

# Youth Education Programming and Peacebuilding in Dadaab Refugee Camp

Results and Lessons Learned



**Youth Education Programming and Peacebuilding in Dadaab Refugee Camp: Results and Lessons Learned**

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December 10, 2015 Cover Photo: NRC YEP Centre in Dadaab town/Kenya © Chrissie Monaghan

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# Document Overview

## Purpose and Intended Use of the Case Study

This study will look at the opportunities and challenges of peacebuilding through education in Kenya's Dadaab Refugee Camp and how, in this context, PBEA interventions might strengthen resilience.

This document is intended to be used by UNICEF staff, implementing partner ministries, and organizations and other practitioners in the wider fields of Education in Emergencies as well as education and peacebuilding. It will explore how education might advance peacebuilding and resilience amongst refugees residing in Dadaab, as well as post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia upon repatriation of Somali refugees (97 percent of the refugees in Dadaab are Somali), through UNICEF supported YEP programming for refugee adolescents and youth. This is particularly important given recent efforts by the Government

of Kenya (GoK) to close Dadaab. It will also explore opportunities for UNICEF to develop and work with partners to implement PBEA interventions even more effectively and the challenges facing programme efforts. It is hoped that the study will contribute to discussions and planning to strengthen peacebuilding through education initiatives designed to increase access to quality education and employment opportunities for refugee adolescents and youth.

Using an analysis based on the PBEA theory of change (ToC), the report finds strong indicators on one of three outputs (provision of the programme), and mixed evidence in regards to the other two outputs (culturally and economically "relevant" and "appropriate" education and programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment). Preliminary signs of increasing levels of resilience were also noted, at least in terms of increasing hope and optimism among refugees.

# Abbreviations

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CO	Country Office
DSTV	Digital Satellite Television
EEPCT	Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition
EFA	Education for All
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
ESDP	Education Sector Development Plan
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FO	Field Office
GER	Gross Enrollment Ratio
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoN	Government of the Netherlands
KCPE	Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MoE	Ministry of Education
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OOSC	Out-of-School Children
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PBEA	Peacebuilding, Education, and Advocacy
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
ToC	Theory of Change
YEP	Youth Education Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WTK	Windle Trust Kenya

# Executive Summary

The Peacebuilding, Education, and Advocacy (PBEA) programme in Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp aims to strengthen resilience and social cohesion in the camp, where most refugees are Somali, and in Somalia upon refugees' eventual repatriation. Refugees residing in Dadaab are vulnerable to frequent natural disasters and also prone to conflicts of varying scale between different communal groups in and around the camp as well as in countries of origin. PBEA is intended to address a number of specific conflict drivers and risks affecting refugees that are clearly identified throughout this report as related to education; it is not designed to address all conflict drivers identified in the camp or in refugees' home countries.

This study examines the Youth Education Programme (YEP) implemented in Dadaab camp/town by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNICEF's implementing partner for YEP, that intends to make gains towards PBEA **Outcome 4: Increase access to quality and relevant conflict sensitive education that contributes to peace**. YEP primarily aims to support out-of-school refugee youth ages 15 to 24 as well as out-of-school youth from the local Kenyan host community (and to a lesser though still noted degree, adolescents ages 10-14) acquire skills that will help them enter the job market or become self-employed, thus contributing to an increase in resilience. The programme is intended to address risks of alienation of young people through their economic exclusion; associated risks of radicalization and/or recruitment to armed groups; as well as facilitate 'voluntary repatriation' to Somalia. Specific focus is given to the ways in which:

- The programme's Theory of Change (ToC) has informed the provision of YEP programming;
- How this ToC is intended to address known conflict drivers in Dadaab camp/town; and
- If and how this ToC has been actualized through YEP programming.

The study is designed to respond to a set of questions (included below) that correspond to **PBEA Outcome 5—Generating Evidence and Knowledge** through ongoing monitoring and

reporting of the impacts of PBEA interventions in sites of implementation. Until recently, vocational education programming has been largely excluded from refugee education programming in camps and thus seldom explored in academic or practitioner-oriented literature devoted to both these areas of focus. However, peacebuilding education programming has increasingly included vocational education in refugee and host community education programming. As such, this study provides an opportunity to consider these formerly delimited literatures and attendant programmes collectively. The questions guiding this study are as follows:

- How is PBEA [YEP] programming supporting conflict transformation among beneficiaries?
- How has YEP programming addressed risks related to youth marginalization and/or radicalization?
- What examples can be provided about how the PBEA [YEP] programme is supporting peaceful conflict resolution strategies and resilience against conflict?
- To what extent are the needs of out-of-school youth addressed through education [YEP] programming in a manner that reduces conflict pressures (both structural and cultural), and particularly reduces youth alienation and radicalization resulting from limited economic opportunity?
- What challenges exist with promoting social cohesion and resilience through education [YEP] programming?
- How has the NRC adapted training materials to ensure they are relevant economically and socially?
- What lessons can be drawn out with programme implementation?

The questions relate to outputs and outcomes, challenges, and lessons learned. In order to answer these questions, the study explicates ToC that primarily underlie **Outcome 4**. Interviews were conducted with key NRC staff and UNICEF staff members in Dadaab as well as with UNICEF staff members in the Kenya Country Office (CO) in Nairobi. The field research included three visits

to the YEP centre in Dadaab town. Teachers, parent-teacher association (PTA) members, and students from the YEP centres in Dagahaley and Ifo<sup>1</sup> camps were brought to this centre for focus group discussions (FGD) and one-on-one interviews. In total, **50 individuals** participated in one-on-one and FGD interviews. This case study also draws upon quantitative data collected by UNICEF through a survey of Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions (KAP) in Dadaab. Additionally, this case study was informed by desk research of programme updates, trip reports, and annual reports provided by UNICEF and the NRC, as well as a review of literature relevant to peacebuilding and education, refugee education, and vocational education programming for refugees.

UNICEF's Kenya CO and UNICEF's Field Office (FO) in Dadaab along with the NRC as the implementing partner for YEP work towards **Outcome 4** through following Education for Peacebuilding ToC: *By providing marginalised youth with access to relevant life skills and vocational training opportunities and creating space for constructive engagement in social and cultural activities, patterns of youth exclusion fueling grievance and violent conflict will be reduced and will result in greater social cohesion* (UNICEF, 2014).

The study derived observable implications—outputs and outcomes—upon which findings are based. The observable implications are as follows:

- **Outputs:** the provision of 4-month courses at YEP centres in Dadaab camp/town; culturally and economically “relevant” or “appropriate” education; programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment.
- **Outcomes:** Improved perceived equity/inclusion of access to education and employment for youth and reduced risks of marginalization/radicalization or recruitment to armed groups; Increased ability amongst youth to be ‘resilient’ and adapt to change (e.g. repatriating from Dadaab to Somalia); and reduction of violence/reduced vulnerability to radicalization.

In sum, the report finds strong indicators on one of three outputs (provision of the programme), and mixed evidence in regards to the other two outputs (i.e. culturally and economically “relevant” and “appropriate” education and programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment). In regards to outcomes, the study

raises questions about baseline presumptions, such as youth’s perceptions of inequality and grievance that may be lower than presumed. The report finds preliminary signs of increasing levels of resilience, at least in terms of increasing hope and optimism among refugees. The research design for this case study did not allow for an assessment of respondents prior to and following the intervention of PBEA-supported YEP programmes or meaningful comparison of participants to non-participants.

The study includes several Lessons Learned and Recommendations. **Lessons Learned include:**

### How specific ToC have informed PBEA interventions

- PBEA YEP is primarily intended to address and mitigate Somali refugee adolescent and youth radicalization more broadly and recruitment into militant groups in Dadaab and/or upon repatriation to Somalia and facilitate repatriation to Somalia through strengthening livelihood strategies and income-generating opportunities.
- Programming has increased perceptions of access to income generating opportunities for some programme participants and in some cases participants have gained increased access to employment.
- A number of programme participants are adolescent and youth from other countries (e.g. South Sudan, Burundi, Kenya) and are not accounted for directly in the ToC, outputs, and intended outcomes.

### How these ToC are intended to address known conflict drivers

- PBEA ToC map on to some known conflict drivers (e.g. unequal economic development) in Dadaab camp/town.
- Although biases in responses are likely, and interpretations are difficult, KAP survey respondents indicate fewer grievances, less involvement in armed groups and weapon carrying, and stronger resilience than presumed in the ToC and beyond.
- There are differences between Somalis and non-Somalis on a number of measures that warrant further investigation. For example, whereas Somalis feel less discriminated against than non-Somalis, non-Somalis rate the Kenyan

1 For an overview of the layout of the camp, see pg. 4 of this report.

government's provision of education "to help daily life" more highly than Somalis.

- In some ways, the programme may be exacerbating or reinforcing grievances between diverse communal groups.

### Achievement of programme outputs and outcomes

- Programming has expanded access to education for youth, particularly newly arrived refugees from countries other than Somalia who otherwise are excluded from education in Dadaab camp/town. That some of the beneficiaries are not Somali, and thus not necessarily the intended beneficiaries (i.e. Somali youth who might repatriate to Somalia) of PBEA YEP programming, merits further consideration.
- In an effort to match the Dadaab and Somali-based demands to the courses offered, one new course in livestock production (implemented at the Hagadera YEP centre) has been added alongside Somali language as a component of all four-month short courses. All of the other courses are shortened versions of the one-year courses offered at NRC's YEP centres in Dadaab.
- The study identifies strong indicators on one of three outputs (provision of the programme to youth who may be at risk), and mixed evidence in regards to the other two outputs (culturally and economically "relevant" and "appropriate" education and programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment).
- The programme may be reaching youth who are at risk of violent behavior.
- Anecdotes suggest that the programme may increase hope and optimism among participants, which may be linked to resilience, an important outcome according to programme planners.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### Strengthening evidence-base for programming

- UNICEF, in partnership with the NRC, should continue the exercise of more fully fleshing out the ToC and the observable implications they would expect to see at each step if the programme were indeed producing desired impacts.
- Extend/deepen research design for evaluation and consider more comparative (possibly experimental), longitudinal, on-going evaluations.

Consider long-term partnerships with academics for rigorous research.

- Consider more explicitly, at the level of programme development and implementation, the ways in which programming might contribute to disputes or not. Include indicators for conflict in ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of programming (i.e. conflict-sensitive monitoring systems to help ensure 'Do No Harm' and timely programme adjustments to 'Do More Good' – or support peacebuilding).

### Strengthening programme Implementation

- Given limited programme capacity and great need, ensure PBEA YEP is targeting the most at-risk youth.
- Do more to match skills taught with market opportunities in the desired location of employment (Dadaab/Somalia, urban/rural).
- Consider reducing group sizes to lessen the number of people amongst whom the start-up kit must be shared and/or possibilities to improve equitable division of start-up kits among group members.
- Explore possibilities for further facilitating the transition to employment including apprenticeships with implementing partners (possible given current security parameters), and placements or internships with existing businesses (if the security situation permits).
- Adopt a more explicitly gender-sensitive approach to programming that recognizes more limited employment opportunities for women and the challenges of prevalent norms and discrimination graduates and women, more generally, may face.
- Decide if and how non-Somali refugee youth are meant to engage in, and benefit from, PBEA YEP programming. Reconsider the ToC and consequent programming adjustments in light of decisions.
- Adapt programme to changing context (i.e. repatriation policies vs. reality) as .01 percent have actually repatriated since PBEA programming in Dadaab began.
- Further consider the importance of the hope and optimism the YEP programme appears to be generating.



# 1. Introduction

The Peacebuilding Education and Advocacy (PBEA) programme (or ‘Learning for Peace’) is a four-year initiative established in 2012 funded by the Government of the Netherlands (GoN). The programme aims to strengthen resilience, social cohesion, and human security in fragile and conflict-affected contexts by improving policies and practices for education and peacebuilding.

PBEA represents a continuation of the work of UNICEF and the GoN to implement education programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. Specifically, PBEA followed the Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition (EEPCT) programme, carried out from 2006 to 2011 in 44 countries.<sup>2</sup> Conflict-sensitive programming and peacebuilding through social services are seen as critical approaches by UNICEF that aim to strengthen resilience to the complex challenges facing children and communities in such settings. PBEA is perhaps the first UNICEF initiative that systematically aims to address the drivers of violent intrastate conflict in the 14 countries (see Figure 1<sup>3</sup>) where PBEA programming has been implemented, including Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camp, the focus of this report.<sup>4</sup>

**TOCs Informing Interventions.** PBEA is informed conceptually by a political-economy approach to understanding and explaining conflict (Novelli, 2011; Novelli & Smith, 2011). The highest level Theory of Change (ToC), or guiding logic, underlying UNICEF’s PBEA programme is that (i) understanding the ways in which the interactions between actors and institutions across sectors and levels drive conflict leads to (ii) designing education interventions that aim to address those interactions and (iii) ultimately transforming these drivers of conflict and facilitating peacebuilding (Novelli, 2011; UNICEF, 2013a). These same

reports also outline several more specific ToC that underlie programming decisions.

**Focus of Report:** This case study adopts this useful approach and focuses upon the ways in which specific ToC at the PBEA and intervention levels have informed PBEA interventions in Dadaab, how these ToC are intended to address known conflict drivers, and if and how these theories of change have been actualized through programming to ‘work on’ (thus transform conflict drivers) to facilitate peacebuilding.

**Youth Education Programme in Dadaab.** This case study focuses on PBEA in Dadaab refugee camp and in neighboring Dadaab town, specifically on the Youth Education Pack (YEP), a four-month vocational education and training programme for adolescents and youth implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).<sup>5</sup> We ultimately explore if and how this peacebuilding and education intervention has contributed to **Global Outcome 4**, as intended by programme planners and implementers. We include UNICEF’s 5 Global Outcomes here, and highlight **Outcome 4**:

- 1) Increased inclusion of education into peacebuilding and conflict-reduction policies, analyses, and implementation
- 2) Increased institutional capacities to supply conflict-sensitive education
- 3) Increased capacity of children, parents, and other duty-bearers to prevent, reduce, and cope with conflict and promote peace
- 4) **Increased access for children to quality, relevant, conflict-sensitive education that contributes to peace**

2 The goal of EEPCT was to support countries experiencing emergencies and post-crisis transitions in the process of sustainable progress towards provision of basic education for all.

3 Kenya is also included via support to the Dadaab refugee camp to address cross border conflict risks associated with Somali refugees.

4 UNICEF (2014a) “About.” file://localhost/Learning for Peace. Available/ <http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/about:learning-for-peace:>

5 UNICEF defines older adolescents as those from the ages of 15-18 and youth as persons between 15 and 24 years of age.

5) Contribute to the generation and use of evidence and knowledge on policies and programming on linkages between education, conflict, and peacebuilding (sic).

The case study aims to contribute findings, lessons learned, and recommendations for Dadaab and PBEA more broadly. It also aims to contribute to wider scholarship on refugee education. In this way, the study itself strongly contributes to **Outcome 5**.

Table 1. PBEA programme countries

PBEA TARGET COUNTRIES				
West & Central Africa	East and Southern Africa <sup>6</sup>	Middle East and North Africa	South Asia	East Asia and Pacific
Chad, Cote D'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone	Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda	Palestine, Yemen	Pakistan	Myanmar

### 1.1 Research Methods and Limitations

PBEA has as one of its goals, Outcome 5—Generating Evidence and Knowledge, ongoing monitoring and reporting of the impacts of PBEA interventions in implementing countries. This outcome is focused on generating new knowledge and evidence about the ways that education contributed to peacebuilding in conflict-affected and post-conflict environments. This study explores the following questions:

- How is PBEA [YEP] programming supporting conflict transformation among beneficiaries?
- How has YEP programming addressed risks related to youth marginalization and/or radicalization?
- What examples can be provided about how the PBEA [YEP] programme is supporting peaceful conflict resolution strategies and resilience against conflict?
- To what extent are the needs of out-of-school youth addressed through education [YEP] programming in a manner that reduces conflict pressures (both structural and cultural), and particularly reduces youth alienation and radicalization resulting from limited economic

opportunity?

- What challenges exist with promoting social cohesion and resilience through education [YEP] programming?
- How has the NRC adapted training materials to ensure they are relevant economically and socially?
- What lessons can be drawn out with programme implementation?

This case study examining the role of PBEA programming in Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp was informed by multiple methods. These methods are:

- 1) Primary qualitative research in Dadaab (including key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGD), and direct observations);
- 2) Analysis of quantitative data from an ongoing Knowledge, Attitudes and Perceptions (KAP) survey conducted by UNICEF;
- 3) Desk research of programme updates, trip reports, and annual reports provided by UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), UNICEF's implementing partner for YEP; and

<sup>6</sup> Kenya is also included via support to the Dadaab refugee camp to address cross border conflict risks associated with Somali refugees.

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- 4) A review of literature relevant to peacebuilding and education, refugee education, and vocational education programming in conflict and post-conflict settings.


To the extent possible, the study triangulates these data sources to strengthen case study findings. Stakeholders with UNICEF ESARO and the Kenya Country Office (CO) education team also reviewed the report, suggesting refinements and additional information as relevant.

**Key Informant Interviews and field visits.** Interviews were conducted with key NRC as well as UNICEF staff members in Dadaab and with UNICEF staff members in the Kenya CO in Nairobi. The field visits for this research trip

included three visits to the YEP centre in Dadaab town. Dadaab town is located just outside the UN/NGO compound and the camp. The layout of the camp complex is depicted in Map 1 below.

In order to speak with as many stakeholders as possible, but also given security constraints, UNICEF brought teachers, parent-teacher association (PTA) members, and students from the YEP centres in Dagahaley and Ifo camps to this centre in Dadaab town for FGDs and one-on-one interviews. Table 2 highlights the differences across the four YEP centres and the number of participants from each centre included in this study.

Map 1. Dadaab Camp Complex



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Table 2. Traits of the 4 YEP Centres visited for data collection in Dadaab.

	Dadaab Town	Dagahaley	Hagadera	Ifo
<b>Number of registered refugees<sup>7</sup></b>	n/a	<b>87,170</b>	<b>106,765</b>	<b>84,181</b>
<b>Nationalities and/or ethnicities residing in town or camp</b>	-Kenyan -Kamba (indigenous group)	-Somali (range of different ethnicities/clans) -South Sudanese	-Somali (range of different ethnicities/clans)	-Burundian -Congolese -Ethiopian Oromo
<b>Courses of study<sup>8</sup></b>	-Painting -DSTV Installation -Tailoring -Housekeeping -Barbering	-DSTV Installation -Barbering -Henna Tattoo Artistry -Housekeeping -Photography	-Livestock production (meat hygiene and handling) -Barbering -Housekeeping	-DSTV Installation -Barbering -Housekeeping -Henna Tattoo Artistry -Photography

Across these four YEP centres, 9 FGDs and 5 one-on-one interviews were conducted, reaching a total of 50 individuals, including YEP teachers (n=7; 2 females and 5 males), PTA members (n=8; 3 females and 5 males), and youth attending YEP centres (n=35; 10 females and 25 males). As illustrated in Table 2, there is variance between the YEP centres upon which this research focused in terms of the degree of national diversity and types of courses available to students.

Questions posed to research participants during FGDs and one-on-one interviews sought to capture:

- Drivers of conflict specific to each of the 3 sub-camps and 1 town in which there is a YEP centre;
- The theory of change specific to YEP programming in the 3 sub-camps and 1 town; and
- Changes in occurrence, scope, and/or scale of conflict that participants observed and/or experienced and participants’ perceptions of the sources of these changes.

Informed consent was obtained for all interviews and the study adhered to UNICEF ethical guidelines and research with children.<sup>9</sup>

The researchers also drew on a KAP survey that was conducted by the UNICEF FO in Dadaab in coordination with the implementing partner for YEP, NRC, that began in January 2015 and remains ongoing. Using a sampling strategy designed by UNICEF and the implementing partners in Dadaab—randomly selected from programme beneficiaries (participants) and “indirect beneficiaries” (non-participants) surrounding intervention areas—the survey was conducted with 667 participants from five different camps including Hagadera, Kambioos, Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo II and the host community. The ages of the respondents ranged from 9 to 88 years old, with the majority of respondents being adults over the age of 24 (50 percent) and youth 15-24 (40 percent). The respondents were primarily Islamic (93 percent) with the remainder indicating Christianity as their religion (7 percent). 79 percent of participants originated from Somalia, however respondents also came from Ethiopia (6 percent), South Sudan (3 percent), Burundi (0.3 percent) and Sudan (0.1 percent), thus overweighting these other groups given that Somalis represent 97 percent of refugees in Dadaab. Respondents who indicated “Other” comprised 12 percent, representing the host community (Garissa, Dadaab town, etc.).

7 The number of registered refugees in Ifo 2: 51,436; Kambioos: 20,480. For registration figures, see: UNHCR (2015). Dadaab camp profile, August 2015. Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/region.php?id=3&country=110>

8 While courses of study varied across the different YEP centres, according to NRC program planners and facilitators, Somali language and life skills were offered at all centres and included as part of all courses offered.

9 UNICEF ERIC Compendium at <http://childethics.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ERIC-compendium-approved-digital-web.pdf>.

Less than half of the respondents were currently attending school, however the majority of children (86 percent, 51/59) and youth (65 percent, 164/253) were enrolled in school. 59 percent of primary school-aged children in Dadaab are out of primary school (UNHCR, 2015) and 92 percent of secondary school-aged adolescents and youth are out of secondary school (ibid.), meaning that this sample heavily overweighs in-school youth as compared to their proportion in the Dadaab population. Of all KAP respondents, 40 percent had achieved some primary school, 10 percent had some secondary schooling, 5 percent had vocational training, 6 percent had only attended religious school, and 34 percent of respondents had never attended school.

Of the total number of respondents, 28 percent (185/666) were listed as direct beneficiaries of a PBEA intervention. Of this subsample, 22 percent (41/184) were beneficiaries of NRC (YEP programming). Of these 41 direct NRC programme beneficiaries, 29 were male and 12 were female. The average age was 22 years old. 28 respondents were Somali, 10 Ethiopian, and 3 others.

**Limitations.** While there was much to learn from the fieldwork conducted, there are also a number of limitations to this study. First, security was an important limiting factor in researcher mobility for primary fieldwork. In a context where security concerns were already heightened (further discussed in the Dadaab refugee camp section below), during the time the 2015 fieldwork was undertaken, a Kenyan-national teacher employed by UNHCR's implementing partner for secondary education, Windle Trust Kenya (WTK), was kidnapped while traveling by car from Dagahaley to Hagadera.<sup>10</sup> All field-based research is thus limited to the YEP centre in Dadaab town, although participants from two additional sites (Dagahaley and Ifo) were brought to Dadaab town, where security risks were comparatively lesser, to participate. Second, due to a number of timing and logistical challenges

stemming from the heightened security protocol, participants from the Hagadera YEP centre were not included in the 2015 field research that was undertaken to examine the impact of PBEA YEP programming. However, primary fieldwork was supplemented by UNICEF reports from field-visits to the three YEP centres in Dadaab's sub-camps (Dagahaley, Hagadera, and Ifo) carried out in 2014. Third, in the KAP survey, but in in one-on-one interviews as well, social desirability biases are an important concern, caused in part by potential risks to answering questions about carrying weapons, armed group involvement, etc. Despite these limitations, interviews were conducted with a wide range of stakeholders participating in programming at each of the four centres, allowing for a strong cross-section of views to be gathered.

### 1.2 Analytical Framework, ToC, Conflict Drivers, Outcomes

The research framework focuses on linking theories of change to outcomes and conflict drivers. Theory of Change is taken to mean "a set of assumptions that explain both the mini-steps that lead to a long-term goal and the connections between these activities and the outcomes of an intervention or programme" (Anderson, 2004). Given that PBEA programmes are meant to address context-specific conflict drivers, the study also considers if and how the ToC effectively do so.

**Table 3** below combines UNICEF PBEA's **Outcome 4** with 'Education for Peacebuilding' Theories of Change (UNICEF, 2014a), which guide the work of UNICEF's Kenya CO, UNICEF's FO in Dadaab, and UNICEF's implementing partner for YEP, NRC. The study also includes reduced vulnerability to radicalization as a desired outcome based on conversations with PBEA and Kenya CO staff. The study authors derived observable implications from the ToC and programme documentation.

<sup>10</sup> See: <http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/police-rescue-kidnapped-daadab-tutor>

Table 3. UNICEF PBEA Targeted Outcome 4, ToC and Observable Implications

UNICEF PBEA Targeted Outcomes	UNICEF PBEA ToC (PEP/SDP)	Observable Implications	
		Outputs	Final Outcomes
<p><b>Outcome 4:</b> Increased access to quality, relevant, context responsive education that contributes to social cohesion and peace.</p>	<p><b>Economic marginalization and group grievance theories:</b> By providing marginalised youth with access to relevant life skills and vocational training opportunities and creating space for constructive engagement in social and cultural activities, patterns of youth exclusion fueling grievance and violent conflict will be reduced and will result in greater social cohesion.<sup>11</sup></p>	<p>Provision of 4-month courses at YEP centres</p> <p>Culturally and economically relevant and appropriate education;</p> <p>flexible and safe learning spaces.</p> <p>Programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment</p>	<p>Improved perceived equity/ inclusion of access to education and employment for youth and reduced risks of marginalization/ radicalization or recruitment to armed groups.</p> <p>Increased ability amongst youth to be 'resilient' and adapt to change (e.g. repatriating from Dadaab to Somalia) and reduction of violence/ reduced vulnerability to radicalization.</p>

The PBEA YEP 4-month courses are primarily intended to address the risk of radicalization of Somali refugee adolescents and youth as a result of economic exclusion and mitigate associated risks of radicalization and/or recruitment into armed groups (in Dadaab and/or Somalia

upon repatriation). As a step towards this, the programme is intended to help programme participants access income-generating activities and strengthen livelihood opportunities (in Dadaab and Somalia upon repatriation).

11 UNICEF ESARO PBEA Operational Matrix 2014f.

## 2. Background

The Dadaab PBEA programme started in 2013 with the aim to support the government of Kenya (GoK) and UNHCR in strengthening resilience and social cohesion in Dadaab camp/town as well as the Federal Government of Somalia if/when Dadaab's Somali refugees (who comprise approximately 97 percent of the camp population) repatriate to Somalia. Kenya was not initially included as a PBEA country of focus, but events on the ground prompted its later inclusion. Since 2011, the GoK has made several public announcements that it will close Dadaab and that refugees will be repatriated to Somalia, particularly following major incidents perpetrated by armed groups in Kenya (e.g. the 2013 attack in Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall<sup>12</sup> and the 2015 attack at Garissa University College<sup>13</sup>). Towards this end, in November 2013, the governments of Somalia and Kenya and the UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees<sup>14</sup> and in July 2015 adopted a four year Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees from Kenya Operations Strategy 2015-2019 (UNHCR, 2015). UNHCR, UNICEF, and other implementing partners have begun to introduce programming that would help to facilitate and prepare refugees for repatriation, although UNHCR as well as a number of international organizations express concern about this possibility.<sup>15</sup> PBEA YEP programming was also, in part, intended for these purposes. To date though, a very limited number of refugees have repatriated to Somalia. UNHCR's most recent figures indicate that between December 2014 and September 2015, approximately 4,423 refugees (approximately

.01 percent) of the camp's total population have repatriated (UNHCR, 2015). Additionally, PBEA YEP was also intended to address issues of refugee adolescent and youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups in Dadaab and in Somalia upon repatriation. The GoK has and continues to claim that Dadaab is a breeding ground for these two phenomena.<sup>16</sup> According to PBEA programme planners, it was within this context that PBEA YEP programming in Dadaab was developed and implemented.

Dadaab currently hosts approximately 349,280 registered refugees (approximately 50 percent children/youth) (UNHCR, 2015). It is the largest refugee camp in the world. Dadaab camp and town have long been prone to varying levels of violence and insecurity waged by a range of different actors for reasons that have shifted and changed since the camp was founded almost twenty-five years ago.

The PBEA YEP programme focuses on improving education and making it more contextually relevant and responsive to the needs of refugee adolescents and youth who, the GoK and PBEA programme planners maintain, might otherwise be at risk of marginalization and its associated risks (e.g. radicalization, recruitment into armed groups). The overarching aim of the programme in Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp is to contribute to strengthening resilience through education as well as helping to prepare refugees to "voluntarily repatriate" to Somalia. UNICEF's approach to PBEA programming in Dadaab is informed by a "light conflict analysis" (UNICEF,

12 See: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-terror>

13 See: <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Dadaab-Refugee-Camp-Terrorism-Somalia-Repatriation/-/1056/2686320/-/4as3n9/-/index.html>

14 Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5285e0294.pdf>

15 See: <http://www.unhcr.org/552d12c49.html>; see also:

<http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/bp-dadaab-march-2014-low.pdf>; and <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/crisis-looms-for-somali-refugees-as-kenya-orders-closure-of-dadaab-refugee-camp-1/>

16 See: <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21650590-closing-huge-somali-refugee-camp-kenya-would-not-reduce-terrorism-scapegoats>

2013) conducted by UNICEF in December 2012 and again in July 2013. The conflict analysis is also to be updated by a KAP survey conducted in Dadaab that explores a range of issues, including types of conflict experienced by programme beneficiaries (see the companion study to this one, King & Monaghan 2016). Table 4 below includes the conflict drivers in Dadaab as identified by these two analyses along with the PBEA approach implemented in Dadaab for addressing these conflict drivers. According to programme planners, PBEA focuses primarily on drivers 2, 3, and 4. It should be noted that the types of conflict (e.g. inter/intra-ethnic, international, etc.) propelled by these conflict drivers are not specified in either analysis.

*Table 4. Conflict Drivers addressed by YEP Approach in Dadaab*

Dadaab Conflict Drivers	Dadaab PBEA Approach
1) Poverty and unequal economic development	Provision of 4-month short courses at NRC YEP centres.
2) Inequitable social service provision, i.e., education, creating inequities between education and those not education via formal school structures	
3) Education that is of low quality and not economically and culturally relevant	
4) Disenchanted and disillusioned youth who are easily recruited for violent causes	

## 2.1 Dadaab refugee camp

Dadaab refugee camp was established by the UNHCR in 1992 to host refugees fleeing Somalia following the escalation of sectarian violence resulting from the collapse of the Siad Barre regime (De Waal, 2013). The camp is located in a vast stretch of semi-arid land in the Northeastern Province of Kenya approximately 100 kilometres

from the Kenya/Somali border. The average rainfall in the region is approximately thirteen inches per year (UNHCR, 2014) and clusters of trees dot an otherwise barren landscape. In addition to the refugees residing in Dadaab, the area is also populated by Somali-Kenyan nomadic pastoralists who are legally Kenyan citizens yet culturally Somali (e.g. they speak Somali dialects as well as Arabic, practice similar tribal customs as those found in Somalia, and also practice Islam).<sup>17</sup> As such, there has been far less tension and conflict between Somali refugees residing in Dadaab and the host community than between refugees residing in Kakuma refugee camp located in the northwest region of Kenya and their host community, the Turkanas. This comparative distinction is useful as it is widely held that tensions between host and refugee communities almost always arise in areas that serve as locations for camps (Crisp, 2003).

The term ‘camp’ is somewhat misleading as Dadaab has for all intents and purposes grown into a city in the twenty-five years since it was first established. In fact, ‘accidental city’ is a term coined by anthropologists to refer to Dadaab (and Kakuma) (Jansen, 2009). It is accidental because an institutional arrangement meant to be temporary has taken on characteristics of settlement and habitation that were never intended and city because Dadaab contains market places, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, running water, electricity, transportation via car and motorbike taxi, as well as Kenya’s third largest population (compared to all cities throughout the country) (KNBS, 2014). The economic development and social change that has been in part both cause and effect of Dadaab’s burgeoning population has led to ad hoc and haphazard growth.

When first established in 1992, Dadaab housed approximately 180,000 Somali refugees across three sub-camps (Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera). The camp offered little beyond temporary shelters made of plastic sheeting and a handful of semi-permanent health clinics, food distribution centres, water pumps, as well as offices and bunkhouses for staff at the UNHCR and its implementing partners. Today, as noted above, there are approximately 349,280 registered

17 Ibid.



refugees in Dadaab. Approximately 10,000 third generation refugees are born to parents who were also born there (UNHCR, 2012). Dadaab is a protracted refugee situation and while there have, for years, been announcements by the GoK that the camp would close “by the end of the year,”<sup>18</sup> many can and do maintain that, “there is no end in sight”<sup>19</sup> (Crisp & Slaughter, 2009). There are now five sub-camps in Dadaab as Ifo II and Kambioos were added in 2012 in response to a mass influx of refugees fleeing on-going war and famine in Somalia.<sup>20</sup> During this same year, UNICEF commenced operations in Dadaab across a range of different sectors, including education.

The five sub-camps vary demographically as well as in their level of “economic development.” Briefly stated, Dagahaley, Ifo, and Ifo II are increasingly diverse sub-camps as a number of refugees arriving to Dadaab in 2014 and 2015 from several countries throughout East Africa were settled there upon registration. Ifo in particular was referred to several times during the course of this research as a very “cosmopolitan” camp. In contrast, Hagadera and Kambioos are still comprised almost exclusively of Somali refugees. With regards to comparative levels of economic development, the three original sub-camps (Dagahaley, Ifo, and Hagadera) have a significantly greater number of marketplaces, shops, and restaurants that have grown and in many cases thrived since they were first established. Opportunities for refugees to generate income via entrepreneurship or salaried employment with refugee businesses are particularly significant as refugees are prohibited from working outside of the camp and are limited to “incentive-wages” (approximately USD 100/mo.) for employment with UNHCR and its implementing partners. Dadaab town has also grown significantly since the camp was founded. Prior to the camp, there was one primary school serving the area and a handful of shops. Today, there are four primary schools, one secondary school, and several

hotels, shops, and restaurants. This growth in part reflects intentional efforts undertaken by UNHCR and its implementing partners to prevent tensions from arising between refugees and the host community due to differential access to services.

There are significant issues with security in Dadaab camp/town. In 2011, Al Shabaab infiltrated Dadaab, following Kenya’s military incursion into Somalia that same year,<sup>21</sup> and until 2014 maintained a steady presence there—raiding the homes and businesses of community leaders, detonating a number of bombs in heavily trafficked marketplaces, and kidnapping or alternately killing several aid workers.<sup>22</sup> Additionally, anecdotal reports indicate that Al Shabaab has targeted out-of-school adolescents and youth for recruitment.<sup>23</sup> While the GoK continues to claim that Al Shabaab is still active in Dadaab and that other local militant groups (e.g. Al Hijra) with links to Al Shabaab are active in and around the camps, UN personnel working in the camp across a variety of sectors (most notably the security sector), maintain that Al Shabaab withdrew from the camp in late 2014 when more than 500 Kenyan security police troops were deployed across the five sub-camps. They also maintain that Al Shabaab is blamed for acts of banditry waged by Al Shabaab affiliates and/or Somalis and Somali-Kenyans unaffiliated with the organization, that continues on the roads between Somalia and Dadaab as it has since the camp was founded. As previously stated, it is within this context of claims by the GoK regarding the propensity and potential occurrence of adolescent and youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups, as well as preparation for ‘imminent’ return to Somalia that has, as of yet, not materialized, that PBEA YEP programming was developed and implemented.

18 See: <http://www.npr.org/2015/05/04/404114278/kenya-threatens-again-to-close-dadaab-worlds-largest-refugee-camp>

19 The UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations as “one in which 25,000 or more displaced persons find themselves in a longstanding and intractable state of limbo with no prospect of a solution.” See: Crisp & Slaughter (2009).

20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Dadaab: World’s Biggest Refugee Camp 20 Years Old*. 21 February, 2012, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi>

21 See: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2011-11-15/why-kenya-invaded-somalia>

22 See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Twin Blasts in Dadaab Raise Concern of Worsening Security*. 21 December, 2011, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4ef1ec326&query=Dadaab>

23 See: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/06/dadaab-camp-refugee-story-2014620172234831264.html>

### Youth in Dadaab

For the GoK, refugee adolescents and youth in Dadaab are a central concern for security. It is widely believed that because there are a large number of refugee adolescents and youth out of school and there are limited opportunities for refugees (adolescents/youth and adults) to access income generating<sup>24</sup> or livelihood<sup>25</sup> opportunities, there is a high propensity for refugee adolescents and youth to be radicalized, recruited into armed groups, or engage in other negative behaviors. 92 percent of adolescents and youth of secondary-school age are not enrolled in Dadaab's secondary schools (UNHCR, 2015a) and approximately 99 percent of youth do not have access to vocational or life skills education (Ibid.). Additionally, while secondary schooling in the camp is provided to a limited number of refugees who in theory qualify for places based on scores on the Kenyan Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE), for which students sit at the end of Grade 8, there are in most years, more refugees who qualify than there are places available. Vocational programming provided by NRC's YEP programme in part endeavors to provide opportunities for these youth (in addition to other youth who for various reasons have limited or no access to schooling in the camps) to continue their education.

It is also possible to draw on youth-specific information from the KAP study to illustrate the situation of youth in Dadaab. Of the 41 youth who were identified as beneficiaries of NRC (YEP), 4 of them chose "last week" in response to the question "When was the last time you had a conflict that made you angry?". 6 respondents chose "last month," 7 chose "last 3 months," 5 chose "last 6 months," and 14 chose "last year or longer" (an additional 5 selected "other"). When asked which from a list "best describes this conflict," the most common answer was "access to resources (land, water, etc.)," with 18/41 respondents choosing this option. Other responses, in order of frequency were violence at home (n=8), theft (n=6), other (n=4),

attack by military of police (n=3), and cattle raiding or land dispute (each receiving 1 vote). The most common "response to that conflict" (again, selecting from a list of possibilities), was "talk with them to resolve the conflict" (10/41). The second most common responses were to "go to religious/block/clan leaders" (n=7) or to "yell at them" (n=7). "Go to police" (n=6), "don't respond" (n=5), and "other" (n=4) were additional responses. Only 2 of 41 respondents chose "fight with them" as their response. These responses may speak to social desirability biases—it is likely that youth would want to share anti-social behavior with a survey enumerator. They may also speak to the existence of conflict management channels that have had little attention in programming or literature.

### PBEA YEP programming in Dadaab

Since the PBEA YEP programme began in Dadaab in 2014, activities have focused on increasing access to vocational education for out-of-school adolescents and youth in Dadaab camp/town. Rather than starting from scratch, the project was implemented in the four already existing YEP centres run by the NRC since 2008 where the NRC has and continues to offer 1-year programmes covering a range of skills.<sup>26</sup> According to NRC programme literature, the YEP programme aims to contribute to livelihood and self-reliance amongst refugee youth in Dadaab. Radicalization or recruitment into armed groups have not been part of the rationale or guiding logic of the 1-year programmes, although they do guide the four-month PBEA-funded programmes.

In contrast to the longer-running year-long courses, PBEA YEP was implemented in 2014 as a four-month "short course," primarily to mitigate or prevent altogether youth radicalization or recruitment into armed groups as well as to help facilitate 'voluntary' repatriation to Somalia that, at the time of initial implementation, seemed imminent. In the current four-month "short

24 Livelihood strategies are broadly considered to be the way in which individuals arrange the combination of capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities available to them to support life and provide for basic necessities (e.g. food, water, shelter). Income generating activities may or may not be included in livelihood strategies.

25 Income generating opportunities are broadly considered to be activities in the formal or informal economy designed to generate capital.

26 With the exception of Hagadera where one 4-month short-course on livestock production has been developed and implemented as part of PBEA YEP.

courses,” programme participants choose between several courses of study (e.g. DSTV installation, barbering, photography, housecleaning, tailoring, henna tattoo artistry) that were previously offered as year-long courses and have been shortened to four-month courses. In addition to these courses, livestock production (meat hygiene and handling) and Somali language courses were included as part of the four-month programme—livestock production as a stand-alone four-month course and Somali language as a component of all four-month courses (UNICEF, 2014g). These two additions are intended to provide participants with relevant vocational skills that will be useful upon repatriation to Somalia (UNICEF, 2014g; NRC 2013; NRC, 2014) and might help to create livelihood opportunities in Dadaab (UNICEF, 2014g). While these are important programme modifications, livestock production is only offered at one NRC centre. While other Somalia-relevant livelihood courses have been planned (e.g. animal husbandry, agriculture) as part of PBEA YEP, they had not yet been implemented at the time this study was undertaken.<sup>27</sup> As in the year-long programme, participants are provided with start-up kits intended to help them establish their own businesses.

With the camp context in which PBEA programming in Dadaab operates and the structure and content of PBEA YEP programming in the three sub-camps and Dadaab town thus established, the report now turns to a review of relevant literature.

## 2.2 Literature Review

For a higher-level review of academic and practitioner-oriented literature on education, peace, and conflict, please see a study on PBEA programming in the Somali region of Ethiopia undertaken by King and Monaghan (2015). This literature review focuses specifically on concepts related to education, peace and conflict, and on literature related to refugee education and vocational education programming in conflict and post-conflict settings. Until recently, vocational education programming was largely excluded from refugee education programming in camps and thus seldom explored in academic or practitioner-

oriented literature devoted to both these areas of focus. However, peacebuilding education programming has increasingly included vocational education in refugee education programming. As such, this research provides an opportunity to consider these formerly delimited programmes and attendant literatures collectively.

## Education, Peace, and Conflict

A handful of UNICEF documents (UNICEF, 2012a; 2012b; 2014c; 2014e) usefully establish a common set of definitions for key ‘peacebuilding’ terms across UNICEF offices and sites of PBEA implementation.<sup>28</sup> This study briefly includes these definitions here so as to make clear the ways in which we will utilize these terms throughout our study. Peacebuilding is a multidimensional range of interventions that aim to solidify peace and prevent the lapse or relapse of conflict—it is a system wide undertaking across multiple sectors including, but certainly not limited to, education (UNICEF, 2012a). Peacebuilding is conceptually distinct from conflict-sensitivity, which is the capacity of an organization to understand its operating context, understand the interaction between its interventions and the context, and act upon this understanding to minimize any negative impacts on conflict factors. Conflict-sensitivity is necessary but not alone sufficient for peacebuilding (ibid.). Social cohesion is the degree to which vertical (i.e. a responsive state to its citizenry) and horizontal (i.e. cross-cutting, networked relations among diverse communal groups) social capital intersect and in turn provide communities with mechanisms necessary for mediating and managing conflict. Resilience is the ability of a community or society to anticipate, withstand, and recover from pressures and shocks (manmade and natural) (UNICEF, 2014e).

## Refugee Education

With few notable exceptions, refugee education is not usually regarded as a field in its own right with its own particular political and legal contexts and institutional arrangements. Instead, it has been subsumed within a wider discourse and defense of education in emergencies. This reflects, on the one hand, the ways in which

27 See pg. 19 for a complete list of courses offered and skills relevant in Somali as identified by market assessments.

28 This paragraph is borrowed from the partner study to this one. See: King, E. & Monaghan, C. (2015). *Pastoralist Education and Peacebuilding in Ethiopia: Results and Lessons Learned*. Nairobi: UNICEF pp. 18-19.

refugee education policymakers have framed refugee education as 'emergency education' and as central to achieving Education for All (EFA) and on the other a limited number of descriptive or empirical studies that focus specifically on refugee education as distinct from Education in Emergencies (EiE) (Monaghan, 2015).

The majority of studies that have been carried out on refugee education have been commissioned by UN agencies (primarily the UNHCR) or partner INGOs. These publications typically describe particular programmes or initiatives (e.g. IRC's Healing Classrooms Initiative or the UNHCR's Peace Education Programme) and include suggestive findings of the impact of different programmes on participants. They also highlight the ways in which formal primary schooling provides refugee children with a sense of normalcy and routine; psychosocial support; life skills for their immediate environment (e.g. landmine awareness, prevention of HIV/AIDS); protection from recruitment into armed groups; and knowledge/skills necessary for post-conflict state-building and nation-building. This literature leaves a number of issues under-examined. Seldom considered, for instance, are the purposes of refugee education in arguably non-emergent, protracted situations and the ways in which those purposes may substantially differ from education in 'emergency situations.' Stated differently, when it is unknown if and when refugees will resettle to a third country, repatriate to their home country, or remain in camps, for what is education preparing them? Similarly, the ways in which focus by the UNHCR and its implementing partners on the provision of basic education services (i.e. primary schooling) under the auspices of EFA precludes a large number of refugee adolescents and youth from accessing education (e.g. their academic credentials from their home country do not transfer to their host country, they have large gaps in their schooling, they do not speak the same language as the formal language of instruction in schools) are also under-theorized and under-examined. As such, existing education programming in protracted refugee situations often serves to further exacerbate the "limbo" and uncertainty refugee adolescents and youth feel with regards to the future (Monaghan, 2015).

As mentioned, however, a handful of studies conducted by scholars and/or scholar-practitioners engage with the specific challenges that inhere

in the content, structure, and provisioning of education in refugee camps. Waters and Leblanc (2005) identify the paradoxes that make problematic the development of refugee education programmes, including the challenge of non-state actors (e.g. the UNHCR) determining curriculum and the ways in which traditional purposes of schooling (e.g. the cultivation of citizenship and economic development) simply do not exist in refugee camps. Wright and Plasterer (2010) map the education opportunities for secondary, vocational, and higher education in Dadaab and Kakuma and document that few programmes provide non-formal education (including vocational education) for youth or formal higher education. They conclude that efforts should be undertaken by the international community to advocate for these programmes in camps. However, Dryden-Peterson (2012) in an exposition on higher education programming for refugees, explains the ways in which UNHCR's focus on basic education reflects EFA's global policy priorities for education, which centre around universal access to "quality, basic primary education" with a focus on literacy, numeracy, and basic life skills. She makes a case for the increased provision of secondary, tertiary, and higher education in camps by highlighting the protective role these play via increased opportunities for employment and additional years in school that help to prevent against military recruitment.

### Vocational Education Programming for Youth

Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) has, in recent years, become increasingly linked to "poverty reduction, economic recovery, and sustainable development" (UNESCO, 2012: 21). It has also been touted as an "effective means to quickly instill in people the skills necessary for establishing non-violent livelihoods" (UNESCO, 2013: 4). However, the majority of studies have been carried out in developing countries (e.g. Argentina, Peru) that are not considered fragile or conflict-affected and evaluate the impact of TVET programmes on youth employment and earnings (USAID, 2014).

The interest in TVET programmes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts stems from the widely cited finding that countries with youthful populations are more prone to conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Novelli and Lopes Cardozo,

2008; Borton, 2009). Despite limited empirical evidence, these studies reflect a widely held belief that “in the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection, growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youth into terrorist groups” (Borton, 2009: 26). However, the evidence base for such programming is lacking and, where it exists, the evidence is often contrary to programme planners’ hoped-for outcomes. For instance, a survey of literature on youth employment programmes, conflict, and extremism carried out by USAID (2013) found that “programmes with economic or workforce development objectives typically failed to achieve them” (4) and that “short-term interventions have limited impact. The possibility of recurring violence and conflict and weak governance structures require a long-term investment by donors and NGOs” (ibid).

A handful of studies have specifically evaluated the impact of NRC YEP programmes on youth participants across a range of contexts around the world (e.g. camps, conflict, post-conflict) (Christensen, 2013; Winters et al., 2013) and two studies focus specifically on the 1-year YEP courses (not PBEA YEP 4-month short courses) in Dadaab camp/town. With regards to studies evaluating YEP outside of Dadaab camp/town, a recent case study on YEP programming in Afghanistan for internally displaced youth echoes findings from previous studies, concluding that while “YEP does lead to increased employment and income, these are limited in scope” (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014: 34) and “YEP does not offer a way out of poverty per se” (Ibid.). These findings are significant with regards to TVET programming (those offered by the NRC or others) in refugee camps, particularly in protracted refugee situations, that are intended to help facilitate peacebuilding. As Smith and Ellison (2012) explain:

Given the constraints of the economic circumstances in which TVET programmes are implemented, they often receive criticism for not actually resulting in increased employment. From a peacebuilding perspective, this is a critical issue. While training programmes that occupy youth may contribute to negative peace, without the creation of sustainable livelihoods, there is no transformative effect (17).

These challenges are also echoed in the two reports that focus on the 1-year YEP programme in Dadaab camp/town. The first, an assessment of the relevance and transferability of skills taught in YEP centres in Dadaab camp/town to Somalia undertaken in 2013 and 2014 found that “interventions by NRC and other VT partners are inadequate to address the big demand for employable skills [in Dadaab or Somalia]” (NRC, 2014: 11) and recommends that “NRC improve access to YEP by making it relevant” (12) to reflect “supply and demand side so that the skills provided are socially and economically relevant to the community” (12). Similarly, a tracer study conducted in 2014 that studied whether graduates were successful in accessing income generating opportunities or improving livelihood strategies found, on the one hand, that graduates faced several challenges to generating income, including “lack of job opportunities, lack of resources, lack of experience, clan issues, cultural factors, security issues, lack of resources, and lack of experience” (NRC, 2014: 39). At the same time, it found, impressively, that “[approximately] 60 percent of graduates were successful” in securing income generating opportunities (broadly defined). It should be again noted that both NRC studies focus on the 1-year programme— not the shorter 4-month PBEA YEP programme—on which a formal evaluation has yet to be conducted.

Given the focus on formal primary education in camps under the guise of EFA (which leaves a large number of refugee youth unable to access education), an area of inquiry that remains unexplored in accounts across these three distinct literatures is the overall effect on adolescent and youth participants (and direct or indirect effects on peacebuilding) of access to further education via TVET, as distinct from whether this education leads to employment opportunities. While increasing employment and livelihood opportunities for youth is one of the goals of PBEA YEP, programme goals also include strengthening peacebuilding in Somalia and Dadaab and preventing youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups through “constructive engagement with social and cultural activities” that their participation in programming might make possible. As such, this research offers an opportunity to begin that investigation.

# 3. Findings and Discussion

The case study has identified several aspects of YEP programming supported by PBEA in Dadaab camp/town that indicate gains in regards to **Outcome 4**. These are presented and discussed in turn.

## 3.1 Outputs: Provision of 4-month courses at YEP Centres

More than **300** adolescents and youth per year (in 2014 and 2015), totaling to approximately **600**, have participated in the 4-month short-courses offered at the NRC YEP centres (UNICEF, 2014). Approximately **20 percent** of these youth are women and girls (Ibid.) and a range of nationalities are represented, including Burundian, Congolese, Ethiopian, Kenyan, Somali, and South Sudanese. That a number of participants are not Somali complicates the evaluation of the ToC and the ultimate achievement of programme goals (i.e. voluntary repatriation to Somalia and prevention of radicalization/recruitment into armed groups in Somalia, though this might still be applicable to Dadaab).

While a thorough assessment of beneficiary targeting is beyond the scope of this study, the programme may be reaching youth who are at risk of violent behavior. In the KAP survey, only 5 percent of respondents (n = 664) said yes to the question “Have you ever used a weapon for any reason” and only 1 percent (n = 664) said yes to “Were you ever part of an armed group?” These are quite low figures, although it is also likely that respondents would not want to answer in the affirmative to these sensitive questions. Notably, among respondents who were beneficiaries of YEP programming, 6 of 41 reported having used a weapon, representing nearly 15 percent, suggesting, albeit with a very small sample, as noted above, that the programme may be reaching youth that are at risk of violent behavior. On the other hand, all 41 respondents that were beneficiaries of YEP responded no to the question regarding participation in an armed group.

To be clear, youth that participate in NRC

programming do experience violence. 35 respondents (or 85 percent) reported having, in the last year (i.e. 2014) been victim to physical assault and/or theft (armed and/or unarmed). 2 reported being a victim of armed theft by a friend or family member; 11 a victim of armed theft by someone else or unknown; 5 unarmed theft by someone else or unknown; 4 reported being physically assaulted with a weapon; 4 physically assaulted without a weapon; 3 reported being victim to witchcraft; 2 victims of bribery or corruption; and 6 stopped from using a public facility because of their ethnicity or religion.

## 3.2 Culturally and economically ‘relevant’ and ‘appropriate’ education including ‘flexible’ and ‘safe’ learning spaces

YEP programming is intended to enhance access to vocational education to accommodate those who miss out on secondary education, are forced to leave school for a variety of reasons, as well as out of school youth who need access to flexible and market-responsive skills development opportunities (UNICEF, 2014). The skills offered (e.g. barbering, painting, DSTV installation) are intended to address immediate market demand in Dadaab camp/town and also be useful upon repatriation to Somalia through the intended inclusion of short-courses on livestock production and Somali language as a component of all four-month short courses.

Contrary to common critiques of mismatches between skills-training and the job market (EFA, 2012), the particular courses of study were selected for inclusion into PBEA programming based upon a 2014 assessment report completed by the NRC in February 2014, entitled *Assessment of Youth Education Pack (YEP) Program in Dadaab and its Relevant Replicability in Somalia* (NRC, 2014) and a study completed by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in 2013 on livelihood activities and opportunities for refugees in Dadaab (DRC, 2013). Table 5 provides a list of

courses currently offered in Dadaab and those identified in the market assessments.

*Table 5: Market assessment skills and courses offered*

Market Assessment (NRC, 2014; DRC, 2013; UNICEF, 2014).	Courses Offered Bolding indicates match with market assessment for Dadaab; Italics indicates match with market assessment for Somalia
<p><b>Urban areas</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction (e.g. electrical installation)</li> <li>• Hospitality (e.g. housecleaning)</li> <li>• ICT (e.g. DSTV installation)</li> <li>• Journalism/Media</li> </ul> <p><b>Pastoralist/ Agricultural/Coastal Areas</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved animal husbandry</li> <li>• Erosion control</li> <li>• Manufacturing of leather goods</li> <li>• Poultry-keeping</li> <li>• Construction of water catchments</li> <li>• Construction in erosion prone areas</li> <li>• Hydrological planning</li> <li>• Well-drilling</li> <li>• Fish hygiene and handling and use of nets and long lines for fishing catching</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Barbering</li> <li>• <b>DSTV Installation</b></li> <li>• Henna Tattoo Artistry</li> <li>• <b>Housekeeping</b></li> <li>• Painting</li> <li>• <b>Photography (journalism/media)</b></li> <li>• Tailoring</li> <li>• <i>Livestock production (meat hygiene and handling) (offered at the Hagadera YEP centre)</i></li> </ul>

While the effort to match needs and skills is to be praised, the needs suggested by the market assessments as compared to the course offerings only partially line up and are heavily over-weighted toward skills for Dadaab. Nonetheless, a number of skills relevant to Somalia were identified in the market assessment. As previously noted, a particular requirement of PBEA support for YEP was that the implementing partner develop and

implement 4-month short courses that offer skills to help facilitate refugees’ voluntary repatriation and provide them with livelihood opportunities in Somalia upon repatriation. The inclusion of livestock production and Somali language is a significant first step, though it is important for future programming to develop and implement courses that correspond with the other relevant skills related to livelihood strategies in pastoralist, agricultural, and coastal areas identified by the market survey. This programme element is particularly significant as approximately 60 percent of Somalis residing in Somalia engage in pastoral livelihoods (NRC 2013, 2014; UNICEF, 2014) and many Somali refugees residing in Dadaab—the accidental city—for several years have seldom engaged with those practices or alternately never learned them in the first place.

Offering Somali language as part of these 4-month courses is intended to support return and reintegration of youth to Somalia. This is a particularly relevant addition to programming and may provide “a more culturally empowering education experience” (UNICEF, 2014: 5) as many Somali youth have resided in the camps for their entire lives and are not literate in Somali.

Similar to the mixed evaluation of the market assessment demands as compared to courses supplied, case study interviews with YEP students, teachers, and PTA members indicate mixed perceptions regarding the economic and cultural relevance of YEP. Some participants thought the courses were very relevant. One recent graduate of the DSTV programme remarked, “I now have a skill that I can take with me all over the globe—regardless of where I go, this is a global skill.” Another graduate who completed the programme in barbering stated, “our skills have changed and for some of us, our life has changed. We can get basic necessities now for us and our families because we have access to wages. We don’t have to go home empty-handed.” Teachers also remarked that courses like henna tattoo artistry, that were not mentioned in the market assessments, were particularly relevant and appropriate for promoting the inclusion of girls and women into the YEP programme. “You see, in Dagahaley, most of the skills are for males, but in the Somali culture there is really a market for henna because it washes off but is so commonly applied,” one teacher stated.

Simultaneously, though, there were concerns about the appropriateness of some elements of the programme. For example, a female student

expressed concern that the composition of groups was not culturally appropriate. She stated that, “when we graduated from the photography programme, there were eight male learners and two females. According to custom, we are supposed to be separate. The male learners took over everything and would not include us. So now we are just at home doing nothing.”

Moreover, several participants from the range of courses opined that the skills learned are not economically relevant. One concern was that the skills do not lead to jobs. A graduate from the housekeeping course stated simply, “we learned the skills, but our life hasn’t changed.” A related concern arose in regards to the appropriateness of the skills for Somalia vs. Dadaab. A graduate from the DSTV programme explained that:

Some of these skills...housekeeping, painting—there just isn’t a market for them here. We want skills for the camp. So we can have employment here. For Somalia? Maybe, but we won’t leave here for a long time. Some of us are from very different education backgrounds—some Standard 8, some Form 2, others no schooling. But we can work...and we need to work.

### 3.3 Programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment

A key objective, and measure of success for YEP training is the extent to which participants were able to gain meaningful livelihoods. There are both notable successes and significant challenges with regards to establishing businesses and/or gaining employment. A handful of course graduates of the PBEA YEP programme said they had started a business and were renting storefront space and taking clients or working in already established businesses. A graduate from the barbering course explained, “I often cut hair in different shops, especially during holiday times like Eid. Also some of us are trying to become teachers at the YEP centre in the skill areas where we were students.”

Further, as previously noted, a tracer study conducted in 2014 that evaluated the one-year long programme found that approximately 60 percent of programme graduates were engaged in livelihood generating activities (20 percent had secured wage-earning employment while 40 percent reported being self-employed) (NRC,

2014: 18). These figures are to be praised. However, this study was focused on NRC’s one-year programme, as distinct from the PBEA YEP 4-month short-course programme, on which a comparable study has yet to be conducted. There are good reasons to believe that it may be more difficult to become employed after just 4 months of training as compared to a year. Indeed, several interviewees expressed that to meet market demand they needed advanced courses that served as a follow-up to their beginner-level short courses. They explained that their short-course credentials were not readily accepted in the refugee community. A DSTV graduate remarked that:

In the community, they don’t believe you have the skills—they won’t let you fix or install. They say you will wreck it. This is just a basic course and where did you learn? So you show them your YEP certificate and they say ‘this is just a basic course’ we want to see advanced learning and we want to see a work portfolio.

The KAP data suggests a diversity of experiences in terms of securing employment after training. Of the 41 direct beneficiaries who participated in the KAP survey (to note, it is not known if/when they completed the training), 13 self-reported to be employed (7 as traders, 3 as labourers, 3 as teachers) and an additional 4 said they were employed part-time. Twelve were students and 10 were unemployed (2 responded “other”).

Some programme graduates interviewed for this study described several challenges, in addition to those described above, that prevented them from generating income from their business. Alongside successes, it is particularly important to highlight these challenges as ways to improve future programming. These challenges include start-up kits that are not big enough to accommodate the number of people in a group, issues with group dynamics and divergent interests in starting a business amongst group members, competition from established businesses, prohibitive costs to doing business in the camp, and issues with security.

In terms of group size and start-up kits, interviewees explained that the seed money and materials provided to groups of eight to ten (and in one case a group of twenty) were simply not enough. A graduate of the barbering course stated:



There were nine members in our group and we were given one razor to share for all nine of us and one barbershop chair. Nine members in the group can all cut hair, but we can't service more than one client at a time. So during Eid, for instance, people came and there was real demand, but we couldn't meet the demand so they just said we're going to another shop where we don't have to wait. The thing is we come from Somalia where everything is war-torn. Our parents cannot financially support us because they lost everything to come here. The only way they can support us is helping us get through the course to get these skills so we can try and help them. We're still trying—we try and offer other complimentary services while people are getting their hair cut like polishing shoes—but it's hard. Sometimes group members run away when the monthly rent is due.

Several graduates from DSTV and the henna tattoo artistry programme expressed similar challenges. One DSTV graduate opined, “all graduates think they will go and really make it, but in reality it takes a long time.”

Interviewees elaborated by explaining that their groups had fractured upon being given the start-up kits for a variety of reasons ranging from desire to find work or start businesses outside of Dadaab camp/town to simply being interested in the seed money to inter-personal/intra-group issues. First, some Kenyans participating in courses in the YEP centre in Dadaab town wanted to take their skills outside of the town to Garissa or elsewhere in Kenya while refugee group members wanted to stay and find work or establish a business in the camp. Similarly some Somali refugee programme participants wanted to return to Somalia while others did not wish to leave the camp. While programme planners stated they tried to form groups based upon who wished to stay or leave the town/camp upon completion of the programme, this did not seem to be widely reflected in the majority of graduates' professed experiences.

Second, and perhaps more problematically, nearly all graduates interviewed reported that some group members simply took their share (or more) of the seed money or materials and left the group without helping start-up a business. “There's different groups within the group,” one barbering graduate explained. “Some either take the money or they take the supplies and just go straight

to the market to sell them.” A PTA member described that, “there was one person who was designated as the chairperson of the group and she was to receive the money and materials and was supposed to distribute. But overnight she took everything—she took the money and materials and left on a bus with it and no one knew until the next day. Sometimes because the funds are only given to the chairperson of the group, that person will just take everything.” Another graduate of the painting programme stated, “the challenge is that some people want to work, others don't. And the ones who don't say you go make the money, just give me my cut [of the start-up] and I'm out.” Interviews with NRC programme staff indicate that they are aware of this problem, though have not taken steps to address it within the PBEA YEP programme (or the 1-year programme).

Third, a number of programme graduates detailed issues with regards to competition from established businesses, which were in many cases related to prohibitive costs to doing business. A South Sudanese refugee and DSTV graduate explained that:

The electricity in the camp is run by a monopoly and people are charged differently depending on their nationality. So for us [South Sudanese], we are minorities and are being charged much more to get on the grid. Plus others can run their shops off of generators, which means they can stay open longer.

These respondents asked that solar power kits be included in their start-up kits to allow them to operate viable businesses in the marketplace.

In terms of challenges with security, a DSTV graduate recalled that:

We opened the shop, put the DSTV sign out front, and people came to watch. But then because of all these security problems in the camp—one time a bomb exploded in the nearby market, another time there was a riot—when this happened people will just run away. And us too. And we tried to remember to lock up the shop but just couldn't—I was afraid for my life. So when we ran, in the time it took to come back, looters came and stole everything. The security personnel ran too so there was no one to watch and guard. Once something like that happens, your start-up is gone. And for us, this happened twice.

Finally, nearly all female graduates reported that they had not been able to gain employment and/or start a business since graduating from the henna tattoo artistry, house cleaning, or photography courses in 2014 or 2015. They reported that, “people aren’t willing to pay for housekeeping,” or “I was at home before I started, convinced my parents to let me participate in the course, but now I am just back home again.” One female participant stated that, “it does seem sometimes like we’ve gained skills but not opportunities. Graduates do get frustrated sometimes—they say this is a waste of time.” The particular challenges women face in accessing employment in Dadaab may reflect a lack of demand for housekeeping services in the camp but also cultural stigma against women seeking formal employment outside of the household. While the sample size is small, the KAP survey data from NRC beneficiaries is potentially illustrative: In response to the question “Have you ever felt excluded/discriminated against because of your gender?” the average for female respondents was 3.8 (n=12) (with 5 being not at all and 1 denoting nearly always). In contrast, the average for male respondents was 4.3 (n=29), pointing to the particular challenges that female youth face.

Overall, while 4-month courses at YEP centres are indeed being provided (the first output), other outputs, crucial to the theory of change are more problematic. The findings are mixed in regards to the second output—provision of culturally and economically ‘relevant’ and ‘appropriate’ education. Youth perceive the skills to be valuable but some question their economic relevance. Additionally, beyond the Hagadera YEP centre where one course related to livestock production has been developed and implemented and the inclusion of Somali-language as a component of all four-month courses, the skills offered as part of the 1-year model have been shortened and offered as PBEA YEP 4-month courses, which may not align with the theory of change and chosen programme goals. Additionally, as many programme participants are not Somali and therefore will not repatriate to Somalia, the inclusion of Somali language courses are not necessarily of direct relevance to them. Findings in relation to the third output – programme graduates establishing businesses or gaining employment – are also mixed.

### 3.4 Outcomes: Improved perceived inclusion/equity in access to education and employment opportunities for youth and reduced risks of marginalization/radicalization or recruitment to armed groups.

A key issue related to outcomes is in regards to a programmatic presumption that youth experience unequal access to education and employment opportunities in Dadaab. Furthermore, the YEP theory of change also understands these perceptions of marginalization to increase the risk of radicalization or recruitment to armed groups. A number of questions from the KAP survey give insight into these underlying assumptions. For instance, respondents were asked to agree or disagree (on a 5-point scale with 5 as the strongest agreement) with the statement “Everyone has equal access to education services regardless of ethnicity, religion or other factor.” The average response across all participants was 4.3 (n=665, SD=.76) with an average response for youth aged 15-24 of 4.2 (n=254, SD=.82). In other questions asking respondents “Have you ever felt excluded/discriminated against because of your clan background” and “Have you ever felt excluded/discriminated against because of your religion?” the average answers were 4.6 (n=655, SD=.84) and 4.7 (n=663, SD=.74), respectively, with 5 in this case denoting the strongest disagreement (“not at all”).

Likewise, the respondents quite highly rate service providers, including the Kenyan government and religious organizations. 81 percent agree (55 percent) or strongly agree (26 percent) that “The Kenyan government provides education that helps me in my daily life,” and ratings are higher among youth aged 15-24 than among those 25 and older. 88 percent agree (48 percent) or strongly agree (40 percent) to the same question posed about religious organizations. In response to the question “How would you rate the central government handling of providing access to services like health and education,” 39 percent selected “very good” and an additional 50 percent chose “good.” These findings suggest either a strong social desirability bias in responses, and/

or fewer perceptions of grievance and inequality than programme planners may presume. If followed by a second panel survey, the second round of KAP may be able to detect changes over time, although with these high baseline values, one may wonder how much room there is for movement. Given the broader research design includes only randomly selected non-beneficiaries (community members) as a potential control group (as opposed to random selection into the programme, or a matched control group), it will also be difficult to robustly attribute changes to PBEA.

There were, however, important differences between respondents of Somali, compared to non-Somali origin on a number of these questions. In response to the above-mentioned question about discrimination because of clan background non-Somalis averaged 4.4 (with 5 being that they “not at all” feel discrimination) whereas Somalis averaged 4.6.<sup>29</sup> Likewise, non-Somalis averaged 4.3 in their responses to discrimination because of religion (again with 5 being that they “not at all” feel discrimination) in contrast to Somalis who averaged 4.8.<sup>30</sup> These findings warrant further investigation and highlight an important focus on the perceived marginalization of non-Somalis, in a way that may diverge from the programmatic focus especially on Somalis.

Furthermore, during the 2015 qualitative fieldwork, respondents offered anecdotal examples that indicate the ways in which the YEP programme is helping to provide access to education for youth from South Sudan and other countries throughout East Africa (besides Somalia) whose academic credentials do not transfer to camp schools. This is an example of improved perceived inclusion/equity in access to education. One DSTV graduate from South Sudan explained:

I had finished Form 4 in South Sudan but I couldn't take the national exams because I had to run—this was right before I was going to sit for them. So when I came here and tried to enroll in secondary so I

could sit for the KCSE [Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education], they said no—you have to get your education achievement verified in Nairobi. But as you know, I can't do this—I can't leave the camp to do this and I also don't have the money to pay for it. So I was really frustrated. And then I had the opportunity to do DSTV and I was given the opportunity to stay on in the YEP programme and do a one-year electrical programme course. I now have an opportunity that I had given up on.

This example is illustrative of the ways in which YEP programming is one of the only means through which youth belonging to minority groups (i.e. nationalities besides Somali)—because of issues with transferability of education achievement from schools in refugees' home country to camp schools—can continue their education and create income generating opportunities.<sup>31</sup> It is a positive example of how PBEA YEP might be addressing issues of youth exclusion in the camp. However, it is again noted that the programme participant is South Sudanese, not Somali, and thus not the primary intended beneficiary of PBEA YEP for at least some of the outcomes.

At the same time, some contradictory findings emerge in the KAP survey. In response to the question “the Kenyan government provides education to help my daily life,” non-Somalis rated the government more highly (with an average response of 4.1) as compared to Somalis who rated the government 3.9<sup>32</sup>. This finding may be illustrative of deeper problems with how Somali adolescents and youth are being engaged.

A second key issue in regards to outcomes relates to conflict-sensitivity. Anecdotal examples shared by participants and detailed in the outputs section above indicate that rather than increasing social cohesion between diverse communal groups, the composition of groups in the programme may in fact be contributing to grievances, especially between refugees of different nationalities.

29 This is a statistically significant difference at  $p < 0.05$  (95 percent confidence interval).

30 This difference is statistically significant at  $p < 0.01$  (99 percent confidence interval).

31 The report notes that these same issues of transferability of education credentials do not apply to newly arrived Somalis whose academic credentials are transferable to Dadaab—a system developed because until recently the camp hosted almost entirely Somali refugees.

32 This difference is statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level (95 percent confidence interval).

Many of the challenges with start-up kits relayed by respondents were related to tensions between group members that arose along inter-national lines. Somali graduates from a range of different courses explained that, “there is not a problem with [Somali] clans mixing in the groups.” However South Sudanese, Gambellas (from the Gambella region of Ethiopia), and Congolese (n = 13 between these three groups) reported that tensions arose in groups comprised of Somalis and other nationalities. One graduate from the photography course explained:

In our group we had three Somalis and seven Ogadens [a different group of Ethiopians]—the minority here in the camp. It was very hard for us to start our business because the Somalis said we’ll just take all of this [the start-up materials] to the market and sell it and we’ll take the money. But we wanted to start the business. This is how conflicts happen. And they said there would be problems if we tried to handle this through community structures. So we went to the head teacher at the YEP centre and the three Somalis took the money and we took the materials.

Teachers also described competition between graduates from the Kenyan host community and refugees from the camps over opportunities in the camp. One teacher at the YEP centre in Dadaab town stated that, “sometimes the refugees can be very aggressive when it comes to working—territorial for work in the camps with the graduates from the host community.” It should be noted the while graduates from the YEP in Dadaab town can work and sell goods in the marketplaces in the camp, refugees cannot work or sell goods in the marketplaces in Dadaab town.<sup>33</sup> Despite this objective asymmetry between host/refugees, programme graduates, in contrast to teachers, did not report this to be a source of grievance or tension.

How to deal with this conflict potentiality was approached differently by different programme planners. Some NRC programme staff stated that they tried “not to mix different ethnicities from Somalia or put different nationalities in groups because we don’t want there to be violence.” However, other programme planners stated that the “groups allow for different ethnicities and nationalities to work together. We do some peacebuilding and peace education with them to get them thinking about how they can share resources and things.” There was not evidence of this latter, contact hypothesis type effort,<sup>34</sup> materializing. Indeed, the majority of anecdotes reveal that members belonging to different groups “unmix” as soon as the start-up kits are distributed and pursue livelihood strategies with members of the same nationality.

Many of these same issues were also cited in the previous studies conducted on the 1-year NRC YEP programme in Dadaab carried out in 2013 and 2014. Interviewees for this study did not report that disputes had escalated into physical conflict nor did those interviewed for the studies carried out in 2013 and 2014. However, interviewees for this study did note that significant tensions arose between members from different national groups. This is an important area for further research.

### 3.5 Increased ability amongst youth to be ‘resilient’ and adapt to change (e.g. repatriating from Dadaab to Somalia) and reduction of violence/reduced vulnerability to radicalization

A handful of interviewees for this study (n = 5) alluded to increased resilience amongst

33 Refugees residing in Kenya are not permitted to work or conduct business outside of the camp in which they have been settled. See: Laws of Kenya, Refugee Act: Chapter 173. Available at: <https://rorypecktrust.org/getmedia/9c86ef6c-c192-4572-b275-4feb3b8685a2/Kenya-Refugee-Act-2006.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf>

34 Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis states that: under appropriate conditions interpersonal contact is one of the most effective ways to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members (3). For a discussion of the contact hypothesis evidenced in PBEA programming, see King, E. & Monaghan, C. (2015). Pastoralist Education and Peacebuilding in Ethiopia: Results and Lessons Learned. Nairobi: UNICEF.

participants because of YEP programming. A graduate of the DSTV programme from South Sudan remarked that:

I was zero in my mind before this programme. I watched my parents, 3 brothers, and my sisters shot down in front of me. I was the one from my family who survived. Before this programme, I was just thinking about the war and all I had lost, but now I have something to hold on to.


Another graduate from the barbering programme stated, “now I feel like I’m in control of my own life.” Teachers also indicated the intangible benefits to programme participants. “Most of these students before this programme—they have no hope,” a female teacher explained, “but this gives them something to feel inspired about.” While the field research did not provide direct examples or anecdotes of if and how hope and optimism might be increasing resilience amongst programme participants against radicalization/recruitment into militant groups and/or repatriation to Somalia, hope and optimism are under-explored mechanisms worth further investigation in relation to increasing resilience (King, 2015).

Like in the previous section, though, the KAP survey presents data that suggests underlying assumptions—this time in reference to youth resilience—may already be even stronger than presumed. One attribute that is often considered in measuring resilience is self-efficacy (Reisman & Payan, 2015)—the extent or strength of one’s belief in his/her ability to complete tasks,

reach goals or effect change. The KAP asked a number of questions in this vein, both broadly, and in terms of educational decision-making. On a five-point scale (ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “nearly always”), respondents’ average response was 3.4 in response to the statement “I feel that I can achieve my goals” (n=677, SD=1.12). The response was 3.3 in response to the statement “I think of myself as a strong person” (n=667, SD=1.28), positioning both responses between “sometimes” and “usually.” Among the subsample of NRC beneficiaries, the averages in response to these questions were virtually identical to the broader sample.

Respondents also answered the question “I feel I can influence decisions made by agencies (i.e UNHCR, LWF, Care, Islamic Relief) on education services that affect me” and similar questions replacing agencies with “Kenya local/district government” and “Kenyan National Government.” Responses were again on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The average response was 3.6 (n=666, SD=1.07) in regards to agencies as compared to 3.4 for local/district governments (n=666, SD=1.13) and the Kenyan National Government (n=667,SD=1.09).<sup>35</sup> The frequency of different responses is captured in Figure 1 below. Of likely significance to PBEA, working with both the Kenyan government (see the companion study to this one, King & Monaghan, 2016) and implementing partners such as NRC for the YEP programme, “agencies” received the most numerous responses of “strongly agree.”

Figure 1: Ability to Influence Decisions



35 Both are statistically significant differences at p<0.1 (99 percent confidence interval).

It is very difficult, though, to make judgments as to whether these are strong or weak findings in relation to resilience, a concept that is very difficult to measure. On one hand, these scores may represent relatively high resilience in a context where youth face a multiplicity of challenges. On the other hand, considering the likelihood of social desirability bias, these may be actually quite low scores. If followed by a second panel survey, the second round of KAP may be able to detect changes over time, although, for reasons explained above, it would be difficult to rigorously attribute changes to any PBEA.

### 3.6 Summary Discussion

Using an analysis based on the PBEA theory of change, presented in Table 3, the report finds strong indicators of progress on one of three outputs (provision of the programme) and mixed evidence in regards to the other two outputs (culturally and economically “relevant” and “appropriate” education and programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment).

The study, although limited by its design, also finds mixed results in regards to outcomes. In perhaps the most promising avenue, preliminary signs of increasing levels of resilience were noted, at least in terms of increasing hope and optimism among refugees. That such perceived increases are disproportionate to objective gains (jobs, incomes) allude to many of the intangible outcomes for participants in the programme, particularly “hope,” diversions “from thinking about war,” or as one participant stated no longer, “being zero in my mind” due to lack of opportunity upon arrival in the camp to access formal education. The relationship between hope and optimism and resilience to radicalization and recruitment into militant groups are important areas for further research in relation to outcomes of PBEA YEP.

A number of questions also arise. For a variety of reasons ranging from global education policy priorities (i.e. EFA), which focus on the provision of formal primary schooling, to issues with transferability of academic credentials from countries of origin to camp schools, as well as GoK policy, youth in Dadaab have very limited opportunities to access education beyond basic primary education. The PBEA YEP programme is, very importantly, helping to fill this gap in education service provision in the camp. However

for the programme to be more than a stopgap measure for these youth, challenges they, along with teachers, parents, and NRC programme staff identified will need to be addressed. There are a number of questions that PBEA and NRC programme planners might consider in developing and implementing future YEP programming that addresses and ultimately helps to overcome these challenges:

- 1) Is the programme intended to provide youth with livelihood opportunities in Dadaab camp/town or in Somalia upon repatriation?
- 2) What are the goals for non-Somali youth?
- 3) What skills are useful and in demand amongst UN agencies and NGOs in the camp? Can these skills be taught as short-courses at YEP centres such that programme graduates are qualified for incentive wage employment? Alternately, can programme graduates apprentice with trained staff at UN agencies and NGOs (e.g. motor mechanics) to gain practical “on-the-job” experience that also helps to fulfill a need for skilled labor amongst UN agencies and NGOs?
- 4) What skills are useful and in demand in Somalia? Which of these skills, if any, overlap with those that are useful in Dadaab camp/town?
- 5) Is the YEP programme primarily targeting youth with little or no formal education or youth who completed several years of formal education? At present, which of these populations comprise the majority of programme participants?
- 6) Can the programme be a bridge to formal schooling for programme graduates or help participants from other countries in East Africa (e.g. South Sudan, DRC) transfer their academic certifications from their home country to Dadaab camp schools?
- 7) What more can be learned about the types of conflict in which youth participate in Dadaab camp/town? What drives these conflicts and youth participation?

Ultimately each question is designed to provide insight into the purpose(s) of refugee education. To ask and answer what is refugee education for also requires asking where is refugee education for? These questions are crucial for developing and implementing programming that is “relevant” and “appropriate” to refugees in Dadaab and/or in their home country.

# 4. Lessons Learned

This case study has focused upon the ways in which specific ToC have informed PBEA interventions, how these ToCs are intended to address known conflict drivers, and if and how these theories of change have been actualized through programming. Based upon the study findings and analysis, several lessons learned and recommendations are offered for each of these areas.

## 4.1 How specific ToC have informed PBEA interventions

- PBEA YEP is primarily intended to address and mitigate Somali refugee adolescent and youth radicalization more broadly and recruitment into militant groups in Dadaab and/or upon repatriation to Somali and facilitate repatriation to Somali through strengthening livelihood strategies and income-generating opportunities.
- Programming has increased perceptions of access to income generating opportunities for some programme participants and in some cases participants have gained increased access to employment.
- A number of programme participants are adolescent and youth from other countries (e.g. South Sudan, Burundi, Kenya) and are not accounted for directly in the ToC, outputs, and intended outcomes.

## 4.2 How these ToC are intended to address known conflict drivers

- PBEA ToC map on to some known conflict drivers (e.g. unequal economic development) in Dadaab camp/town.
- Although biases in responses are likely, and interpretations are difficult, KAP survey respondents indicate fewer grievances, less involvement in armed groups and weapon carrying, and stronger resilience than presumed in the ToC and beyond.
- There are differences between Somalis and

non-Somalis on a number of measures that warrant further investigation. For example, whereas Somalis feel less discriminated against than non-Somalis, non-Somalis rate the Kenyan government's provision of education "to help daily life" more highly than Somalis.

- In some ways, the programme may be exacerbating or reinforcing grievances between diverse communal groups.

## 4.3 Achievement of programme outputs and outcomes

- Programming has expanded access to education for youth, particularly newly arrived refugees from countries other than Somalia who otherwise are excluded from education in Dadaab camp/town. That some of the beneficiaries are not Somali, and thus not necessarily the intended beneficiaries (i.e. Somali youth who might repatriate to Somalia) of PBEA YEP programming, merits further consideration.
- In an effort to match the Dadaab and Somali-based demands to the courses offered, one new course in livestock production (implemented at the Hagadera YEP centre) has been added alongside Somali language as a component of all four-month short courses. All of the other courses are shortened versions of the one-year courses offered at NRC's YEP centres in Dadaab.
- The study identifies strong indicators on one of three outputs (provision of the programme to youth who may be at risk), and mixed evidence in regards to the other two outputs (culturally and economically "relevant" and "appropriate" education and programme graduates establishing businesses and/or gaining employment).
- The programme may be reaching youth who are at risk of violent behavior.
- Anecdotes suggest that the programme may increase hope and optimism among participants, which may be linked to resilience, an important outcome according to programme planners.

# 5. Recommendations

## 5.1 Strengthening evidence-base for programming

- UNICEF, in partnership with the NRC, should continue the exercise of more fully fleshing out the ToC and the observable implications they would expect to see at each step if the programme were indeed producing desired impacts.
- Extend/deepen research design for evaluation and consider more comparative (possibly experimental), longitudinal, on-going evaluations. Consider long-term partnerships with academics for rigorous research.
- Consider more explicitly, at the level of programme development and implementation, the ways in which programming might contribute to disputes or not. Include indicators for conflict in ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of programming (i.e. conflict-sensitive monitoring systems to help ensure 'Do No Harm' and timely programme adjustments to 'Do More Good' – or support peacebuilding).

## 5.2 Strengthening programme Implementation

- Given limited programme capacity and great need, ensure PBEA YEP is targeting the most at-risk youth.
- Do more to match skills taught with market opportunities in the desired location of employment (Dadaab/Somalia, urban/rural).

- Consider reducing group sizes to lessen the number of people amongst whom the start-up kit must be shared and/or possibilities to improve equitable division of start-up kits among group members.
- Explore possibilities for further facilitating the transition to employment including apprenticeships with implementing partners (possible given current security parameters), and placements or internships with existing businesses (if the security situation permits).
- Adopt a more explicitly gender-sensitive approach to programming that recognizes more limited employment opportunities for women and the challenges of prevalent norms and discrimination graduates and women, more generally, may face.
- Decide if and how non-Somali refugee youth are meant to engage in, and benefit from, PBEA YEP programming. Reconsider the ToC and consequent programming adjustments in light of decisions.
- Adapt programme to changing context (i.e. repatriation policies vs. reality) as .01 percent have actually repatriated since PBEA programming in Dadaab began.
- Further consider the importance of the hope and optimism the YEP programme appears to be generating.



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