peacebuilding community to increasingly engage around consideration of child centred social services for peacebuilding.

As noted in the evaluation, some country programmes only had one full year of PBEA implementation by the time of this outcome evaluation. Having COs update the result statements from this evaluation will afford PBEA staff time and space for reflection in the remaining months of the programme to draw lessons from programme successes and challenges. This effort could also contribute to any future efforts to synthesise the results of this and other evaluations and lessons learned if UNICEF chooses to do so.

9.5 SUMMARY

Whether UNICEF makes peacebuilding a global priority or not, HQ support to ensure capacity and awareness of peacebuilding concepts and programme cycle management remain important for conflict-sensitive and/or risk informed programming, a non-negotiable minimum that is required to ensure that UNICEF adheres to 'do no harm' principles. A scalable knowledge management function for ROs and HQ also remains important for efficiency and effectiveness. Elements for continuing to support country offices in their learning are available within the PMT and HATIS if this work can be prioritised and have resources committed to it.

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APPENDIX 1

METHODOLOGY AND EVALUATION MATRIX

This appendix provides an overview of the methodology used in the evaluation. The first section explains the evaluation design and overall approach. The second section describes the consolidated data analysis framework. Section three describes the steps used to collect and manage data. The fourth section describes the iterative data analysis approach. Finally, the advantages and limitations of the methodology are discussed.

The overall scope and dimensions of the methodology used in this evaluation were guided by objectives, themes and questions found in the evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) developed by the UNICEF Evaluation Office. The ToR were informed by the Evaluability Assessment, which was conducted in 2013, during the second year of implementation.

Evaluation design

The evaluation was designed to take a bottom up approach to identifying the results achieved and factors that support or inhibit results. Data collection took place over three months in two phases followed by a four-week period for data analysis and initial report drafting.

Significant emphasis was placed on engaging all 14 PBEA CO in a participatory process using a combination of rapid outcome harvesting[77] and other evaluation techniques (e.g. broader key informant interviews and document review to examine programme dimensions beyond specific results). Three country visits (Burundi, Pakistan and South Sudan) were designed to provide deeper insights and engagment with beneficiaries and programme partners. Global stakeholders in UNICEF HQ, RO and partner organisations were also engaged to identify results, contributions and explanatory factors.

Five evaluation themes were established by the EO in the ToR to guide the evaluation. These five themes are:

1. Achievement of outcomes
2. UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning
3. External partnerships
4. Management and governance
5. UNICEF-wide collaboration and learning

TABLE A1 **Evaluation criteria**

Effectiveness	Measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of outputs.
Scalability	Considers the ability of an intervention shown to be efficacioius on a small scale to be expanded to reach a greater population while retaining effectiveness.
Relevance	Concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities and consistent with intended effects.
Efficiency	Measures the ratio of outputs achieve to the total inputs contributed (cost efficiency, timeliness, and comparison to other alternatives).
Coherence	Assesses the consistency in approach and whether policies/guidance take into account standards and human rights considerations.

[77] Outcome harvesting is designed to be a participatory process, often over an extended period of time with facilitated in-person workshops and dialogue. The approach was modified for brevity and the remote nature of engagement with the 11 CO not visited.

21 evaluation questions were developed under these five themes and based on the draft detailed questions provided in the ToR.

A set of five evaluation criteria were linked to the themes and evaluation questions and considered in the analysis stage. These criteria, shown in Table A1, mostly represent OECD Development Assistance Committee evaluation criteria with the addtion of scalability[78]. All themes, questions, criteria and data sources are show in the evaluation matrix found in Table A2.

TABLE A2 **PBEA Outcome Evaluation - Evaluation Matrix**

			Data Gathering Approaches								
			Phase 1: Remote Outcome Harvesting					Phase 2: Field Visits & Final Analysis			
Themes	Ser.	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria	Country-Level Outcome Harvest	Country-Level Remote Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Country-Level Literature Review	Global and Regional Programme Literature Review	CO Field Visits	Global and Regional Outcome Harvest	Global and Regional Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Global External Literature Review
1 Achievement of outcomes	1.1	To what extent, and how, has PBEA at all levels achieved outcomes in the 5 key outcome areas?	Effectiveness	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	1.2	To what extent, and how, has PBEA resulted in unintended outcomes or consequences (positive/negative)?	Effectiveness	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
	1.3	Were programme planning and implementation guidance and support sufficient at all levels to support achievement of outcomes?	Effectiveness, Efficiency, Scalability		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
	1.4	To what extent, and how, did PBEA at different levels adapt to changes in context and mitigate risks?	Effectiveness, Relevance	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

[78] Definition of scalability adapted from: Milat, King, Bauman and Redman, The concept of scalability: increasing the scale and potential adoption of health promotion interventions into policy and practice, Health Promotion International, Oxford University Press, January 12, 2012.

Table A2 (cont'd)

			Data Gathering Approaches								
			Phase 1: Remote Outcome Harvesting					Phase 2: Field Visits & Final Analysis			
Themes	Ser.	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria	Country-Level Outcome Harvest	Country-Level Remote Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Country-Level Literature Review	Global and Regional Programme Literature Review	CO Field Visits	Global and Regional Outcome Harvest	Global and Regional Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Global External Literature Review
1 Achievement of outcomes	1.5	Is there evidence to demonstrate that outcomes achieved were commensurate with the resources allocated to the PBEA?	Efficiency			✓					✓
2 UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning	2.1	Are key peacebuilding concepts and practices commonly understood across PBEA implementing units and other UNICEF Education Programme staff at all levels?	Coherence, Scalability		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	2.2	What are the underlying PBEA theories of change in each implementing country and how clearly are they articulated?	Coherence			✓		✓			
	2.3	What influence have conflict analyses had on PBEA implementation and other UNICEF activities and programming?	Effectiveness, Coherence		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	2.4	What CO institutional strengths have most supported achievement of PBEA outcomes?	Relevance, Effectiveness		✓			✓		✓	

Table A2 (cont'd)

			Data Gathering Approaches								
			Phase 1: Remote Outcome Harvesting					Phase 2: Field Visits & Final Analysis			
Themes	Ser.	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria	Country-Level Outcome Harvest	Country-Level Remote Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Country-Level Literature Review	Global and Regional Programme Literature Review	CO Field Visits	Global and Regional Outcome Harvest	Global and Regional Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Global External Literature Review
2 UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding relative to its positioning	2.5	What, if any, alternate approaches or practices to social service delivery for peacebuilding exist and how do they compare to PBEA?	Relevance, Coherence			✓		✓		✓	✓
3 External partnerships	3.1	Has UNICEF formed partnerships with the right players at the global and national level in view of their mandate?	Effectiveness		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
	3.2	Did UNICEF work with partners in the most efficient and effective ways?	Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence		✓			✓		✓	
	3.3	To what extent did UNICEF strengthen its capacities or expose itself to trade-offs and risks by engaging key partnerships?	Efficiency					✓		✓	
	3.4	What did the PBEA programme and its beneficiaries gain from UNICEF working in partnership with other actors?	Relevance, Efficiency			✓	✓	✓		✓	

Table A2 (cont'd)

			Data Gathering Approaches								
			Phase 1: Remote Outcome Harvesting					Phase 2: Field Visits & Final Analysis			
Themes	Ser.	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria	Country-Level Outcome Harvest	Country-Level Remote Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Country-Level Literature Review	Global and Regional Programme Literature Review	CO Field Visits	Global and Regional Outcome Harvest	Global and Regional Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Global External Literature Review
4 Management and governance	4.1	How did PBEA programme management, governance, implementation and monitoring capacities improve over time (human, technical and financial resources) at all levels (global, regional, country)?	Efficiency		✓		✓	✓		✓	
	4.2	How well were key aspects of programme management (knowledge management, M&E, risk management etc.) harnessed and communicated for success?	Efficiency, Effectiveness		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	
	4.3	How did UNICEF's governance and management adapt to implementing PBEA as a global programme within UNICEF's decentralized structure?	Coherence, Effectiveness				✓	✓		✓	
	4.4	How efficient, reasonable and transparent was the resource allocation process for PBEA?	Efficiency		✓		✓	✓		✓	

Table A2 (cont'd)

			Data Gathering Approaches								
			Phase 1: Remote Outcome Harvesting					Phase 2: Field Visits & Final Analysis			
Themes	Ser.	Evaluation Questions	Evaluation Criteria	Country-Level Outcome Harvest	Country-Level Remote Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Country-Level Literature Review	Global and Regional Programme Literature Review	CO Field Visits	Global and Regional Outcome Harvest	Global and Regional Interviews-UNICEF, Partners	Global External Literature Review
5 UNICEF-wide collaboration and learning	5.1	Did the PBEA management team collaborate and coordinate effectively with other divisions to advance the objectives of the programme?	Effectiveness				✓			✓	
	5.2	What efficiencies were realized through PBEA collaboration and/or coordination strategy?	Efficiency				✓			✓	
	5.3	To what extent and how did PBEA mainstream peacebuilding into other UNICEF sectors and/or country programmes as a cross-cutting theme?	Relevance, Effectiveness, Scalability		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	

Consolidated analysis framework

To ensure coverage of the five evaluation themes a high level analysis framework was developed in the inception stage. The analysis framework shown in Figure A1 seeks to ensure that priority is given to the question of outcome achievement as this was identified as the most important theme during consultations with evaluation users during the inception phase. The analysis framework covers the remaining themes through the lense of contributing factors and poses some overarching questions to frame the evaluation conclusions and recommendations.

Data collection and management process

Data collection took place in two stages:

Stage 1 involved an initial six-week period of remote data collection involving all 14 PBEA implementing countries and global programme literature. Remote data collection was extended an additional 5 weeks (overlapping with Stage 2) to maximise opportunities for country offices to participate. The methods used to collect data during this phase are as follows:

Rapid outcome harvesting:

- Individual and group interviews with CO key informants on results achieved;

FIGURE A1 Evaluation analysis framework

Results Evaluation theme 1 Accountability / summative			**Contributing Factors** Evaluation theme 2, 3, 4, 5 Learning / formative			**Lessons** Accountability and Learning, Future guidance
Global outcome areas	**Actual**	**Expected**	**Programme**	**Strength**	**Weakness**	**Conclusions and Recommendations**
1. Policy 2. Institutional capacities 3. Capacity of children, parents, teachers and duty bearers 4. Access to quality, relevant, conflict sensitive education 5. Learning: generation of evidence and knowledge 6. Other unexpected	Finding	Finding	Peacebuilding Approach	Finding	Finding	• Is approach fit for purpose? • Are pathways and concepts clear and understood? • Did PBEA programming choices establish or follow good practice? • Do UNICEF's position and comparative advantages support PBEA?
			External Partnerships	Finding	Finding	
			Management and Governance	Finding	Finding	
			UNICEF-wide collaboration	Finding	Finding	

- Collection and review of CO programme documentation and external documentation related to peacebuilding and the context;
- Drafting of result statements to capture what the programme achieved, how it contributed to changes and what was significant about the change; and
- Iterative review, feedback and incorporation of CO input to revise result statements.

Other data collection to answer evaluation questions:

- Individual and group interviews with CO key informants; and
- Collection and review of CO programme documentation and external literature.

Global programme literature review:

- Collection and review of global PBEA programme documentation, records and statistics.

Stage 2 involved a five-week period of on-site and remote data collection involving the following methods:

- Three CO visits (Burundi, Pakistan and South Sudan) involving participatory workshops, individual and group interviews with staff, partners and beneficiaries, and observation of programme activities;
- In-person and remote interviews with HQ staff and global partners;
- Review of external literature on peacebuilding;
- Follow-up review of additional PBEA programme literature; and
- Additional remote interviews and written feedback with the 11 CO not visited to ensure maximum participation and refine country case profiles (carried over from Stage 1).

Data management was controlled using a combination of outcome harvesting workbooks - excel spreadsheets for each country to record interview notes and document reivew data and to capture the iterative drafting and feedback process for results statements.

While the evaluation used a number of data collection methods, participatory yet rapid outcome harvesting produced the most data for the evaluation. Outcome harvesting was expanded to take the form of "Result Harvesting" to ensure the evaluation captured all preliminary results, whether outputs, intermediate outcomes or full outcomes. Figure A2 provides an overview of the rapid outcome harvesting process.

FIGURE A2 Overview of outcome harvesting approach used in the evaluation

Outcome Harvesting for PBEA Outcome Evaluation
Outcome Harvesting identifies outcomes and changes that have occurred then collects and substantiates evidence on what happened, who/what contributed, how we can demonstrate contribution and why it is important. The six iterative steps of Outcome Harvesting are shown below with a description of how they were implemented in the PBEA outcome evaluation.



Data analysis

Two stages of data analysis took place in conjunction with the two stages of data collection.

The first stage of data analysis relied on remote data and literature review results as follows:

- Coding of all draft result statements and coding checks for intercoder reliability;
- Per country triangulation of data from interviews and document review to produce draft country case profiles covering results achieved and explanatory factors;
- Cross-country triangulation of data and analysis of result statements harvested; and
- Consolidation and triangulation across literature sources and synthesis regarding global patterns on results achieved and explanatory factors.

The results of this preliminary analysis were captured in a desk review and synthesis analysis report in late May.

The second stage of data analysis involved finalisation of country case profiles and a final consolidated analysis against each evaluation theme and question. The steps involved in this stage of analysis included:

- Revisions of country case profiles to incorporate new data and written CO feedback;
- Stakeholder analysis and theory of change development for the three countries visited;
- Recoding of final result statements and multiple coding checks for intercoder reliability;
- Coding (and checks) of data per country related to programmatic explanatory factors;
- Correlation analysis using a consolidated outcome harvesting database including result statements and their coded attributes and overarching CO programme management attributes;
- Consolidation of global staff and partner interviews and synthesis of results by stakeholder group per evaluation question;
- Consolidation, triangulation and synthesis of data from literature reviews by evaluation question;
- In-person team analysis (over 4 days) to triangulate and synthesise data across all sources per evaluation question, including process analysis to identify programme cycles followed.

General programmatic attributes were identified for each PBEA implementing country to compare against results achievement in each country. The factors captured for each CO included:

- Whether conflict analyses were education sector specific and geographically specific (below national level);
- Whether staff with peacebuilding experience were in place;
- Whether the overall focus of the PBEA programme was towards peacebuilding (working on conflict) or conflict sensitivity (working in conflict following "do no harm" principles);
- Whether there was an overarching theory of change for the PBEA programme in the country;
- Whether peacebuilding was mainstreamed into multiple sector's programming
- Whether peacebuilding was institutionalised in organisational structures, systems, strategies and policies and demonstrated through funding and leadership support; and
- Who the PBEA programme reported to in the CO.

Some key definitions and examples (rubrics) per PBEA global outcome area were developed for the coding of result statement data that can help the reader to interpret the findings in section 4. Table A3 shows the key definitions and rubrics.

The correlation analysis was based on the 78 outcome statements identified by the evaluation team, to compare the degree of change for each result statement with the seven broader programme implementation factors listed above for each CO. The analysis was conducted using χ^2 tests (χ^2 are specific for categorical data). Factors were codified as binary variables (yes/no). χ^2 tests were applied assuming an error of 10%, although for most cases correlation is significant with an error below 5%.

TABLE A3 Key coding definitions and rubrics

Codes and Definitions		Descriptions and Examples				
Term	**Definition for Coding**	**1. Policy**	**2. Institutional Capacity**	**3. Individual Capacity**	**4. Access to Conflict Sensitive Education**	**5. Research, Evidence and Learning**
Degree of Change						
Activity	Actions undertaken as part of the program that have not yet resulted in outputs or outcomes.	Advocacy with government to change a policy, provision of advice to inform policy development, or assistance to disseminate a policy.	Development of programme guidance, plans, training materials for UNICEF or others organisations. Trainings, workshops, sensitizations, or other instutitional capacity development activiites conducted.	Programme design and planning, partner selection, initial community consultations, volunteer recruitment and material development process.	Engagement with key decision-makers, initial programme planning or design or development of materials/ systems in progress.	Research or M&E planning, design, data collection, analysis, report writing.
Output	Tangible and intangible products that result from program activities that have not yet resulted in outcomes.	A new or revised policy , law or strategy document.	Finalized guidance, plans, training materials. Capacity development activities undertaken (e.g. organisational capacity built, new curricula developed and teachers trained) and there is evidence of knowledge, skills, abilty transfer. (e.g. pre-post tests).	Products created, events conducted, people trained or reached and there is evidence of knowledge, skills, abiltiy transfer (e.g training materials produced, trainings held and testimony of learning).	Tools for conflict sensitive education created, trainings held (e.g. supplementary education materials printed and disseminated, schools built but not yet being used.)	Reports, databases, learning events, symposiums, conferences or events.

Table A3 (cont'd)

Codes and Definitions		Descriptions and Examples				
Term	**Definition for Coding**	**1. Policy**	**2. Institutional Capacity**	**3. Individual Capacity**	**4. Access to Conflict Sensitive Education**	**5. Research, Evidence and Learning**
Degree of Change						
Intermediate outcome	A change in capacity, skills or knowledge that is being applied but has not yet led to the targeted changes in behavior, relationships or actions of social actors.	A policy, law or strategy that is in the early stages of implementation resulting in changes in intermediate actors (e.g. teachers, administrators trained and employing new approach) but not yet end beneficiaries (e.g. students).	Evidence that organisations (UNICEF or others) are beginning to apply learning or new plans/systems but application of new capacities is about to start or has just started (i.e. teachers start teaching new curricula next school term).	Evidence that individuals are beginning to use gains in capacity, skills or knowledge, or capacity development products, but application of new capacities is about to start or has just started (e.g. children demonstrate awareness of conflict management approaches but have only just started to employ them with little evidence of behavioural change).	Evidence that systems and/ or resources have changed or exclusionary practices rescinded with a high likelihood leading to increased equitable access (e.g. alternative learning programme launched and enrollment campaign initiated).	Observable application of lessons learned and evidence leading to initial changes in organisational or individual capacity, skills or knowledge. [Likely to be reflected under a separate outcome area.]
Outcome	Observable changes in the behaviour, relationships, activities and actions of 'social actors' including those individuals, groups or organizations that were influenced directly or not, intentionally or not, by the PBEA programme.	A policy, law or strategy that has been implemented with observable effects on end beneficiaries (e.g. reduced violence in schools).	Evidence that new institutional capacity is having intended effects (e.g. new curricula is being taught by teachers).	Evidence that capacity development has resulted in changed beneficiary behavior (e.g. children interact with others from different backgrounds with respect and tolerance).	Evidence that students previously excluded from education have gained access to education that is conflict sensitive.	Evidence that evidence disseminated and put into practice has led to observable changes in community or individual behavior, relationships or activities.

Table A3 (cont'd)

Codes and Definitions		Descriptions and Examples				
Term	**Definition for Coding**	**1. Policy**	**2. Institutional Capacity**	**3. Individual Capacity**	**4. Access to Conflict Sensitive Education**	**5. Research, Evidence and Learning**
Scale of Change						
High scale of change	Changes that affect large numbers of people and cover many geographic locations.	National policy, law or strategy affecting a whole sector (e.g. national curricula, education policy or Education Sector Plan).	All staff in an organisation at national and sub-national levels impacted (e.g. national and sub-national teacher training)	All individuals in a target group nation-wide reached (e.g. all primary school children throughout a national education system reached).	All out-of-school children in a targeted age group across a country reached.	Data and analysis covering a large sample and many locations.
Low scale of change	Changes that only affect small numbers of people and cover few geographic locations.	A procedural change in a single school district.	A capacity developed for a small sub-set of teachers in a single location.	A few individuals in select locations reached.	A few out-of-school children in select locations reached.	Data and analysis covering a small sample and few locations.
Substantiveness of Change						
High significance of change	Changes that represent a high magnitude of difference from the original state and have a high degree of importance/ consequence for the people affected.	Change from no policy, law or strategy on a subject to a well developed conflict sensitive one.	Change from no awareness and application of peacebuilding approaches to complete institutionalization of concepts.	Groups of individuals demonstrate a complete change in previous behaviours linked to conflict drivers.	Educational system enrollment and content completely transformed to allow and promote equitable access to truly conflict sensitive education.	An in-depth analysis that finds strong correlation between approaches or interventions and addressing drivers of conflict and is used to effect change.
Low significance of change	Changes that represent a low magnitude of difference from the original state and have a low degree of importance/ consequence for the people affected.	Small incremental adjustments to an existing policy, law or strategy (e.g. inserting the term conflict sensitivity into a policy with little explanation).	Change from no awareness and application of peacebuilding concepts to a limited degree of conflict sensitivity.	Individuals demonstrate little to no change in previous behaviours linked to conflict drivers.	Temporary or ad-hoc changes to enrollment criteria or small changes in educational content.	A brief case study lacking in evidence used solely for marketing purposes.

APPENDIX 2

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

Based on an analysis of PBEA stakeholders, stakeholders with the highest influence and interest in the PBEA programme are UNICEF CO, PMT, PBEA TWG, HQ Programme Division and Senior Management, the PBEA donor (Dutch Government), governments at national and sub-national levels, IPs, and the community of research and practice around education and peacebuilding. This concentration of interest and influence correlates with programme investments in leadership, partnerships and capacity among these stakeholders. Out of this group, IPs demonstrated the least amount of influence, despite relatively high interest. It would be worthwhile for UNICEF to consider partnership approaches that better harness IPs' comparative advantages and expertise to influence the programme.

Beneficiaries and global partners fall into the category of high interest, but low influence. While not surprising, UNICEF can further engage these stakeholders using participatory programming practices and other action-oriented approaches.

Interestingly the UNICEF Executive Board and UN sister agencies are in the lowest influence and interest spectrum. PBEA should consider strategies to engage these two stakeholders in approaches to peacebuilding informed by PBEA lessons and achievements.

The influence and interest of key stakeholder groups is presented in *Figure A5.1*.

Table A5.2 details stakeholder group roles, interest in the programme, influence over the programme and interest in the evaluation.

FIGURE A5.1 **Stakeholder Influence and Interest in PBEA**



TABLE A5.2 Stakeholder roles, interests and influence

Stakeholder Category	Stakeholders	Role in PBEA	
UNICEF	Executive Board	As the governing body of UNICEF, the Executive Board reviews UNICEF activities and approves its policies, country programmes and budgets, including PBEA and other peacebuilding programmes in country CPDs.	
UNICEF	Senior Management (Executive Director (ED) and Deputy Executive Directors (DEDs))	High level decision making power and guidance to Executive Board for policy, programmatic approach and implementation.	
UNICEF	Programme Division, including Education Section	Oversight of all programmes, including education programs (humanitarian response, DRR, resilience, PBEA, research etc.) and HATIS, which plays an important role in PBEA due to its peacebuilding expertise and technical support.	
UNICEF	PBEA Programme Management Team	Management of PBEA global governance, communication, M&E, and global partnerships for PBEA. Technical support to PBEA design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, reporting at country and regional levels.	

	Interest in PBEA	Influence or Power over PBEA	Interest in Evaluation
	PBEA outcomes have implications for UNICEF's broader approach to peacebuilding and conflict sensitive programming.	The Executive Board has final oversight over the future of PBEA and UNICEF's role in social service for peacebuilding.	The findings from the evaluation can inform future programming and UNICEF's overall approach to peacebuilding. The evaluation was not highlighted as a priority activity for EB interest.
	PBEA's link to peacebuilding and conflcit sensitive programming which represent new approaches for UNICEF and raises its profile within UNICEF.	By guiding programming design and approaches, senior management has direct influence and control over the objectives and scope of future PBEA programming and how the programme fits within UNICEF's broader strategic approaches and programming direction.	Some members of senior management have expressed an interest in the PBEA evaluation for learning purposes.
	Interest in PBEA's potential to inform practice around service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected contexts and as an innovative cross-sector programming instrument. Focus on results varies: interest lies in improved education outcomes; peacebuilding results; PBEA's catalytic role in integrating peacebuilding work into other sectors; and promoting innovative cross-sector programming.	Under general supervision by senior management, managerial oversight of PBEA's programme management team (PMT), including staffing and budget at HQ. Controls PBEA's relative influence and role within the Education Section. Guides linkages with other teams and sectors within Programme division.	Specific interest includes: actual/ tangible programme outcomes in peacebuilding and education sector results (noted that outcomes may not have been achieved, but other results towards achievement of outcomes are considered valuable information as well); adaptability and flexibility to fragile, changing, conflict affected contacts (e.g. conflict in South Sudan, ebola in Liberia); institutionalization of programme learning beyond the education sector; and role and usefulness of conflict analysis.
	As the hands-on global management structure for the PBEA programme, the team is invested in the success of the programme at all levels (global, regional, country). Team members come from various backgrounds - education, peacebuilding, knowledge management and M&E - and as such have different approaches to the programme. There is a clear interest in the continuation of PBEA t and engagement in UNICEF's programming through social services for peacebuilding.	Power rests at the technical and implementation levels. The team influences guidance, tools and services for PBEA roll-out. However, lack of capacity and staffing limitedo full support of the programme, particularly in the first year of PBEA implementation. The PBEA team is relatively small compared to other teams within the larger education section. Its ability to influence wider UNICEF management and governance structures (such as finance, planning and reporting functions) appears to be limited. It is also challenged to influence country offices in some cases within UNICEF's decentralized structure.	The PMT's primary interest lies in learning. There is also an interest in whether the programme is moving towards the anticipated results (accountability) and can attract potential future funding. Specific learning interests include: -understand better what worked and what didn't and how UNICEF dealt with challenges (structure, program design, implementation, M&E) to inform a potential second phase - understand how other sectors (WASH, nutrition, health) and cross-sectoral areas (gender, child protection, youth, ECD, etc.) benefitted from PBEA (education as convening sector) - identify factors for success at the country level (leadership, new partnerships for innovative programming, adaptability of the program to respond to emergencies (ex: Liberia, Sierra Leone during the Ebola crises)) - understand the extent to which organizational learning took place (e.g. on processes)

Table A5.2 (cont'd)

Stakeholder Category	Stakeholders	Role in PBEA	
UNICEF	Technical Working Group (TWG) Members, Cross-Cutting Teams engaged with PBEA	Advise, influence and provide technical support to (a) integrate cross-cutting themes (gender, adolescents and youth, peacebuilding/HATIS, communication) into PBEA programming and (b) integrate PBEA programming into other UNICEF core work, sectors and programmes. Primary deliverable is direct technical assistance to country offices and regional offices.	
UNICEF	Regional Offices (ROs)	Direct coordination and technical assistance role to COs. Some regional offices have been identified as being more engaged in PBEA than others.	
UNICEF	Country Offices (COs) (including field offices)	Implementation of PBEA. Oversight of all stages of programme cycle, from assessment to context-specific design, local/national partnerships, to implementation, M&E and reporting. Interface with ROs and HQ for guidance and support.	
Direct Beneficiaries	Targeted recipients (children, parents, teachers, duty-bearers and communities) of PBEA programme assistance	Affected by PBEA programme	
Indirect Beneficiaries	Wider communities and individuals impacted by PBEA but not direct beneficiaries	Affected by PBEA programme	
Government	National and local governments in PBEA countries	Varying degrees of influence on and participation in PBEA programme. Also direct or indirect beneficiaries of PBEA activities in most countries.	

	Interest in PBEA	Influence or Power over PBEA	Interest in Evaluation
	Interest in promoting PBEA as a cross-cutting (not just education) programme and catalytic programme for integrating peacebuilding objectives into UNICEF core work and other programming. Also an interest in furthering integration of gender into PBEA (especially around gender based violence).	Influence over PBEA is indirect and limited to an advisory and support role. TWG has had more success integrating peacebuilding as an objective within their own team's guidance and supported activities.	Lessons learned from PBEA's role as a cross-cutting programme and effectiveness of TWG initiatives.
	ESARO and WCARO are engaged in guidance, technical assistance and administrative support. Other regional offices engaged to lesser extents.	Power has increased over the course of the PBEA implementation, with ROs now playing a more engaged technical and advisory role to country offices.	Effectivenes and efficiency of RO and regional initiatives, lessons learned for PBEA COs in their regional and as global programme.
	Level of interest in PBEA varies between COs depending on size, other competing priorities, and country context. Many countries exhibited high levels of interest in PBEA and other DRR, conflict-sensitive, peacebulding and resilience intiatives.	COs have a high level of control the design and implementation of PBEA in their country within the parameters set by the global programme, including governance, management, and dispensing funds across sections beyond education.	COs are interested in learning dimensions of the evaluation findings, which could benefit assessment processes, programme design, M&E and reporting. Findings could also advise on improvements on governance, management and partnership mechanisms that could benefit COs. COs are also interested in the evaluation's findings and recommendations for UNICEF's role peacebuilding and resilience agenda. Demonstrated accountability at country-level can be directly leverage by COs for future resource mobilization and peacebuilding programmes.
	Direct beneficiaries encompass individuals targeted for PBEA assistance, often at the community and institutional levels. Beneficiaries are ultimately the group most affected by the PBEA programme, both by positive and negative and intended and unintended consequences.	Beneficiaries have a disproportionately low amount of power in the programme design and implementation, although the use of participatory methods in the conflict analyses in some countries increased beneficiary influence.	When fully informed of the purpose of the evaluation, beneficiaries have voiced opinions, concerns and lessons learned to help inform the evaluation, and provided recommendations for CO level imrprovements to PBEA.
	Individuals, communities, institutions and wider economies that can be positively or negatively affected by PBEA. PBEA has the potential to affect institutions and power structures at all levels. Interest has been expressed by individuals and communities to engage in the programme in some countries.	This group has little power or influence over the programme. Some channels exist in some countries for communities and individuals to voice their concerns, for example through local governments and traditional governance structures.	Not known.
	National and local governments have primary responsibility for the wellbeing and protection of their citizens. These countries will have varying degrees of interest or stake in PBEA, which is influenced by standing national priorities for education and peacebuilding, country context and prior engagement with UNICEF on education.	Influence over the programme is relatively high, depending on the country context, as national government' s have the power include or exclude PBEA activities from national priorities and plans.	National and local governments have an interest in learning from the evaluation to gain clarity on UNICEF's approach to education, service deliver and peacebuilding, what has been done so far, what can be improved, and demonstrable results of PBEA in their countries.

Table A5.2 (cont'd)

Stakeholder Category	Stakeholders	Role in PBEA	
Partners - Global	(I)NGOs, think tanks, research institutions, networks, coalitions, other UN agencies, donors	Cooperating partners at the global level working with UNICEF to research, or provide technical or implementation support to programming or advice on the PBEA programme.	
Partners - Country-level	(I)NGOs, think tanks, research institutions, networks, coalitions, other UN agencies, donors	Cooperating partners at the country and regional levels are contracted by UNICEF tend to research and advise on or implement PBEA programme activities.	
Donor	Government of the Netherlands (GoN)	Only donor to PBEA. Influence over: design, scope, funding of PBEA and potential second phase of PBEA.	
UN	UN Agencies, interagency clusters	Involved in PBEA coordination or implementation, but in only in certain PBEA components and discrete cases by country.	
Community of research and practice	Larger INGO/NGO community, academic, research organizations	Contributes to implementing peacebuilding, education and other initiatives that relate to PBEA. Contributes to the body of knowledge and learning in the fields of education, social service delivery and peacebuilding.	

	Interest in PBEA	Influence or Power over PBEA	Interest in Evaluation
	Beyond the contractual agreement with UNICEF, partners' engagement in PBEA can forward their own organizational vision and agenda, build organizational capacity and facilitate learning.	Partners in contractual agreements seem to have close working relationships with UNICEF, but are in an inverse power relationship. Power to influence PBEA rest in the partners ability to advocate and convince UNICEF.	Although not the primary user of the evaluation, global partners have expressed an interest in lessons on fund management by UN and donors (e.g. how to do better, rapidly, effectively, efficiently), approaches to partnership, and the replicability of the PBEA. Expects findings to be fully shared among partners.
	Cooperating partners at the country-level often have deep relationships with communities and households and context-sensitive knowledge. These partners are directly affected by UNICEF's approach to programme design, implementation and M&E, and PBEA partnership arrangements, and have generally expressed a high interest in the PBEA.	Country-level partners in contractual agreements have some influence regards to PBEA in terms of project design, adaptation and research focus. They have less influence on a larger scale due to issues around coordination ofpartners and power imbalances inherent in contractual arrrangements.	Interest revolve around results achieved on the ground, partnership arrangements, governance and management arrangements, and future programming approaches and opporunities.
	Interest in PBEA implementation to ensure the efficient and effective use of resources.	Relatively high level of power over PBEA components and focus as sole funder. Direct influence over the future of PBEA funding and programming.	Interest in establishing accountability for resources by determining the efficiency and effectiveness for which resources were used to achieve planned results. Interest in conclusions and recommendations that inform potential future programme approaches.
	Less than expected interaction with other UN Agencies with regards to PBEA. Discete interaction include in integrating conflict senstiivity, peacebuilding or resilience into UN planning processes; coordination on complementary programmes; and infromation sharing on intiatives. Main reasons given for lack of interaction include: high overheads to work with other agencies compared to small programme budget/scope; peacebuilding through child-centered approaches or social services not a focus area for most other agencies; short implemetnation time period to develop relationships for implementation.	UN agencies have had the lowest level of influence over PBEA compared to other stakeholders. This appears to be due to their lower levels of engagement and interest in the programme.	Not known.
	Interest in PBEA initiatives globally, regionally and in countries, potential partnerships, and lessons learned from the programme.	Little influence over PBEA. Influence can arise through research or engagement PBEA activities, and other approaches or initiatives, in the areas of education, peacebuilding, resliience, social services and conflcict sensitivity, althouugh few instances were identified in the evaluation.	Interest in learning from the evaluation to inform ongoing research, study and programming in peacebulding, education, social services and reslience.

APPENDIX 3

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR OTHER KEY PBEA CONCEPTS

Concept/ Term	Operational Definitions and Descriptions
Education as a "Peace Dividend"	It is argued that quick investment aimed at getting the social service system functioning provides a considerable "peace dividend" in the post conflict context. In other words, providing education and allowing children and youth to return to school through a process that consults key stakeholders can provide a demonstrable outcome of the peace process and create an incentive to maintain peace.
Social services/ Education and Peace-building	UNICEF understands that its contribution to peacebuilding is through social services, an area that has not yet been prioritised adequately in national peacebuilding plans[79]. Providing equitable and quality social services "can offer tangible peace dividends outside of capitals and in war-affected communities and help rebuild the citizen-state compact". UNICEF's areas of contributions to peacebuilding include education, WASH, health, nutrition, child protection, youth, early childhood development and gender at all levels of society.[80] McCandless[81] identifies three broad theories of change underlying the contribution of social services such as education to peacebuilding. These are identified as: • **Delivery of peace dividends** – social tensions can be reduced through the provision of tangible, needed services, and by incentivising non-violent behaviour and supporting statebuilding efforts. • **Strengthening sector governance** – supporting conflict-sensitive sector governance and policy reform and the development of responsive, inclusive and accountable institutions at national and sub-national levels can improve state-society relations and lay foundations for a self-sustaining peace. • **Providing entry points to deliver peacebuilding results** – administrative and social services can lead to joint action around programming that may help building relationships and meet immediate needs in ways that address conflict drivers.
Human security	The United Nations defines human security as "an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and crosscutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people" based on the understanding that all humans are "entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential"[82]. UNICEF's Concept Note on key PBEA concepts states that while Human Security is still being used by some CO as a concept, the PBEA Programme has replaced Human Security by social cohesion to more clearly articulate the results of the programme's peacebuilding efforts.

79 The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) acknowledged in a 2011 review of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), "despite their recognised contributions to peacebuilding, administrative and social services tend to take a back seat to interventions focused on the security sector and political processes in post conflict settings". Erin McCandless 2011. Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of administrative and social services to peacebuilding, United Nations Thematic Review for the Peacebuilding Support Office, p.10.

80 UNICEF 2012. UNICEF Note on Key Peacebuilding Concepts and Terms.

81 Erin McCandless 2011. Peace Dividends and Beyond: Contributions of administrative and social services to peacebuilding, United Nations Thematic Review for the Peacebuilding Support Office.

82 UNICEF 2012. UNICEF Note on Key Peacebuilding Concepts and Terms.

Operational Definitions For Other Key PBEA Concepts (cont'd)

Concept/ Term	Operational Definitions and Descriptions
Resilience	UNICEF's working definition for resilience is "the ability of children, households, communities, and systems to anticipate, manage, and overcome shocks and cumulative stresses in ways which advance the rights of every child, with special attention to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children"[83]. The concept focuses on strengthening local capacities needed at the individual, community, institutional and system levels to cope with and overcome any kind of natural or man-made risks, shocks or stresses (while peacebuilding deals with man-made risks, shocks and stresses). Resilience has gained much attention over the recent years and constitutes one of UNICEF's key strategies for realising the rights of every child, especially the most disadvantaged as stated in the UNICEF Strategic Plan 2014-2017[84].
Peace-building and resilience	A resilience scholar[85] notes on the interlinkage of peacebuilding and resilience: "Resilience offers a results-based evaluative framework where the end result – the ability of a community to opt out of or prevent the escalation of violence – is the most effective measure of peacebuilding work."[86] McCandless and Nilaus-Tarp[87] identify peacebuilding and resilience programming as: • Understanding the operational context, whether through the lens of risks (resilience focus) or drivers of conflict (peacebuilding focus); • Understanding and valuing of local/national capacities, structures and systems as the route to sustaining peace and development; and, • The need for equity-based programming.[88]
Social cohesion	Social cohesion promotes a sense of belonging, inclusion, respect, trust or tolerance, both individually and institutionally. UNICEF documents refer to a definition developed by UNDP: "Social Cohesion refers to the quality of coexistence between the multiple groups that operate within a society. Groups can be distinguished in terms of ethnic and socio-cultural origin, religious and political beliefs, social class or economic sector or on the basis of interpersonal characteristics such as gender and age. Quality of coexistence between the groups can be evaluated along the dimensions of mutual respect and trust, shared values and social participation, life satisfaction and happiness as well as structural equity and social justice."[89] UNDP considers two principal dimensions to social cohesion: 1. The reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and 2. The strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties. UNDP views social cohesion in a similar way to conflict sensitivity in terms of integrating a social cohesion lens in all programming in conflict and crisis contexts in addition to targeted actions.[90]
Social cohesion vs. Peace-building	The reestablishment or strengthening of social cohesion is one of the results that emerge from an effective peacebuilding intervention. UNICEF PBEA acknowledges that social cohesion has been often used as an alternative to peacebuilding due to local sensitiveness around the notion of peacebuilding respectively conflict.

83 UNICEF 2013. Working Paper on UNICEF and Resilience, p. 3.

84 The UNICEF Strategic Plan (2014-2017) states: "There is a need for dedicated systems and capacities for effective preparedness and response, more explicit integration of humanitarian and development programming to promote resilience, and increased attention to human rights protection in emergencies. Systematic attention to risk analysis and mitigation is particularly important to effectively addressing the specific needs of children living in fragile and conflict-affected contexts" UNICEF 2013, page 3.

85 Laure Van Metre (undated). Resilience as a Peacebuilding Practice: To Realism from Idealism. USIP. Available at: http://www.usip.org/insights-newsletter/resilience-peacebuilding-practice-realism-idealism

86 Laure Van Metre (undated). Resilience as a Peacebuilding Practice: To Realism from Idealism. USIP. Available at: http://www.usip.org/insights-newsletter/resilience-peacebuilding-practice-realism-idealism

87 See Erin McCandless and Kristoffer Nilaus-Tarp 2014. Social Service Contributions to resilience through peacebuilding: programme Guidance. Theories of Change and Indicators. Draft, page 7.

88 See Erin McCandless and Kristoffer Nilaus-Tarp 2014. Social Service Contributions to resilience through peacebuilding: programme Guidance. Theories of Change and Indicators. Draft, page 7.

89 UNICEF 2012. UNICEF Note on Key Peacebuilding Concepts and Terms.

90 UNDP 2009. Community Security and Social Cohesion. Towards a UNDP Approach. Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, page 15.

APPENDIX 4

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY INTERVENTION TYPE AND CONFLICT DRIVERS PER GLOBAL OUTCOME AREA

	Top 5 Conflict Drivers					
1 - Policy	**Culture of violence (and its many forms)**	**Weak governance**	**Exclusion (youth, women, children, ethnic groups, etc.)**	**Inequitable distribution of resources (not identity-based)**	**Inequality between identity-based groups and access to services and resources**	**Total # of statements per intervention type for all conflict drivers**
Adolescents and Youth	1	1	3	1		9
Advocacy	5	1	4	3	4	35
Capacity development general (workshops, technical advice/assistance)		1	2		2	9
Child Friendly Schools/ Education	1		1			2
Community Dialogue	1	1	1	1		5
Curriculum Development and Reform	2	3	1	2	2	11
Disaster Risk Reduction	2	2	2	2	1	14
Early Childhood Education / Development	1	1	1	1		5
Education in Emergencies	1	1	1	2	1	15
Education Policy	3	2	4	1	3	19
Education Sector Plan	2	4	4	2	3	17
Gender-based Violence	1	1	1	1		5
Go-to-school, stay-in-school, back-to-school campaign (or parts of it)	1	1	1	1		6
Life Skills	1	1	1	1		6
Participatory conflict analysis	4	2	4	2	1	21
Peace clubs	1	1			1	3
Primary education	2	2	1	3		11
Principal and school administrator training	1					1
Research	1		1			9
Sports / Camps / Play	1	1	1	1		6
Teacher Training	2	1			1	4
Total # of statements per driver	34	27	34	24	19	

Intervention Types

Intervention Types	Top 5 Conflict Drivers					
2 - Institutional Capacity Development	Culture of violence (and its many forms)	Weak governance	Exclusion (youth, women, children, ethnic groups, etc.)	Inequitable distribution of resources (not identity-based)	Inequality between identity-based groups and access to services and resources	Total # of statements per intervention type for all conflict drivers
Adolescents and Youth	1	1	1	1		4
Advocacy	3	2	2	1	2	14
Capacity development general (workshops, technical advice/assistance)	1	3	4		5	28
Child Friendly Schools/ Education	3	1	1		1	7
Child Protection	2	1				4
Community Conflict Mediation	2	1				6
Community Dialogue	3	1	1	1		10
Curriculum Development and Reform	3	3	2	1	4	17
Disaster Risk Reduction		1	1		1	4
Early Childhood Education / Development	1	1	1	1		5
Education Policy	4	1	1	1	1	9
Education Sector Plan	1	1	1	1	2	9
Gender-based Violence	1	1	1	1		5
Go-to-school, stay-in-school, back-to-school campaign (or parts of it)	2	1	1	1		6
Life Skills	2	1	1	1		9
Participatory conflict analysis	4	4	5	3	4	32
Peace clubs	1	1			1	3
Primary education	1	1	1	1		4
Principal and school administrator training	2					2
Reducing school violence	1	1				5
Research	1	1	1	1	1	7
School Construction					1	1
Sports / Camps / Play	2	1	1	1		9
Teacher Training	5	2	1		2	11
Total # of statements per driver	46	31	27	16	25	

Intervention Types	Top 5 Conflict Drivers					
3 - Individual Capacity Development	Culture of violence (and its many forms)	Weak governance	Exclusion (youth, women, children, ethnic groups, etc.)	Mobilization of ethnic and religious divisions	Inequality between identity-based groups and access to services and resources	Total # of statements per intervention type for all conflict drivers
Adolescents and Youth	4		2		1	13
Advocacy	2		1			3
Capacity development general (workshops, technical advice/assistance)	2		2	2	2	9
Child Friendly Schools/ Education	2					6
Child Protection	3	1				5
Community Conflict Mediation	3	1	1		1	14
Community Dialogue	7	1	3	3	2	26
Curriculum Development and Reform	1	1		2	2	6
Early Childhood Education / Development	4	1	1	2	1	13
Education Policy	1		1			2
Gender-based Violence	3	1	2	3	2	14
Go-to-school, stay-in-school, back-to-school campaign (or parts of it)	1	1	1	1		5
Life Skills	7	1	5	3	2	25
Peace clubs	3	1		2	2	9
Primary education	1				1	2
Principal and school administrator training	1					2
Reducing school violence	4	1	1		1	8
Research	2					5
School Construction	2					3
Sports / Camps / Play	9	1	4	5	4	31
Teacher Training	5	1		1	3	13
Total # of statements per driver	67	12	24	23	24	

	Top 5 Conflict Drivers					
4 - Access to Conflict Sensitive Education	**Culture of violence (and its many forms)**	**Reintegration of returnees (and IDPs)**	**Weak governance**	**Exclusion (youth, women, children, ethnic groups, etc.)**	**Inequality between identity-based groups and access to services and resources**	**Total # of statements per intervention type for all conflict drivers**
Adolescents and Youth	1					4
Advocacy		1	1	1	1	4
Child Friendly Schools/ Education	1	1		1	1	6
Child Protection	1	1		1	1	5
Community Conflict Mediation						1
Community Dialogue	2		1	1		8
Curriculum Development and Reform	1		2		1	5
Disaster Risk Reduction			1			2
Early Childhood Education / Development	3	2	2	2	2	14
Education in Emergencies	1	2	2	1	1	9
Education Sector Plan			1			2
Gender-based Violence	3	1	1	2	1	12
Go-to-school, stay-in-school, back-to-school campaign (or parts of it)	2		2	2	1	14
Life Skills	1		1	1	1	7
Peace clubs	1		1		1	4
Primary education	1	1	3	4	3	18
School Construction	1	4	1	1	3	13
Sports / Camps / Play	1	1	1	1	1	8
Teacher Training	4	1	2	2	4	17
Total # of statements per driver	24	15	22	20	22	

Intervention Types

APPENDIX 5

ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSES IN PBEA COUNTRIES

Country	Pre-existing CA	PBEA CA Conducted	PBEA CA Updated	Is CA Education Sector Specific?	Is CA Geographically Specific (sub-national)?	Use of Other Agency CA	
Burundi	No	2012 - May-13	Ongoing (research agenda)	No	No	No	
Chad	No	2012 - Dec-13	Ongoing (informal)	No	Yes	No	
Cote d'Ivoire	No	2012 - Apr-13	2014 and 2015	Yes	No	No	
DRC	No	June-July research, report September 2012	Not updated	Yes	Yes	No	
Ethiopia	No	1st Draft Dec-13. Endorsed in Aug-14	Not updated	Yes	Yes	Harmonised and aligned to CPD and the UN Joint DRS Programme	
Liberia	No	Completed Dec 2012, published Sept 2013	Not updated	Yes	Yes	No (but jointly conducted with Liberia Peace-building Office)	
Myanmar	Yes	End of 2013 (desk review)	May-14	Yes	Yes	Not reported	
Pakistan	No	May-14	Jun-15	Yes	Yes	No	
Sierra Leone	Yes by other actors but not sector specific	2012, published in Jan-13	Not updated	Yes	No	Included in desk review for CA	
Somalia	Yes by other actors but not sector-specific	Mar-13 - Feb-14, published in Apr-14	Not known	Yes	Yes	No	
South Sudan	Yes by other actors but not sector-specific	Aug-12 - Feb-13	2015	Yes	Yes	No	
State of Palestine	Yes by other actors but not sector specific	13-May	As part of SitAn	Yes	Yes	Yes, UNDAF	
Uganda	Yes by other actors but not sector-specific	Finalized Oct-12	Jun-14	Yes	Yes	No	
Yemen	No	Jan-13 - Dec-13	No	No	Yes	Yes, UNCT-wide CA	

	Quality of CA	How CA Was Used
	Inter-mediate	Integrated conflict analysis into PBEA research strategy regarding the inter-generational transmission of violence and the connection between the macro- and microdynamics of violence, and the effects of conflict and violence on children and adolescents.
	High	Influenced the PBEA programme design and 2014 scale-up. In the process of influencing broader UNICEF and UN programming.
	Inter-mediate	Initial CA lacked geographic specificity and had little influence on programme but subsequent studies, action research and updated analyses filled gaps and were influential in adjusting programming.
	High	Used as basis of programme design. Identified entry points for programming to address conflict drivers (around political and policy responses, structural and education reforms, and individual and interpersonal changes)
	Inter-mediate	Not used on initial programme design, but to revise programme and OM and better adapt ongoing PBEA activities to the Ethiopian context (adaptation of ECD training materials design, incorporation of PBEA interventions in their post Mid-Term Review 2014/15 and 2015/16 annual work plans by REBs) and also to inform the policy work stream (Identification of priorities in the ESDPV).
	Unknown, full CA not received	Influenced programme design (e.g. developing theories of change and interventions). Fed into the Strategic Roadmap for National Healing, Peacebuilding and Reconciliation
	Inter-mediate	CA informed the ongoing QBEP and the Mid Term Review (MTR) of the Country Programme, CA informed the improvement of both the access to and quality of basic education available in the regions most affected by conflict (Rakhine and Kachin). It has also been used in the development of the strategy to collaborate with Non State Actors.
	Inter-mediate	Basis of SCR programming. Used by partners who conducted a smaller CA at district level to identify conflict drivers. Interest from other sections to use CA going forward.
	Inter-mediate	Influenced design of programmes and built stakeholder buy-in by highlighting previously known aspects of operating environment and helping to prioritize interventions.
	High	Programme design, was disseminated via INEE, executive summary was shared with partners. Used by other agencies to inform resilience strategies and common planning processes.
	High	Initially deemed intermediate quality by RO and susequently updated. Used for programme design, update 2014 will inform country programme writ large (CPD though reduced version because of conflict context). Used to inform partner and other UN agency strategies.
	Inter-mediate	The UNDAF conflict analysis reportedly influenced the CPD and the Social Cohesion programme design. CA is being incorporated into CO SitAn process. The East Jerusalem CA influenced specific activities in this geographic area.
	High	Programme design and research strategy. Also informed results framework of IPs, advocacy, was included in 2014SitAn that informed CPD 2016-2020.
	Inter-mediate	UNCT-wide CA and UNICEF education specific analysis used to identify priorities and education entry points for programme.

APPENDIX 6

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, BY EVALUATION CRITERION

Theme	Evaluation Criteria	Key Findings
Outcomes and other results	Effectiveness	PBEA achieved greater results when COs focused on addressing conflict drivers, within an overarching theory of change (the "why") followed by holistic programme design, attainment of peacebuilding expertise, sensitisation of stakeholders and capacity development (the "how"), before turning their attention to discreet intervention types, activities and outputs (the "what").
		PBEA policy results improved the environment for peacebuilding programming, but windows of opportunity are critical and could not always be sequenced to proceed other activities.
		Work on institutional and individual capacity development was critical to PBEA implementation and represented the largest number of overall results, (output, intermediate outcome and outcome), even though the scale of the change was sometimes small.
		Other than conflict analyses PBEA has thus far underperformed in the number of results achieved under the area of learning, evidence and advocacy due to delays and prioritisation of other activities. However, global research and country monitoring has shown utility and is beginning to yield important evidence and learning.
	Relevance	PBEA interventions achieved greater relevance where it engaged stakeholders in conflict analysis and prioritisation of programmes and extended beyond traditional school-based education work to focus more on engaging adolescents and youth and more holistic community interventions.
	Scalability	PBEA work on access to conflict sensitive education benefited from UNICEF's equity focus, has shown the ability to be brought to scale and achieved the most outcome level results. Conflict drivers related to a culture of violence, exclusion and inequality are best linked to UNICEF's mandate and experience.
	Efficiency	The PBEA underestimated the time and resources needed for initial sensitisation, advocacy and capacity development required to engage effectively in peacebuilding work. This resulted in delayed implementation and spending compared to initial plans.
UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding	Effectiveness	Eight country offices facilitated highly participatory CAs engaging communities, partners and governments at various levels. This supports effectiveness of peacebuilding with advantages for stakeholder buy-in, identifying windows of opportunity, building trust and capacities and sensitising key stakeholders.
		PBEA effectiveness and relevance were enhanced by its demonstrated ability to adapt to changes in contexts and mitigate risks posed by shocks (disease outbreaks, natural disasters and conflicts), obstacles in the authorizing environment and organisational structures.

Summary of Findings, by Evaluation Criterion (cont'd)

Theme	Evaluation Criteria	Key Findings
cont'd **UNICEF's approach to peacebuilding**	Relevance	The decentralised nature of PBEA enhanced relevance and supported peacebuilding by facilitating focus on context-specific conflict drivers. Sub-national conflict analysis further enhances relevance.
		Regular monitoring of conflict drivers and updates of CAs helps ensure relevance and is a good practice for all risk informed programming that should be sustained into future programming. This allowed adjustment of programmes to address emerging issues.
	Coherence	Global concept notes, training and workshops have enhanced coherence and PBEA implementing units now broadly understand key concepts regarding conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding and social cohesion. These concepts need to be contextualised and updated based on stakeholder consultations and changes in context.
		Holistic theories of change (at country level) with clear assumptions and information about mitigating and moderating factors support coherence by helping understand complexity and ensuring complementarity across interventions. A detailed global theory of change is not possible or desirable as peacebuilding must be context specific.
	Scalability	UNICEF's mandate, strategic committments and focus on equity position it well to engage in peacebuilding, especially where a culture of violence, exclusion and/or inequitable access to social services are key conflict drivers. This allowed PBEA to be more scalable and effective by integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding into broader education and child protection initiatives.
Partnerships for PBEA and beyond	**Internal**	
	Effectiveness	The PBEA management team at HQ coordinated effectively with other divisions to advance the objectives of the programme. Many CO management teams coordinated effectively across at least a few sections, while a few focused almost exclusively on education programmes.
		Peacebuilding has been mainstreamed within the education sector in PBEA COs but only beyond in a few cases. Few COs have made signigicant progress on fully institutionalising peacebuilding, though CA is frequently being integrated into UNICEF systems.
	Scalability	The evaluation found it is critical to mainstream conflict sensitivity across entire country programmes. There is insufficient evidence to determine whether advancing peacebuilding programming in UNICEF would be best served by a sector-based approach or through mainstreaming of peacebuilding into entire country programmes.
		At HQ units represented in the TWG have created tools and are testing approaches that could support mainstreaming of peacebuilding in different sectors if widely disseminated and prioritised. The HATIS capacity development package could also support mainstreaming within sectors or across country programmes if its use were expanded and resourced.

Summary of Findings, by Evaluation Criterion (cont'd)

Theme	Evaluation Criteria	Key Findings
	Efficiency	Leadership support for peacebuilding work is a crucial factor for effective mainstreaming and institutionalisation and efficient cross-sectoral collaboration at all levels.
		The PBEA collaboration and coordination strategy at HQ represents a good practice to be expanded on if programmes retain a sector lead construct. It allowed for efficiencies in information sharing and in bringing non-education technical and thematic inputs into the programme to develop tools, test approaches and assure quality planning and reporting.
	External	
cont'd **Partnerships for PBEA and beyond**	Effectiveness	UNICEF formed implementing partnerships with many of the right actors at national and local levels enhancing PBEA effectiveness over time as capacities were built. Greater emphasis should be placed on coordination and forming partnerships with other peacebuilding actors within the UN system and beyond.
		Implementing partners often worked in isolation from one another and were not well informed about holistic programme activities. Their roles are often limited to a contractual relationship. This presents potential missed opportunities to gain from broader partner experience and for synergies between partners and workstreams.
		Partnerships with national and sub-national governments played a critical role in enhancing effectiveness by providing entry points, identifying windows of opportunity and creating space for peacebuilding work.
	Relevance	Non-traditional partners provided critical access to communities (through presence and local trust) increasing programme relevance.
	Efficiency	Inefficiencies in selecting implementing partners due to internal procedures disproportinately affected non-traditional partners, creating a disincentive for selecting the best partner based on peacebuilding capacities. The duration of PCA's and contract lapses caused further inefficiencies.
Management and governance	Effectiveness	After initial delays, PBEA programme management and implementation support has drastically improved across all organisational levels. PMT refocus on accountability and knowledge management and the shift of backstopping to ROs has improved effectiveness.
		The SPAG did not contribute significantly to strategy though governace capacities have benefited from strong guidance and support of Senior Management and some individual SPAG members have provided critical bilateral advice.
		PBEA invested heavily in M&E and knowledge management, which contributed to accountability and can lead to organisational learning if successfully completed and communicated.
		CO management of PBEA was most effective where human resources were dedicated to the programme or a strong cross-sectoral team was established and staff with peacebuilding expertise were hired.

Summary of Findings, by Evaluation Criterion (cont'd)

Theme	Evaluation Criteria	Key Findings
cont'd **Management and governance**	Relevance	Programme management has become more responsive to the decentralised structure of UNICEF and context specificity of peacebuilding increasing the likelihood of relevance while maintaining systems to ensure accountability to the donor.
		The TWG increased the relevance of PBEA by contributing non-education technical advice and tools needed to help COs address key drivers of conflict.
	Scalability	Technical capacities among PBEA implementers have significantly improved. By the end of the programme a significant body of materials will exist to serve as a foundation for future UNICEF work in peacebuilding, but these materials need dissemination strategies to support scalability.
	Efficiency	PBEA planning, monitoring and reporting systems remain duplicative to standard UNICEF systems and present a challenge for COs in terms of efficiency and synchronization.
		Resource allocation has been mostly efficient and transparent but alternative models should be explored that fall between a "global programme" and a simple fund. Allocation of funding should match a logical programme cycle rather than equal funding per year regardless of the stage of implementation.

APPENDIX 7

EVALUATION KEY INFORMANTS

UNICEF HEADQUARTERS				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Andrew	Dunbrack	UNICEF	Education Specialist / Peacebuilding	UNICEF HQ
Pierette	James	UNICEF	Communication Specialist / DOC	UNICEF HQ
Bosun	Jang	UNICEF	Education Specialist / M&E	UNICEF HQ
Colin	Kirk	UNICEF	Director / Evaluation Office	UNICEF HQ
Kathleen	Letshabo	UNICEF	Evaluation Specialist / Evaluation Office	UNICEF HQ
John	Lewis	UNICEF	Peacebuilding Specialist / HATIS	UNICEF HQ
Kerida	McDonald	UNICEF	Senior Advisor / C4D	UNICEF HQ
Jordan	Naidoo	UNICEF	Senior Education Advisor	UNICEF HQ
Christian	Salazar	UNICEF	Deputy Director / Programmes	UNICEF HQ
Emilie Rees	Smith	UNICEF	Program Specialist / GRACE	UNICEF HQ
Saji	Thomas	UNICEF	Child Protection Specialist / CP	UNICEF HQ
Juliet	Young	UNICEF	Consultant / ADAP	UNICEF HQ
Kerida	McDonald	UNICEF	Senior Advisor / C4D	UNICEF HQ
Pierette	James	UNICEF	Communication Specialist / DOC	UNICEF HQ
Saji	Thomas	UNICEF	Child Protection Specialist / CP	UNICEF HQ
Sharif	Baaser	UNICEF	Peacebuilding Specialist / HATIS	UNICEF HQ
Ted	Chaiban	UNICEF	Director, Programmes	UNICEF HQ

REGIONAL OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Neven	Knezevic	UNICEF ESARO	Regional Peacebuilding Adviser	UNICEF RO
Camille	Baudot	UNICEF ESARO	Regional Education Adviser	UNICEF RO
Benoit	d'Ansembourg	UNICEF ESARO	EiE/DRR Specialist	UNICEF RO
Inge	Vervloesem	UNICEF ESARO	Education Specialist, Out-of-School	UNICEF RO
Pablo	Stansbery	UNICEF ESARO	ECD Specialist	UNICEF RO
Michael	Copland	UNICEF ESARO	Child Protection in Emergency Specialist	UNICEF RO
James	Elder	UNICEF ESARO	Regional Advisor Communications	UNICEF RO
Patricia	Portela de Souza	UNICEF ESARO	Regional Advisor C4D	UNICEF RO
Megan	Gilgan	UNICEF ESARO	Regional Emergency Adviser, Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peace Building Section	UNICEF RO
Mohammed	Khaled	UNICEF ESARO	Emergency Specialist (DRR), Humanitarian Action, Resilience and Peace Building Section	UNICEF RO
Ratiba	Taouti Cherif	UNICEF WACRO	M&E Specialist	UNICEF RO

Evaluation Key Informants - Regional Offices (cont'd)

REGIONAL OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Jennifer	Hofmann	UNICEF WACRO	Education Specialist	UNICEF RO
Teija	Vallandingham	UNICEF EAPRO	Education Specialist	UNICEF RO
Lyndsay	MsLaurin	UNICEF ROSA	Education Specialist / Knowledge Management	UNICEF RO
Sanaullah	Panezai	UNICEF ROSA	Education Specialist	UNICEF RO

GLOBAL DONOR				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Ronald	Siebes	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands	Senior Policy Advisor, Civil Society/ Education	Donor

GLOBAL PARTNERS				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Mieke	Lopes Cardozo	University of Amsterdam	Research Consortium Director	Global Partner
Alan	Smith	University of Ulster	Research Consortium Director	Global Partner
Mario	Novelli	University of Sussex	Research Consortium Director	Global Partner
Carina	Omoeva	FHI 360	Director, Education Policy and Data Center	Global Partner
Patrick	Vinck	HHI	Director of the programme on peace and human rights data at HHI	Global Partner
Lori	Heninger	INEE	Former Director	Global Partner
Vanessa	Corlazzoli	SFCG	Senior Manager, Institutional Learning Team	Global Partner
Roger	Duthie	ICTJ	Senior Research Associate, Children and Youth Program	Global Partner
Diya	Nijhowne	GCPEA	Director	Global Partner
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COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
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Sarah	Atkinson	UNICEF Burundi	U-Report Manager	UNICEF CO
Lidewyde	Berckmoes	UNICEF Burundi	PBEA Research Coordinator	UNICEF CO
Julia	Chukwuma	UNICEF Burundi	Social Policy Officer	UNICEF CO
Beate	Dastel	UNICEF Burundi	Chief, Planning, a.i. Social Policy, Advocacy and Evaluation	UNICEF CO
Celine	Demagny	UNICEF Burundi	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
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Pedro	Guerra	UNICEF Burundi	Child Protection Specialist	UNICEF CO
Johary	Randimbivololona	UNICEF Burundi	Chief, Communication and Participation	UNICEF CO
Silas	Rapold	UNICEF Burundi	Partnership Officer/OIC Peacebuilding Specialist/PBEA Programme Manager	UNICEF CO
Erin	Tettensor	UNICEF Burundi	Peacebuilder Adviser	UNICEF CO
Johannes	Wedenig	UNICEF Burundi	Country Representative	UNICEF CO
Benjamin	Ngororabanga	Centre Ubuntu	Deputy Project Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Sophie	Achilles	UNICEF Burundi	Chief of Education	UNICEF CO
Tharcisse	Habonimana	Ministry of Education, Burundi	Director, BEPEB	Government
Antoinette	Irarera	Centre Ubuntu	Programme Manager	Implementing Partner
Jean Berchmans	Niyoyunguruza	FVS Amade	Project Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Léonidas	Ntirampeba	Right to Play (RTP)	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Officer	Implementing Partner
Murielle	Ndikumazambo	Refugee Education Trust (RET)	Programme Manager	Implementing Partner
Floride	Ahitungiye	Search for Common Ground (SFCG)	Programme Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Danny Claire	Nkurikiye	Search for Common Ground (SFCG)	Impore Iwacu Project Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Dawn	Liberi	US Embassy	US Ambassador to Burundi	Substantiator
Jolke	Oppewal	Embassy of the Netherlands	Dutch Ambassador to Burundi	Substantiator
Jean-Marie	Kazitanda	Catholic Diocese	Head of Catholic Schools in Burundi	Substantiator
Jean-Paul	Kandolo	UNICEF Chad	PBEA Programme Manager	UNICEF CO
Ouattara About	Karno	Search for Common Ground	Program Manager	Implementing Partner
Toralta Tell	Moyangar	Centre D'Etudes et de Recherche pour la Dynamic des Organisations	Consultant Economiste	Implementing Partner
Nafie	Dao	ACCRA - CCS	Programme Manager for Peacebuilding	Implementing Partner

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Patricia Safi	Lombo	UNICEF Cote D'Ivoire	PBEA Programme Officer	UNICEF CO
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Paola	Retaggi	UNICEF Democratic Republic of Congo	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
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Aminu	Waziri	UNICEF Liberia	Programme Manager	UNICEF CO
Aung	Kyaw Soe	UNICEF Myanmar	Education Officer	UNICEF CO
Mathias	Kjaer	UNICEF Myanmar	M&E Specialist,	UNICEF CO
Emmanuelle	Compingt	UNICEF Myanmar	Child Protection, Programme Division	UNICEF CO
Anne Laure	Rambaud	UNICEF Myanmar	Field Office Section Chief	UNICEF CO
John	Ekaju	UNICEF	Education Specialist, SCR Manager	UNICEF CO
Hasan	Siddique	UNICEF	Social Cohesion and Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
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Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Miriam	Figueroa	UNICEF	Deputy Representative	UNICEF CO
Angela	Kearney	UNICEF	Representative	UNICEF CO
Euphrates	Gobina	UNICEF	Chief of Education	UNICEF CO
Sarah	Coleman	UNICEF	Chief of Child Protection	UNICEF CO
Sohail	Ahmed	UNICEF	KP/FATA Child Protection Officer	UNICEF CO
Sina Ali	Husain	UNICEF	KP/FATA Child Protection Officer	UNICEF CO
Sagheer	Ahmed	UNICEF	Quetta SCR Focal Point	UNICEF CO
Zulfiqar Ali	Shaikh	UNICEF	Sindh SCR Staff	UNICEF CO
Shahla	Din	UNICEF	Sindh Head of Education	UNICEF CO
Farrukh Zeb	Khan	UNICEF	KP SCR Focal Point	UNICEF CO
Fawad		UNICEF	KP Head of Education	UNICEF CO
Riaz		UNICEF	KP Education Officer	UNICEF CO
Rubina	Nadeem	UNICEF	Punjab Head of Education	UNICEF CO
Asif	Abrar	UNICEF	Punjab PBEA Staff	UNICEF CO
Sehr	Qizilbash	UNICEF	Punjab PBEA Staff	UNICEF CO
Gulab	Khan Mandokhail	Balochistan Government (BOCE)	Director	Government
Dr. Ahmed	Saeed	Balochistan	Textbook Writer	Implementing Partner
Prof. Munawara	Rehman	Balochistan	Textbook Writer	Implementing Partner
Naib Jan	Agha	Balochistan	Textbook Writer	Implementing Partner
Anees	Ahmed	Balochistan	Teacher Trainer / Subject Specialist	Implementing Partner
Rukhsana	Bangash	Balochistan	Teacher Trainer / Subject Specialist	Implementing Partner
Niamatullah Khan	Kakar	Balochistan Government	Additional Director Schools	Government
Muneer Ahmed	Baloch	Balochistan Government	Additional Director Schools	Government
Syed Saadat	Ali	Embassy of the Netherlands	Senior Policy Advisor Political Affairs, Human Rights, Rule of Law	Donor
Mashallah	Ali	Society for the Advancement of Education (SAHE)		Implementing Partner

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
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Rafique	Channa	Pakistan Fisher Folk Forum (PFF)	Chief Project Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Farhat	Fatima	PILER	Chief Project Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Ghulam	Nabi	Government of Sindh, Education Department	Former Manager, Reform Support Unit	Implementing Partner
Fawad Usman	Ali	SUDHAAR		Implementing Partner
Malik	Mustafa	Center for Research & Security Studies (CRSS)	Manager Programs	Implementing Partner
Naseebullah	Kakar	UNICEF	Quetta National Field Security Advisor	UNICEF CO
Tariq	Hayat	Peace Education and Development Foundation (PEAD)	Programme Manager	Implementing Partner
Zeba	Husain	Mashal Model School	Principal / Director Mashal Trust	Implementing Partner
Khurram	Masood	Search for Common Ground	Executive Director, Pakistan	Implementing Partner
Ghulam	Ghous	UNICEF	National Field Security Advisor	UNICEF CO
Sabir	Hussain	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Provincial Secretary	Implementing Partner
Nizam	Mengal	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Provincial Scout Commissioner	Implementing Partner
Irfan	Shah	Balochistan Government	Ex-Director Education	Implementing Partner
Fatima	Shahzad	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Project Manager	Implementing Partner
Talat	Jehan	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Reporting and Information Officer	Implementing Partner
Saad	Waqas	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	HR and Training Coordinator	Implementing Partner

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Zahida	Baloch	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	M&E Officer	Implementing Partner
Saleem	Sheikh	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Administration Officer	Implementing Partner
Shakeel	Parwaiz	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Social Mobilizer	Implementing Partner
Aziz	Baloch	Balochistan Boy Scouts Association (BBSA)	Social Mobilizer	Implementing Partner
Palwashar	Jalalzai	UNICEF	Balochistan Head of Education	UNICEF CO
Maulana Abdul	Raziq	Madrassa	Administrator / Director	Implementing Partner
Badar	Muneer	Madrassa	Teacher	Implementing Partner
Saleh	Muhammed	Madrassa	Member	Implementing Partner
Waqar	Habibi	Madrassa	Member	Implementing Partner
Amber	Naz	Mashal Model School	Teacher	Implementing Partner
Zeba	Hussain	Mashal Model School	Director	Implementing Partner
Shamila	Kiyani	Right to Play	Senior Programme Officer	Implementing Partner
Fazal	Rahim	Right to Play	Project Manager	Implementing Partner
Fazila	Gulnaz	CRSS	Consultant	Implementing Partner
Malik	Mustafa	CRSS	Manager Programmes	Implementing Partner
Shahid	Rahim	SFCG	Manager, Projects	Implementing Partner
Zubair	Azam	PEAD Foundation	Manager Programmes	Implementing Partner
Tariq	Hayat	PEAD Foundation	Programme Manager, SCR	Implementing Partner
Basima	Ahed Ahmed	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Chief of Education (OIC)	UNICEF CO
June	Kunugi	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Representative	UNICEF CO

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Maysoon	Obeidi	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Youth & Adolescent Development Officer	UNICEF CO
Vilasa	Phongsathorn	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Education Consultant, PBEA	UNICEF CO
Jonathan	Bunting-Williams	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
Mgbechikwere	Ezirim	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
Aiah	Mbayo	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Action Research Consultant	UNICEF CO
Wellington	Mushayi	UNICEF Sierra Leone	M&E Specialist	UNICEF CO
Dhuwarakha	Sriram	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Child Protection Specialist	UNICEF CO
Wongani Grace	Taulo	UNICEF Sierra Leone	Chief of Education	UNICEF CO
Linda	Jones	UNICEF Somalia	Chief of Education	UNICEF CO
Marleen	Renders	UNICEF Somalia	Peace-building Specialist/ Resilience Focal Point	UNICEF CO
Steven	Lauwerier	UNICEF Somalia	Country Representative	UNICEF CO
Thelma	Majela	UNICEF South Sudan	PBEA Manager	UNICEF CO
Ticiana	Garcia-Tapia	UNICEF South Sudan	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
Lucy	Kithoi Lomodong	UNICEF South Sudan	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO
Genzeb	Jan	UNICEF South Sudan	M&E Specialist	UNICEF CO
Steward Francis	Kutiyote	UNICEF South Sudan	Field Officer	UNICEF CO
Elis	Walla	UNICEF South Sudan	Project Assistant	UNICEF CO
Phuong T.	Nguyen	UNICEF South Sudan	Chief of Education	UNICEF CO
Etty	Higgins	UNICEF South Sudan	Deputy Representative	UNICEF CO
Jonathan	Veitch	UNICEF South Sudan	Representative	UNICEF CO
Tizie	Maphalala	UNICEF South Sudan	GPE Manager	UNICEF CO
Nathalie Fiona	Hamoudi	UNICEF South Sudan	EiE Manager	UNICEF CO
Shadrach Maper	Adong	UNICEF South Sudan	Programme Coordinator Knajok Field Office	UNICEF CO

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Thadeo	Kuntembwe	UNICEF South Sudan	M&E Specialist, Education, Adolescents Development	UNICEF CO
Jairis	Ligod	UNICEF South Sudan	Adolescent/Youth Specialist, Education/Adolescents Development	UNICEF CO
Amuda James	Scopas	UNICEF South Sudan	Education and Adolescents Specialist	UNICEF CO
Alfred Wani	Wayi	UNICEF South Sudan	Education Officer	UNICEF CO
Kujang	Laki	UNICEF South Sudan	Communication officer	UNICEF CO
Abraham	Kur	UNICEF South Sudan	Child Protection Officer	UNICEF CO
Anthony	Lasuba	UNICEF South Sudan	Health Officer	UNICEF CO
Anthony	Taban	UNICEF South Sudan	WASH Officer	UNICEF CO
Simon	Bulta	UNICEF South Sudan	Education Officer, EiE	UNICEF CO
Joseph Long	Celestino	UNICEF South Sudan	HIV Officer	UNICEF CO
Mathew	Naumann	UNICEF South Sudan	UNICEF Consultant	UNICEF CO
Gabrielle	Daoust	University of Sussex	Researcher	Substantiator
Michael Lopuke	Lotyam	MoEST	Undersecretary	Government
Omot	Olony	MoEST	Director General of Quality Promotions	Government
Ben Lou	Poggo	MoEST	Director	Government
Malual Manyok	Deng	MoEST	Inspector	Government
Tolko Peter	Ansolo	MoCYS	Inspector	Government
Mario Velvur	Gunda	MoCYS	Director	Government
Beou Thomas	Alex	MoCYS	Inspector of Archives and Antiquities	Government
Nhial Johnson	Rieth	MoEST	Deputy Director	Government
Catherina Mahial	Makual	MoEST	Deputy Director	Government
Sokiri Charles	Thomas	MoEST	Deputy Director	Government
Bullen Daniel	Parongwa	MoEST	Associate Director	Government
Gibson	Ronown	MoEST	Director	Government
Rev. Peter Adam	Dang	MoEST	Principle	Government

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Omoromy	Terenfri	MoEST	Inspector	Government
Sarafino Tisa	Salvastore	MoEST	Inspector	Government
Azaria Duku	Enska	MoEST	Director	Government
Bullen	Daniel	MoEST	Curriculum Developer	Government
Sarafino	Tisa	MoEST	RSS Senior Inspector	Government
Elizabeth	Kesi	SOME, Nile models	Teacher	Government
Joy	Samuel	MoEST	Co-curricular	Government
Drichi	Francis	MoEST	Teacher	Government
Pia Philip	Michael	MoEST Western Equatoria	State Minister	Government
Charles	Mogga	MoEST Kajukeji	Deputy Director	Government
Hussein	Mohammed	MoEST Wau	Director of Planning and Budgeting	Government
Chilo	Chor	MoEST Tonj East	Secretary to Commissioner's Office	Government
G.	Lada	UNESCO	Programme Officer HIV/ Education	Development Partner
Kenneth	Conteh	SFCG	Program Manager	Implementing Partner
Portia Comenetia	Allen	Yei Teacher Training College	Resource Mobilization Manager	Implementing Partner
Odego	Angelons	War Child Canada	Education Officer	Implementing Partner
James	Batali	Right to Play	Training Officer	Implementing Partner
Kusima	Henry	Sports for Hope	Peace Officer	Implementing Partner
Patrick	Muzinguzi	Sports for Hope	Program Officer	Implementing Partner
Patrick	Rogers	Sports for Hope	Programme Manager	Implementing Partner
Susan	Lamaro	SCYMI	Field Assistant	Implementing Partner
Nancy	Hinga	ACROSS	Project Director	Implementing Partner
Chol	Bor	ACROSS	Peacebuilding Officer	Implementing Partner
Gizenga	W.	ADRA	Project Manager	Implementing Partner
Jackson	Okello	AET	Manager	Implementing Partner

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
Lucy	Mania	AGI	DD	Implementing Partner
Peter Benjamin	Baltic	SMoEST	AES Inspector	Implementing Partner
Mbuma A.	Anthony	SMoEST	Inspector school	Implementing Partner
Francis	Amuaola	SMoEST	Ag/AES	Implementing Partner
Kunguizu	Stanley	SMoEST	D/OPI	Implementing Partner
Victor Mbengo	Malata	SMoEST		Implementing Partner
Gibson Francis	Wuru	SMoEST	Director General	Implementing Partner
Bullen	Nguizo Musangi	SMoEST	Director Planning and Budget	Implementing Partner
Isaac	Zunguo	SMoEST	Director Admin and Finance	Implementing Partner
Randuod	Arkangelo	SMoEST	Pro??	Implementing Partner
Gabriel	Khamsi	SMoEST	Office M.	Implementing Partner
Abill	Isaac	Edua, Yambio	School Officer	Beneficiary
John	Anthony	Yabongoss, Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Alex	Esan	YPS, Yambio	Headteacher	Beneficiary
William	Bakosa	Y.S.Sch, Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Kinosa	Richard	Goraiva, Yambio	Headteacher	Beneficiary
Gabriel	Bingo	Naduera, Yambio	Headteacher	Beneficiary
Wilson	Mangi	Badi, Yambio	PTA	Beneficiary
Payo	Michael	YSS, Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Abraham	Simon	Badi, Yambio	PTA	Beneficiary
Reverend Charles	Hipainba	YSS, Yambio	Chairman Bog	Beneficiary
Dipio	Gloria	Badi, Yambio	Deputy Headteacher	Beneficiary
Martin	Kumbo	Yambio SS	Teacher	Beneficiary
Simon Gai	Ojine	Yambio SS	Teacher	Beneficiary
Jeremiah	Gekiu	Yambio SS	Teacher	Beneficiary
Arkangelo	Anisa	Yambio SS	Headteacher	Beneficiary
John	Garago	Youth Centre, Yambio	Information Manager	Beneficiary

Evaluation Key Informants - Country Offices (cont'd)

COUNTRY OFFICES				
First	**Last**	**Organisation**	**Title**	**PBEA Group**
James Koni	Angustinos	Lgelu, Yambio	School inspector	Beneficiary
Khadmalla	Adam	Naduru, Yambio	PTA	Beneficiary
Danios	Michael	Y.P/S, Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Gaadeko	Luka	Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Kubako	Daniel	Ikpir P, Yambio	PTA	Beneficiary
Ngbamborigbe	Alfred	Nabaga P/S, Yambio	Teacher	Beneficiary
Simple	John	WES Youth Union	Chairperson	Beneficiary
John	Garasa	WES Youth Union	Information Manager	Beneficiary
Riziq Matthew	Sinong	WES Youth Union	Affair Officer	Beneficiary
Francis	Michael	Yambio S.S.	Student	Beneficiary
Minlallah	Jaekline	WES Youth Union		Beneficiary
Simon	Titayo	Nzara United Youth Association	Secretary	Beneficiary
Lucy Peter	Mauda	WES Youth Union	Student/member	Beneficiary
George Sebit	Tartizio	County Youth	Member	Beneficiary
Emmanuel	Victor	County Youth	Member	Beneficiary
Monica	Llamazares	UNICEF Uganda	Peacebuilding Specialist/ Program Manager 'Content'	UNICEF CO
Semine	Lykke Brorson	UNICEF Uganda	M&E Specialist	UNICEF CO
Irene	Naiga	UNICEF Uganda	Education Specialist/VAC-CFS-District Engagement Focal Point	UNICEF CO
Hajara	Ndayidde	UNICEF Uganda	ECD Focal Point	UNICEF CO
Emilie	Rees-Smith	UNICEF HQ	Gender, Education and Peacebuilding Specialist	UNICEF HQ
Reverend Vincent	Ocheng	MoESTS, Uganda	District Education Officer Gulu	Government
Angela	Nakafeero	VAC Inter-Sectoral Committee	Project Advisor, VAC	Government
Fred	Mwesigye	Uganda Forum for Education NGOs (FENU)	Programme Coordinator	Implementing Partner
Zulfikur Ali	Khan	UNICEF Yemen	Chief of Education (OIC)	UNICEF CO
Kenji	Ohira	UNICEF Yemen	Education Specialist	UNICEF CO